Forum: Civil and General Aviation

I think we've all seen the news reports about this tragic incident and I want to extend my deepest condolences to the family of the child who lost his life in the car that was hit by the aircraft and also my deepest sympathies to the pilots who were involved.

From what I've seen and heard, this incident seems to have many different contributing causes - bad weather, short runways, and a very short overrun at the end of those runways. Reports have indicated that the jet only slid 200 feet after the nose gear collapsed, which seems like a very short distance to slide and wind up on a public road.

I've also heard that airports will soon be required to have 1,000 feet of overrun in the near future, but what can be done at airports like Midway? The pictures all show that the airport is bordered by dense development on all sides, so how could they (and other similar airports) comply with this?

One last thing - the weather that night looked seriously nasty and (intrepid air traveler with limited experience that I have) I think that even I might have been nervous landing in that stuff! I've also seen times here in Vegas when there's a thunderstorm very nearby and they're still flying. By very nearby, I mean pretty much directly overhead Shocked

! I thougt flying in, near, or under thunderstorms was a big no-no with lightning, hail, windshear, and all?

While I know that the airlines need to get the passengers to their intended destination on time, there has to be some point where they call it off for safety's sake and divert to an alternate airport. I've seen that happen with fog and even smoke during the big San Diego wildfires a couple of years ago.

But what's the criteria for closing the airport or diverting a flight and who exactly makes that call? Can the pilots make a judgement call (without risking thier careers) and call for a divert? Is it the airline? Or is it the FAA who finally pulls the plug?

Thank you for bearing with me and reading all the way through as I know this is a lot to ask in one post and to put in one topic and thanks in advance for your replies!

F-16.net Sponsor

parrothead wrote:

I thougt flying in, near, or under thunderstorms was a big no-no with lightning, hail, windshear, and all?

But what's the criteria for closing the airport or diverting a flight and who exactly makes that call? Can the pilots make a judgement call (without risking thier careers) and call for a divert? Is it the airline? Or is it the FAA who finally pulls the plug?

Thunderstorms are bad news. I will not fly in, under or right next to them.

Pilots can (and should) make the call to divert. All ATC can do is provide as much pertinent information as possible, in time for it to be useful to the pilot. Controllers do not have the experience to make those decisions for pilots. Also, controllers do not have the authority to close an airport. Only airport management can do that, and that is kept to a minimum because the decisions about safety of flight should be made by the pilot. Any time a pilot cannot make those decisions, it is time for that pilot to think about a new career.

parrothead wrote:

One last thing - the weather that night looked seriously nasty and (intrepid air traveler with limited experience that I have) I think that even I might have been nervous landing in that stuff!

The factors which come into play, as to whether or not the approach and landing should be conducted at all, are:

----Type of instrument approach system available to the intended runway.

----Reported ceiling and visibility on that runway.

----Wind direction and velocity.

----Type of precipitation and intensity, if any.

----Runway length.

----Runway condition: How deep is any contamination, what kind of contamination, and what are the braking reports?

----Weight of the aircraft.

----Capability of the plane itself (is it certified to do autoland, and if so, which catagory of autoland?). In the case of SWA, I don't believe they have autoland capability, but they do have HUDs on some of their planes.

Assuming the ceiling and visibility is at or above minimums, the pilots have to check their landing weight charts, making adjustments as indicated for wind and contamination, to determine if the landing is permissable. If it is, and if such factors as windshear and/or freezing rain are not present, then there is no reason not to make the approach. If, during the approach, their speed and/or rate of sink exceeds certain required boundaries, or if they are unable to touch down in the first 1,000 ft., then they are REQUIRED to go-around.

Braking reports are crucial. If they are accurate, and if they are "fair" or better, then they can land, even on a short runway. However, if the braking report is "poor to nil," then the plane should proceed to the alternate airport.

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

Last edited by EditorASC on Dec 11, 2005 - 08:54 PM; edited 1 time in total

parrothead wrote:

I've also seen times here in Vegas when there's a thunderstorm very nearby and they're still flying. By very nearby, I mean pretty much directly overhead Shocked

! I thougt flying in, near, or under thunderstorms was a big no-no with lightning, hail, windshear, and all?

While I know that the airlines need to get the passengers to their intended destination on time, there has to be some point where they call it off for safety's sake and divert to an alternate airport. I've seen that happen with fog and even smoke during the big San Diego wildfires a couple of years ago.

You are correct.

Flying in thunderstorms is prohibited. Additionally, it is required that any deviations around them be by certain minimum prescribed distances. Generally, the higher the altitude, the greater the required minimum distance is. Pilots also try to avoid overhangs, from out of the top of TSs, because of the risk of hail coming down in the clear. Hooks and scallops, sticking out from the storm are also to be avoided, by safe distances too, since they are often indicators of the formation of tornadoes.

Some pilots have tried to penetrate squall lines, when they think they see a clear corridor between the cells. Not a good idea. Braniff lost two airliners that way.

Many years ago, I read an extensive article in Flying Magazine, about the nature of squall lines. It was written by a meteorology professor, and his thesis was that the individual cells, in the squall line are often tied together with invisible tornado tubes. One end comes out of the top of one cell, and goes down to the bottom of the adjoining cell, lacing the entire squall together, like a well-knitted sweater.

I don't think that theory has ever been proved to a reasonable certainty, but it does provide a pretty good theoretical explanation of why some planes (usually GA planes) have suddenly disintegrated in the clear air between cells of a squall line. That is precisely what happened to one Braniff jet over Nebraska.

Pilots are not supposed to attempt landings at airports when TSs are too close or on top of the airport, mainly because of the risk of microburst windshear. Failing to follow that policy, was an important contributing cause of both the DAL DFW, L-1011 accident and the AMR LIT, MD-80 accident.

Unfortunately, though they are rare, there have been pilots who place their airliners at risk, by deliberately violating safety SOPs, in regards to conducting approaches to airports, outside of the boundaries of required safety parameters.

I call those the "testosterone" approaches, because the pilots seems hell bent on proving his manhood, by refusing to go-around, when things get out of hand. It is the "any approach can be salvaged" attitude, which unfortunately, has killed many innocent, trusting passengers over the years.

UAL 727 at SLC, 1965.

AMR MD-80 at LIT, 1999.

SWA 737, BUR, 2000.

Among others........

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

ATC and Robert,

Thanks for your replies Very Happy

!!! I've wondered about that quite a bit and it may be that my untrained eye thought the thunderboomers were closer than they actually were Wink

. It makes me feel a whole lot better knowing that it's the pilots who make the final decision. I'm still curious, has a pilot ever been punished by an airline for refusing to take off or land due to weather that he or she considered out of limits?

I'm also still concerned about those short runway airports like Chicago Midway and Lindbergh Field (I'm from San Diego, so Lindbergh is of special concern). I saw on a news report that some airports have installed what's basically styrofoam at the end of thier runways to assist in arresting a sliding or overrunning aircraft. Is this enough and is it a viable solution to short overruns at most airports?

Thanks again for your insights!

Last edited by EditorASC on Dec 11, 2005 - 09:36 AM; edited 1 time in total

parrothead wrote:

It makes me feel a whole lot better knowing that it's the pilots who make the final decision. I'm still curious, has a pilot ever been punished by an airline for refusing to take off or land due to weather that he or she considered out of limits?

I have never heard of that happening.

The FARs make it very clear that the Captain is the final authority on when it is safe to fly and when it is not. No airline would ever attempt to punish a Captain for exercising the authority which the Federal Regulations gives him. If any airline managements were dumb enough to try, the sudden publicity would probably get that management guy fired, and the company fined for attempting to interfere with the Captain's lawful and required authority.

The Captain is required to not take off, or to not land, whenever the FAR limits are being exceeded (weather, visibility, wind, weights, etc.). Additionally, the Captain has the authority to be more conservative and less permissive than the limiting regulations, if he so desires. He is the final decision maker, by law.

If he decides to bust the limiting regulations, then he can be punished by both company and the FAA, but it he decides to operate in a less permissive manner, than the regulations permit, no one can punish him, because he has the lawful authority to be more conservative, if he so chooses.

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

Last edited by EditorASC on Dec 11, 2005 - 09:51 AM; edited 1 time in total

parrothead wrote:

I'm also still concerned about those short runway airports like Chicago Midway and Lindbergh Field (I'm from San Diego, so Lindbergh is of special concern). I saw on a news report that some airports have installed what's basically styrofoam at the end of thier runways to assist in arresting a sliding or overrunning aircraft. Is this enough and is it a viable solution to short overruns at most airports?

Thanks again for your insights!

Actually, it's crushed concrete.

It is a viable solution where there is some room off the end of the runway, but not the recommended 1,000 ft. Trouble is, many runways have no extra room off the end at all. That is true at MDW and it is true at DCA, LGA, some of JFK's runways (water), etc.

BUR installed an EMAS overrun at the departure end of Runway 8, after the SWA crash of March, 2000. They had no extra land beyond the end of the runway, so they shortened it by 230 feet and installed EMAS (Engineered Material Arresting System) in that portion.

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

Great info, Robert Very Happy

!

Thanks for these replies! Now I know that I don't have to worry about the guy driving the jet worrying about whether or not he's going to lose his job if he thinks it ain't safe! I thought those were the rules, but I'd also heard stories otherwise. Thanks for the confirmation.

I hear you about the runways with no room at the end. I think Lindbergh (SAN) is that way. Come to think of it, I don't really think McCarren (LAS) has much if any overrun, either. I hope nobody ever winds up sliding onto the Strip from runway 25R or 25L Shocked

!

I've seen blast fences at every commercial airport I've been to, but I don't know if I've ever seen an arresting barrier. Do you have any pictures or specs on it? I can get the jist of what it is and what it does from its name, but how does it stop a jet? Is it anything like the net they put up on an aircraft carrier when someone's tailhook doesn't go down?

parrothead wrote:

Great info, Robert Very Happy

!

I've seen blast fences at every commercial airport I've been to, but I don't know if I've ever seen an arresting barrier. Do you have any pictures or specs on it? I can get the jist of what it is and what it does from its name, but how does it stop a jet? Is it anything like the net they put up on an aircraft carrier when someone's tailhook doesn't go down?

I just revised my post above, because the "arresting barrier" nomenclature wasn't the best description of the concept. The material is a special type of crushed concrete, which crumbles rather easily, when the weight of the wheels of an airliner rolls over it. That causes the wheels to sink in rapidly, and that provides very powerful braking to stop the plane.

See that newly edited post above.

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

Last edited by parrothead on Dec 12, 2005 - 07:24 AM; edited 1 time in total

Roger that, Robert Smile

.

Now that I look at the pics I found in a Google image search, that's the system they were showing on the news that they were calling "foam." Looks like a great solution to me!

I found some great information at http://www.esco-usa.com/com/com.html

parrothead wrote:

Roger that, Robert Smile

.

Now that I look at the pics I found in a Google image search, that's the system they were showing on the news that they were calling "foam." Looks like a great solution to me!

I found some great information at http://www.esco-usa.com/com/com.html.

I keep getting a "404 not found" message, when I tried that link.

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

EditorASC wrote:

You are correct.

Flying in thunderstorms is prohibited. Additionally, it is required that any deviations around them be by certain minimum prescribed distances. Generally, the higher the altitude, the greater the required minimum distance is.

Where did you find that flying in thunderstorms is prohibited? What are the minimum prescribed distances to deviate around them? What about the formula for distance to avoid vs height? How is the edge of a thunderstorm defined? I'm not questioning the stupidity of flying through thunderstorms, but I am curious about your references on this one.

ATC wrote:

EditorASC wrote:

You are correct.

Flying in thunderstorms is prohibited. Additionally, it is required that any deviations around them be by certain minimum prescribed distances. Generally, the higher the altitude, the greater the required minimum distance is.

Where did you find that flying in thunderstorms is prohibited? What are the minimum prescribed distances to deviate around them? What about the formula for distance to avoid vs height? How is the edge of a thunderstorm defined? I'm not questioning the stupidity of flying through thunderstorms, but I am curious about your references on this one.

Thunderstorms are defined with weather radar. Today most are of the color presentation variety, with red being the most severe, yellow somewhat less severe, and green being the least severe.

Part 121 Airlines are required to have Flight Operations Manuals (FOMs), which set down the rules for operating all flights, domestic and international.

Those FOMs contain all the company policies which are spelled out so as to ensure that all pilots and dispatchers comply with the minimum standards spelled out in FAR part 121. Those FOMs are approved by the FAA and any time any significant changes are made in the FOMs, the FAA must sign off on those changes.

Under the section "Severe Thunderstorm Avoidance":

"At Flight Altitudes Below the Freezing Level:"

"Avoid all detectable precipitation associated with the cell, to include green returns, by at least 10NM in the upwind quadrants, and 20NM in the downwind quadrants. (Use cruise winds aloft to determine quadrants.)"

"At Flight Altitudes Above the Freezing Level:"

Avoid all detectable precipitation associated with the cell, to include green returns, by at least 20NM, all quadrants."

In the case of Convective Showers, where the tops do not exceed 25,000 ft.:

"Avoid all detectable precipitation associated with the cell, to include green returns, by at least 5NM."

============================

Sec. 121.135 - Contents.

(a) Each manual required by §121.133 must --

(1) Include instructions and information necessary to allow the personnel concerned to perform their duties and responsibilities with a high degree of safety;

(2) Be in a form that is easy to revise;

(3) Have the date of last revision on each page concerned; and

(4) Not be contrary to any applicable Federal regulation and, in the case of a flag or supplemental operation, any applicable foreign regulation, or the certificate holder's operations specifications or operating certificate.

(b) The manual may be in two or more separate parts, containing together all of the following information, but each part must contain that part of the information that is appropriate for each group of personnel:

(1) General policies.

(2) Duties and responsibilities of each crewmember, appropriate members of the ground organization, and management personnel.

(3) Reference to appropriate Federal Aviation Regulations.

(4) Flight dispatching and operational control, including procedures for coordinated dispatch or flight control or flight following procedures, as applicable.

(5) En route flight, navigation, and communication procedures, including procedures for the dispatch or release or continuance of flight if any item of equipment required for the particular type of operation becomes inoperative or unserviceable en route.

(6) For domestic or flag operations, appropriate information from the en route operations specifications, including for each approved route the types of airplanes authorized, the type of operation such as VFR, IFR, day, night, etc., and any other pertinent information.

(7) For supplemental operations, appropriate information from the operations specifications, including the area of operations authorized, the types of airplanes authorized, the type of operation such as VFR, IFR, day, night, etc., and any other pertinent information.

( 8 ) Appropriate information from the airport operations specifications, including for each airport --

(i) Its location (domestic and flag operations only);

(ii) Its designation (regular, alternate, provisional, etc.) (domestic and flag operations only);

(iii) The types of airplanes authorized (domestic and flag operations only);

(iv) Instrument approach procedures;

(v) Landing and takeoff minimums; and

(vi) Any other pertinent information.

(9) Takeoff, en route, and landing weight limitations.

(10) Procedures for familiarizing passengers with the use of emergency equipment, during flight.

(11) Emergency equipment and procedures.

(12) The method of designating succession of command of flight crewmembers.

(13) Procedures for determining the usability of landing and takeoff areas, and for disseminating pertinent information thereon to operations personnel.

(14) Procedures for operating in periods of ice, hail, thunderstorms, turbulence, or any potentially hazardous meteorological condition.

(15) Each training program curriculum required by §121.403.

(Truncated)

=============================

Excerpt from the NTSB Accident report on DAL at DFW, 1985:

The Delta Flight Operations Procedures Manual states that below 10,000 feet,
thunderstorms are to be avoided by 5 miles. Furthermore, the Delta company publication
Up Front published an article on microbursts which stated in part, “Microbursts occur
from cell activity. Do not take off or land directly beneath a cell, whether it is
contouring or not.” Although the article contained a disclaimer, Delta’s Systems Manager
for Training stated that the article was not contrary to company policy and, in addition,
Delta would not permit material contrary to the company’s flight procedures and policies
to be presented to its flightcrews in Up Front.

On May 4, 1976, Delta issued Flight Operations Bulletin No. 76-25 to all its
pilots. The subject of the bulletin, which is still in effect, is Spearhead Echo and
Downburst Near the Approach End of Runway 22L at JFK Airport on June 24, 1975. The
%-page bulletin, a condensation of a research paper prepared by Dr. T. Theodore Fujita
of the University of Chicago, was based on his investigation of the meteorological data
involved in the crash of Eastern Air Lines flight 66, a Boeing 727, at John F. Kennedy
Airport, Jamaica, New York, on June 24, 1975.
Delta also publishes a bimonthly publication Up Front that is issued to all
Delta cockpit crews. According to the Systems Manager, the company’s policy is to make
items of timely interest available to all of its pilots, and Up Front is one of the main
vehicles for doing this. The publication has included articles on the aerodynamic effects
of heavy rain, windshear, and microbursts. One of the articles on microbursts stated in
part, “Microbursts occur from cell activity.
cell, whether it is contouring or not.”
Do not take off or land directly beneath a
The article also contained the following disclaimer:
“This article does not necessarily reflect the views of Delta Flight Operations.ff
The Systems Manager was asked, “Considering these two statements, is there
anywhere in Delta’s program where they officially tell pilots not to take off or land
directly beneath a cell?‘I The Systems Manager replied,
I think it’s implied, and can certainly be inferred, that if we tell pilots to
avoid thunderstorm activity by five miles below ten thousand feet, that
that would be in that. I see nothing in this article which conflicts with
Delta policy. It’s just that that is a generic statement stating that this is
not an official Delta policy statement, this is an article written by
someone who is functioning in a capacity other than as a spokesman for
Delta.
He was also asked if he or whoever is responsible for the contents of Up Front would
permit anything to be published therein which would be contrary to the Delta training
procedures or policies. He responded, “No.”

==========================

That was almost 20 years ago. The policies contained in industry FOMs have been tightened considerably since then.

"DISPATCH AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS POLICY:

Flights will be planned and avoid severe thunderstorm areas. The Captain and Dispatcher are responsible for ensuring that the planned route is compatible with the weather. The use of airborne radar and en route deviation are secondary tactics. All flights require the use of airborne radar operate under the policy that radar equipment is an aid to detouring severe weather associated with thunderstorms, rather than as a penetration tool."

"If storm activity in the terminal area is such that recommended cell clearance cannot be maintained, the Captain will consider the following:

----Detouring the area or landing at an alternate airport, if necessary, to avoid a thunderstorm encounter.

----Holding at the gate, or delaying takeoff if not yet airborne, until the activity lessens and the Captain determines that a safe departure can be conducted....

Takeoffs, approaches and landings should not be attempted when thunderstorms are near the airport unless the runway and flight path are clear of the thunderstorm effects and their associated gust fronts."

==================

Robert J. Boser
Editor,
http://AirlineSafety.Com

Again, great stuff, Bob Smile

!

I'll have to watch more carefully when the thunderstorms return to Vegas.

I also fixed that URL link regarding the EMAS barrier Wink

.

Forum: Civil and General Aviation

Chicago Midway 737 Crash and Airport Safety