Forum: General F-35 Forum

maus92 wrote:

megasun wrote:

I have the impression that it will be a number like that.
In the latest Air Force Aircraft Procurement document, FY13, the projected F-35 Flyaway Unit Cost after FY2017 will lower to 107 million. And it is more than last year's document, which projected to something around 90 million.
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/
While Super Hornet 2011 Flyaway Unit Cost is something like 55 million.

SpudmanWP wrote:

When you look at the year to year changes in Flyaway estimates, you must consider the context.

In the FY2012 budget, the total production from 2013 to 2016 was 184 F-35As (with a Flyaway in FY2016 of $89mil). In the FY2013 budget, they gutted this buy to a total of 118 (with a FY2016 flyaway of $111). The reduction was 36% with only an increase in price of 25%. You cannot gut a program that much and still expect the prices to remain anywhere near the same.

The F-35B&C programs were even cut by a larger margins, 38% for the B and 64% for the C.

btw, the latest F-18E Flyaway cost is $82 mil, not $55. (you also are comparing REC Flyaway of the F-18 with the Full Flyaway of the F-35).

We need to be specific when using a "flyaway" cost, because mixing the flavors clouds the issue.

URF for F-35A in FY2017 is estimated to be ~$89M [4,268.058/48] - the cheapest year.

URF for F-18E/F in FY2013 is estimated to be ~$54M [1,413.401/26] - the cheapest year (production authorization ends in FY2014 with a buy under minimum sustainable rate)

The URF is calculated by dividing Flyaway-Total Recurring Cost by units ordered, since Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) is not reflected directly in the budgets.

Sources: USAF PB FY2013, USN PB FY2013

As a clarification, 2017 is the cheapest year in this budget document at 350 units produced. The true cheapest year will probably be 2021 (and thereafter) with 870 units produced. Thats when you'll see it reach around 75 million.

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arkadyrenko wrote:

... The problem with the JSF is that it combined a massive important step for the USAF, wholesale replacement of the F-16, with pretty high technological risk.

1. So the alternative is take the planes we'll depend on the most and buy the most of, then relegate them to mediocrity and potential early obsolescence, through the use of established (and therefore, surpassable) technology. Mind you, they're still not exactly free to develop.

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How to advance forward in technology? I would advocate for the short run construction of 'elite' aircraft, highly specialized and advanced airframes for specific tasks, which then prove the tech that will be rolled into the next major aircraft purchase.

2. And then make up for the fact that most of your air force is flying junk, by spending the entire development cost of making fantastic planes (i.e., a cost equivalent to developing the F-22 or any one variant of the F-35) on small production runs. Essentially, entire runs of LRIP planes still in testing. And then, to top it off, expect these planes to be really, really good, even though there are only a handful of them to work out the bugs on. And naively think that technologies used in a plane designed to do a specific task are widely applicable to other planes. How many planes out there are flying with pieces of SR-71 in them? Or pieces of B-2? Was the F-16 flying around with pieces of F-117 in it, or were the specialized F-117s flying around with the F-18's engines and the F-16's flight control computers? When you have a plane that can do anything reasonably well, its parts are more likely to work reasonably well in a plane that has to do only one of those things.

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The corollary is that the purchase cycle has to be accelerated and the USAF will have to accept a wider range of airframes on the flight line.

3. And then we're going to have to do 2. repeatedly. And bear the added costs of maintenance, training, and logistics for having multiple types. And bear the reduced operational readiness of needing to move a logistical footprint ahead of or concurrently with moving the planes to a trouble spot.

Or...we can recognize that the very, very important planes are worth nearly any development cost, then develop a hearty stomach for the cost because you spend that cost only once, and leapfrog way ahead of obsolescence. When something is important, it's smart to pay for it. Recognize also that while it's not cheap to make a plane do ten things well (and it may not do any of them as well as an imaginary perfect plane for each task), it is actually cheaper than developing ten planes. Plus, even if your plane isn't as good a CAS plane as an A-10, nor as good an air dominance fighter as the F-22, nor as good a bomber as the B-2, 1000 of them means you have 1000 80% A-10s, 1000 80% F-22s, and 1000 50% B-2s when you need each type, as opposed to being limited to a lesser buy of each type. When you buy huge numbers of them, you spread that development cost over many airframes to reduce its per-airframe impact, and also get the most possible use out of the development money you spent. Then you can use them for years and years and not spend the money again for a good long time, because the plane you spent a lot on is better than what your opponents will be able to afford to develop for half a century. And cut logistics costs on top of it all because every part you buy fits all your planes, plus you only need a small reserve of the parts that aren't replaced in scheduled maintenance. And then have just about every friendly landing strip on the planet able to service your most important planes on very short notice.

Personally, I would add in one-off or two-off X-planes in greater numbers than we have today. We do spend way too little on basic research now. But I wouldn't make them operational fighters in fieldable numbers. Strictly testbeds for one or two technologies, never intended to fly outside a test range, or see the front side of a Congresscritter. The USSR built a lot of their navy the way you suggest building aircraft, actually fielding single-boat "types" as operational units. Ask the crew of the K-19 how that worked out. Or ask who won the Cold War, the country developing the amazing, adaptable aircraft, or the country developing the heavily compromized one-trick ponies? Even Russia moved on to building generalist, expensive aircraft with the Su-27 family.

Thanks, comparing Recurring Flyaway Cost makes more sense.
I see F-22 cheapest REC Flyaway is around $135M in FY2009, with airframe 84M, Engines $22.6M, Avionics $27.5M

maus92 wrote:

megasun wrote:

I have the impression that it will be a number like that.
In the latest Air Force Aircraft Procurement document, FY13, the projected F-35 Flyaway Unit Cost after FY2017 will lower to 107 million. And it is more than last year's document, which projected to something around 90 million.
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/
While Super Hornet 2011 Flyaway Unit Cost is something like 55 million.

SpudmanWP wrote:

When you look at the year to year changes in Flyaway estimates, you must consider the context.

In the FY2012 budget, the total production from 2013 to 2016 was 184 F-35As (with a Flyaway in FY2016 of $89mil). In the FY2013 budget, they gutted this buy to a total of 118 (with a FY2016 flyaway of $111). The reduction was 36% with only an increase in price of 25%. You cannot gut a program that much and still expect the prices to remain anywhere near the same.

The F-35B&C programs were even cut by a larger margins, 38% for the B and 64% for the C.

btw, the latest F-18E Flyaway cost is $82 mil, not $55. (you also are comparing REC Flyaway of the F-18 with the Full Flyaway of the F-35).

We need to be specific when using a "flyaway" cost, because mixing the flavors clouds the issue.

URF for F-35A in FY2017 is estimated to be ~$89M [4,268.058/48] - the cheapest year.

URF for F-18E/F in FY2013 is estimated to be ~$54M [1,413.401/26] - the cheapest year (production authorization ends in FY2014 with a buy under minimum sustainable rate)

The URF is calculated by dividing Flyaway-Total Recurring Cost by units ordered, since Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) is not reflected directly in the budgets.

Sources: USAF PB FY2013, USN PB FY2013

$54M is recurring nonsense. That number is CFE only and thus does not include those items funded as separate GFE or off budget in the OCO accounts; the list is long, to wit -- MIDS, JHMCS, AESA, IRST, and Correction of Discrepancies at 2000, 4000 and 6000 hours.

1st503rdsgt wrote:

Arkadyrenko has stated on a recent post that the F-35 is in development hell. I agree, but what constitutes a good weapons development program and why? Ideas? Examples?

One that has parts in every political district, is free, and all the fanboys think looks kewl. Rolling Eyes

quicksilver wrote:

maus92 wrote:

megasun wrote:

I have the impression that it will be a number like that.
In the latest Air Force Aircraft Procurement document, FY13, the projected F-35 Flyaway Unit Cost after FY2017 will lower to 107 million. And it is more than last year's document, which projected to something around 90 million.
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/
While Super Hornet 2011 Flyaway Unit Cost is something like 55 million.

SpudmanWP wrote:

When you look at the year to year changes in Flyaway estimates, you must consider the context.

In the FY2012 budget, the total production from 2013 to 2016 was 184 F-35As (with a Flyaway in FY2016 of $89mil). In the FY2013 budget, they gutted this buy to a total of 118 (with a FY2016 flyaway of $111). The reduction was 36% with only an increase in price of 25%. You cannot gut a program that much and still expect the prices to remain anywhere near the same.

The F-35B&C programs were even cut by a larger margins, 38% for the B and 64% for the C.

btw, the latest F-18E Flyaway cost is $82 mil, not $55. (you also are comparing REC Flyaway of the F-18 with the Full Flyaway of the F-35).

We need to be specific when using a "flyaway" cost, because mixing the flavors clouds the issue.

URF for F-35A in FY2017 is estimated to be ~$89M [4,268.058/48] - the cheapest year.

URF for F-18E/F in FY2013 is estimated to be ~$54M [1,413.401/26] - the cheapest year (production authorization ends in FY2014 with a buy under minimum sustainable rate)

The URF is calculated by dividing Flyaway-Total Recurring Cost by units ordered, since Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) is not reflected directly in the budgets.

Sources: USAF PB FY2013, USN PB FY2013

$54M is recurring nonsense. That number is CFE only and thus does not include those items funded as separate GFE or off budget in the OCO accounts; the list is long, to wit -- MIDS, JHMCS, AESA, IRST, and Correction of Discrepancies at 2000, 4000 and 6000 hours.

The only nonsense is most of what you just wrote. OCO are zeroed for FY2013 for the F-18. MIDS, AESA, JHMCS, ATFLIR are standard equipment in new F-18s, and included in total recurring cost as either GFE or CFE - thus reflected in the URF figure. All aircraft, including the F-35, have or will have discrepancies to correct in their service life, and modifications funded from different areas of the budget.

@ Maus 92. Still, Australia did pay $6.6 billion, 24 F18’s (spares, including maintenance etc.)

So, in comparisson, how much would the F35A Australia will cost in your opinion? F35 in full production, 24 F35A’s and a same package deal as the Australian F18 deal.

I just wanted to share a conversation from two years ago with someone that was involved in USAF procurement and this is what he said:

That is a rather loaded question but here goes on some of the really simple building blocks of a successful program.

1. Do a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the operational needs for the upcoming 10 year period. And how the intended weaponsystem fits into the force structure.
The F-35 program did not!

2. Clearly and precisely define what the weapon system performance and operational capabilities are to be before setting the details down in a contract.
The F-35 program did not!

3. Award a well documented and defined binding contract to a contractor capable of completing the development contract within the parameters, schedule, and pricing.
The F-35 program did a very poor job of disciplined and responsible contracting.

4. Having clearly defined the item and services to be purchased - and they did not - then don't tinker with the design and the parameters in the middle of the design and development process.
The F-35 program continues to adjust and change operational and design parameters - keep moving the goal posts - through a process known as "unpriced change orders". This is the kiss of death to holding the pricing structure in check.
The F-35 program began 'adjusting' the development program from the very beginning thus losing the design baseline, the basic configuration baseline, and shooting the costing and development schedule discipline right between the eyes.

5. Once the program in on contract with an agreed to funding and pricing structure for the current and out years, do not mess with the money.
Our congress, our military leaders, and our development advocates in the pentagon kept 'adjusting' the funding in the current year and out years, as well as adjusting the number of units to be purchased, as well as tinkering with the number of units to be produced per month and per year. In my book that is criminal behavior.

In summary - nobody can run a program and make it produce in a predictable manner when the product was never precisely defined in the first place, and everyone is constantly directing changes be introduced which make an amorphous design even more smokey. The F-35 program is the perfect compilation of every dumb and incompetant thing that can be done in a single weapon system design, develolpment, and test program program.

A person could write volumes about all the bad and inept practices that have made the F-35 development program the Frankenstein it has come to be.

So there you have it - one man's opinion. But it is based on facts.

m wrote:

@ Maus 92. Still, Australia did pay $6.6 billion, 24 F18’s (spares, including maintenance etc.)

So, in comparisson, how much would the F35A Australia will cost in your opinion? F35 in full production, 24 F35A’s and a same package deal as the Australian F18 deal.

Back in FY2008, F/A-18E/F URF was essentially what it is today ~$55M [foreign customers pay no less than URF.] The Australians had some (if not all) of their -Fs prewired to ease conversion to EA-18Gs at some point in the future, so that may have added some costs. Procurement Cost - which adds various support costs and initial spares, therefore a more realistic / relevant number - was ~$89M in FY2008. For 24 units, that totals ~$2.1B.

From an article in Defense Industry Daily:

"In December 2006, therefore, The Australian reported that Defence Minister Brendan Nelson was discussing an A$ 3 billion (about $2.36 billion) purchase of 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet aircraft to fill the fighter gap. The move came as “a surprise to senior defence officials on Russell Hill”; but quickly became an official purchase as requests and contracts were hurriedly submitted. Australia’s new Labor government’s later decided to keep the Super Hornet purchase, rather than pay cancellation fees, but added an interesting option to convert 12 into electronic warfare planes. Ministerial statements place the program’s final figure at A$ 6.6 – 7.0 billion, which includes basing, training, and other ancillary costs."

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/aus ... jsf-02898/

So the December 2006 Australian ~$98M ($2.36B/24) number is about 10% more than the unitized US Procurement Cost of ~$89M. Remember that the Australians may have specified specific modifications that would result in an increased cost over what the US Navy paid for their aircraft. And the US Navy has a support and training infrastructure for the type built up over the years... The Australians would have to start theirs from scratch.

F16VIPER wrote:

I just wanted to share a conversation from two years ago with someone that was involved in USAF procurement and this is what he said:

I've talked to probably a half dozen people involved with the JSF Procurement and interviewed or discussed with dozens if not hundreds involved in procurement. Nearly everything you said in your post is just false or highly conestable.

F16VIPER wrote:

That is a rather loaded question but here goes on some of the really simple building blocks of a successful program.

1. Do a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the operational needs for the upcoming 10 year period. And how the intended weaponsystem fits into the force structure.
The F-35 program did not!

That's frankly the most ridiculous thing ever said EVERY program goes through a stringent analysis. It doesn't even gets past milestone A without that.

for your reference, this is what is needed:

https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=332392#reg

F16VIPER wrote:

2. Clearly and precisely define what the weapon system performance and operational capabilities are to be before setting the details down in a contract.
The F-35 program did not!

Again, programs do not get past Milestone A without that. Actually the JSF program had nearly a decade of doing that as part of the JAST and its predcessors.

F16VIPER wrote:

3. Award a well documented and defined binding contract to a contractor capable of completing the development contract within the parameters, schedule, and pricing.
The F-35 program did a very poor job of disciplined and responsible contracting.

.... ummm no.... just no.

F16VIPER wrote:

4. Having clearly defined the item and services to be purchased - and they did not - then don't tinker with the design and the parameters in the middle of the design and development process.
The F-35 program continues to adjust and change operational and design parameters - keep moving the goal posts - through a process known as "unpriced change orders". This is the kiss of death to holding the pricing structure in check.
The F-35 program began 'adjusting' the development program from the very beginning thus losing the design baseline, the basic configuration baseline, and shooting the costing and development schedule discipline right between the eyes.

I urge you to find me a single program (that is not COTS or a rework of an existing system), that did not have some sort of requirements changing involved. ALL programs with significant R&D has it happen. This actually can even help make the program cheaper, because the anticipated cost of a previously stated capability is just too high (like the F-35's range KPP)

F16VIPER wrote:

5. Once the program in on contract with an agreed to funding and pricing structure for the current and out years, do not mess with the money.
Our congress, our military leaders, and our development advocates in the pentagon kept 'adjusting' the funding in the current year and out years, as well as adjusting the number of units to be purchased, as well as tinkering with the number of units to be produced per month and per year. In my book that is criminal behavior.

So you would suggest that DoD just keep giving them money, even if they don't need it? or maybe not fund useful changes, when the program gets into trouble?

F16VIPER wrote:

In summary - nobody can run a program and make it produce in a predictable manner when the product was never precisely defined in the first place, and everyone is constantly directing changes be introduced which make an amorphous design even more smokey. The F-35 program is the perfect compilation of every dumb and incompetant thing that can be done in a single weapon system design, develolpment, and test program program.

Frankly, your post is so factually inaccurate, I really wonder where you got your information.

F16VIPER wrote:

A person could write volumes about all the bad and inept practices that have made the F-35 development program the Frankenstein it has come to be.

So there you have it - one man's opinion. But it is based on facts.

Well at least you're right about one thing here. It is an opinion. But its certainly not based on fact.

HB Pencil:
I did not write those things as I clearly indicated at the beginning of my post, and wanted to get some comments as I wondered if there divergent points of view.

"I just wanted to share a conversation from two years ago with someone that was involved in USAF procurement and this is what he said:"

I am a team leader for Architectural projects and have delivered projects up to $200 m in construction cost, and from that point of view, I am interested in understanding why the programme seems to be so stuffed up, however this is out of my league and do not have the expertise or the facts to make asessments, that is why I had a chat with this person to get his perspective of things, and that is it.

F16VIPER

F16VIPER wrote:

I just wanted to share a conversation from two years ago with someone that was involved in USAF procurement and this is what he said:

That is a rather loaded question but here goes on some of the really simple building blocks of a successful program.

1. Do a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the operational needs for the upcoming 10 year period. And how the intended weaponsystem fits into the force structure.
The F-35 program did not!

The F-35 is a 30-40 year program if not more. Looking at the needs 10 years out is like hanging curtains slightly ahead of your front bumper, then trying to drive. You may know exactly what your hoodline looks like without distractions, but the things you really need to know aren't there. However, going out farther than that, your evaluation of the situation becomes more based on guesswork than thorough analysis, and your predictions of needs become less precise and more speculative. In other words, your analysis is more likely to be dead wrong, and it becomes less useful to even do a careful analysis. You can try to predict the future, but you wind up with a much broader list of likely potential needs, and a worse "worst reasonably likely case" of severity of likely threats. To meet that, you have to try to procure nothing less than the best you can possibly afford. You have to just stomach the cost overruns because you don't know what future development will bring. Only that way it will at least have a good chance of being ready for all the possible future contingencies you can't meaningfully predict.

Quote:

2. Clearly and precisely define what the weapon system performance and operational capabilities are to be before setting the details down in a contract.
The F-35 program did not!

That's half-fair. We should perhaps have settled better with LM what they thought they definitely could develop as an absolute minimum within a set development time frame of 10 years or so. But on the other hand, they're developing new technologies, so they don't necessarily know how far they can take it or what non-obvious roadblocks may curtail the performance, delay the result, or raise the costs of some technology. It's not pure procurement, it's also guesswork about what actually will be available to procure in the future. For items absolutely critical to the aircraft (engine, basic flight performance, sensors), they should have been more precise and negotiated a safe but demanding minimum, at a set price. But with everything else (including engine, airframe, and sensors exceeding that baseline minimum whenever possible) they should've aimed for a pie in the sky standard they almost certainly could not meet, set a schedule of bonuses for exceeding minimums by various amounts, and settled for the absolute best LM could do as far as development goes rather than demand slavish adherence to contracted specifications. Transitioning to full production, if you really need to cut costs there will be ways to cut a great design down to the best you can afford. But you can't instantly develop things you didn't have in the first place. That has been where the majority of technological cost growth has come into the F-35, trying to crash-develop the most difficult technological problems on a tight budget, in order to meet existing performance specs. There has not been significant cost growth from haggling over performance specs.

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3. Award a well documented and defined binding contract to a contractor capable of completing the development contract within the parameters, schedule, and pricing.
The F-35 program did a very poor job of disciplined and responsible contracting.

Not even half fair. They had too much development work ahead of them to even know what it would be possible to build, much less how much anything would cost to build. Cost is minor and correctable within vast margins. With births and deaths over the life of the F-35, around a billion individual Americans (not even counting partner nations' citizens) will be paying for it. Each individual will need to pay around $1000 each for the F-35, over nearly their entire lives. Tripling the cost of it wouldn't over-burden anybody and it's nowhere near tripling. Getting the needed aircraft, and getting them as good as it was possible to get them, is more important than containing up-front costs. It's safer to have the planes be better than needed (and maybe overpay some relative to what hindsight will tell you should have been developed) than to have them be less than what is ultimately needed. Because if that happens you're up a creek without a paddle.

If they'd done their R&D ahead of time, separate from the actual procurement contract, then you'd be 100% right. But we don't do it that way. It's stupid and short-sighted, but we like to see a "product" for our investments rather than a list of products we then could make if we ever wanted to.

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4. Having clearly defined the item and services to be purchased - and they did not - then don't tinker with the design and the parameters in the middle of the design and development process.

100% in agreement. What was asked for originally should be good enough, or the original contract should have asked for more. If the contractor serendipitously finds something new and wants to make a change because they think it will improve the plane or lower the cost, let them justify it to a skeptical customer. The customer already agreed the original spec was at least acceptable, so the customer at least should stick to what was agreed on and not burden the contractor with forced changes.

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5. Once the program in on contract with an agreed to funding and pricing structure for the current and out years, do not mess with the money.
Our congress, our military leaders, and our development advocates in the pentagon kept 'adjusting' the funding in the current year and out years, as well as adjusting the number of units to be purchased, as well as tinkering with the number of units to be produced per month and per year. In my book that is criminal behavior.

Again here, 100% in agreement.

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In summary - nobody can run a program and make it produce in a predictable manner ...

I'd be less concerned about predictability of cost and exact timelines, and more concerned about making sure it's going to be at least good enough for worst realistic case scenarios 40-50 years out. But yes, at least some predictability is needed.

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...when the product was never precisely defined in the first place, ...

Often you just have to ask for everything that's reasonably possible, demand only a baseline minimum, and commission someone you trust to do their best at trying to provide the former, with a promise only of meeting the latter. Asking for exactly what you are sure can be done means you're going to, by design, fall short of the best you could've had. I'd take quality pushed as far as reasonably possible over knowing exactly how far the quality will be pushed.

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...and everyone is constantly directing changes be introduced which make an amorphous design even more smokey.

Agreed.

Quote:

So there you have it - one man's opinion. But it is based on facts.

Respectfully, I'd disagree about it being "based on facts." It's "based on" the opinion that those are good procurement practices in the first place, and merely "supported by" facts that the F-35 didn't follow those practices. They're definitely typical gub'mint procurement practices, and similar practices have been used to produce some very successful military aircraft. They're great rules for procuring something made of off the shelf parts. I think it's also fair to concede those practices make beancounters happy. That doesn't make them good practices. The beancounters aren't the end users. And the F-35 had to build the shelves, not procure parts off the shelf. In large part, we lucked out with prior procurement programs largely because they were bulked up with Cold War excesses. The careful, predictable procurement processes that led to the F-15, F-16, and F-18 were not so good. The predictions were wrong. In actual use, our "fighers" mostly do ground-attack tasks they were never designed for. They are able to meet the real needs only because Cold War excess allowed them to be grossly overdesigned for the jobs they originally were meant to do. In addition, they were rushed into production before everything was ready, possessing flaws worse than those plaguing the F-35, but with those flaws overlooked due to Cold War priorities and corrected after the planes were in full rate production. We're not seeing the F-35 in full production with its vertical stabilizers cracking off prematurely like with the early F-18s. With the F-35, we're (hopefully) getting a plane designed from the outset to do all the tasks it reasonably likely will be called upon to do in actual service, with its serious flaws corrected before full-rate production.

Here are the 2011 Budget figures amounting to $86.3M per F-18E/F and $91.6M per Growler. What cost do these represent?

http://www.defense.gov/releases/release ... seid=13531

DOD Certifies F/A-18 Multi-year Procurement

Today, the undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certified to Congress that the proposed F/A-18 multiyear procurement met statutory requirements, including substantial savings, for 124 F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft. The proposed agreement will run for four years, from fiscal 2010 through 2013.

Now that the Department of Defense has certified the multiyear procurement request, the Department of the Navy will continue to work with Congress to gain necessary legislative authorities required before the Navy may enter into a multiyear contract.

With this multiyear procurement, the Navy Department intends to acquire the remaining program of record for the 515 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and 114 EA-18G Growlers.

The Navy’s fiscal 2011 budget request, sent to Congress Feb. 1, includes $1.9 billion to buy 22 Super Hornets and $1.1 billion for 12 Growlers. In fiscal 2012, the Navy plans to buy 24 more Growlers and one Super Hornet, with 25 more Super Hornets in fiscal 2013.

The Department of the Navy is committed to reducing acquisition costs in delivering capability to the warfighter.

F16VIPER wrote:

I just wanted to share a conversation from two years ago with someone that was involved in USAF procurement and this is what he said:

That is a rather loaded question but here goes on some of the really simple building blocks of a successful program.<snip>

So there you have it - one man's opinion. But it is based on facts.

Your guy had it right, F16VIPER. His points almost exactly frame the disaster that was the A-12 program from MacAir/GD.

The F-35's advantage is that they actually flew a prototype but science fair exhibit and mass production are two different projects.
fisk

river_otter wrote:

F16VIPER wrote:

I just wanted to share a conversation from two years ago with someone that was involved in USAF procurement and this is what he said:

That is a rather loaded question but here goes on some of the really simple building blocks of a successful program.

1. Do a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the operational needs for the upcoming 10 year period. And how the intended weaponsystem fits into the force structure.
The F-35 program did not!

The F-35 is a 30-40 year program if not more. Looking at the needs 10 years out is like hanging curtains slightly ahead of your front bumper, then trying to drive. You may know exactly what your hoodline looks like without distractions, but the things you really need to know aren't there. However, going out farther than that, your evaluation of the situation becomes more based on guesswork than thorough analysis, and your predictions of needs become less precise and more speculative. In other words, your analysis is more likely to be dead wrong, and it becomes less useful to even do a careful analysis. You can try to predict the future, but you wind up with a much broader list of likely potential needs, and a worse "worst reasonably likely case" of severity of likely threats. To meet that, you have to try to procure nothing less than the best you can possibly afford. You have to just stomach the cost overruns because you don't know what future development will bring. Only that way it will at least have a good chance of being ready for all the possible future contingencies you can't meaningfully predict.

I kinda find this entire discussion off the mark and cringing to listen to. I've worked in this field and know quite a few people who are involved in it. Both Canada and the US has research arms that are dedicated to future warfare. This is the Canadian Army's group.

Certainly its a lot of guesswork involved with the field and there is no "right answers." Even when you get it right, you wouldn't know it; it can always be made better. I've been reading alot of nuclear weapons history lately; how do you assess the cost-benefit of the Trident series of missiles? Its nearly impossible. Furthermore you'll never anticipate the gamechanging changes like the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However its a critical function nonetheless and every major program goes through it... its impossible to move forward without it because its essential for justifying the expenditure, which is why I posted the milestone A requirements above. Its a bit easier today as the strategic environment is somewhat more stable and the needs are easier to assess. Back in the mid 1990s its was a mess. Now we know we need to be prepared to fight a full spectrum of combat operations with the F-35, including full blown conventional war with China.

That's why the original poster's assertion that the program did not do "a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the operational needs" is false and fundamentally ridiculous if you're familiar with US procurement. How would you set your performance needs if you didn't have an idea about what the operational threats might be in the future?

Forum: General F-35 Forum

So What Makes a Good Weapons Program Anyways?