Forum: F-35 Lightning II

maus92 wrote:

The comments of the KC-130 pilot - who has probably seen many Harrier tanking evolutions - should not be dismissed out of hand. Plenty of other naval aviators (usually not senior officers guarding their careers, legacies, or prospects) have questioned the value (capability / effectiveness / decisiveness vs. cost) of STOVL...

...The point is the KC-130 pilot is not some sort of heretic deserving no attention. Plenty of others share his viewpoint in what continues as long and ongoing debate.

Right. We should accept not only the 'word' of any critic, but also the insinuations and purposeful sophisms of those who would have us believe all Marine Corps senior leaders are toady careerists, devoid of intellect, experience, and perspective -- and above all -- lacking integrity.

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quicksilver, thanks you have perfectly described the 'elp syndrome' "...senior leaders are toady careerists, devoid of intellect, experience, and perspective -- and above all -- lacking integrity". Very Happy

Thanks.

Perhaps this perspective on the usefulness of the F-35 will be helpful (sadly for whatever reason I cannot download the document - I hope it is good - nevertheless).

http://www.blackfive.net/main/

has a recent story entitled 'call not to repeat history'
Posted By McQ • [January 31, 2012]

with the link as seen below (in text of the author as such
'RAdm John Stufflebeem (USN, Ret)'

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v& ... &pli=1

Last edited by hb_pencil on Jan 31, 2012 - 09:38 PM; edited 1 time in total

sluf wrote:

The USAF would be wise to re-examine the issue of basing operability and availability to see how STOVL capability could contribute. Way back in time during the Cold War there was an exercise called Salty Demo designed to see what the Soviets might be able to do to our basing operability. The results were frightening so we did what rigid bureaucracies do when they don't like the facts--they ignore them. Now technology for attacking bases has improved significantly, but we continue to ignore the problem. Ask how often "realistic" Red Flags address the issue of basing operability? Does exercise realism begin only when the wheels are in the well and end when they come back down again? Would the Chinese do anything to ruin this approach to airpower?

I think in the most likely Taiwan defence scenario, one has to realize that there are over a dozen bases where an F-35 can operate from and reach Taiwan with only one refuel. Given the prevalence of allied BMD systems its nearly impossible for the Chinese to knock them out. In the next few years there will be over 20 Pac-3 missile defense sites in Japan alone, and eight SM-3 dedicated warships... with a nominal capacity of about 500 missiles. If there is some advanced warning, you're looking at the US military easily adding another 500 missiles within a week or so (THAAD, Patriot PAC-3, and Tico equipped SM-3s CGs are all very mobile.)

Unfortunately the geography means that there really is only one base where USAF aircraft can be based and do not require a refueling, Okinawa. Its likely to be overwhelmed by strikes. So I think the utility of a STOVL version to operate from a FRAP is all the more critical if the USMC commits its MEUs to taiwan and needs on station air cover/CAS.

maus92 wrote:

...In Desert Storm, Harriers operated out of conventional bases alongside CTOL aircraft.

Chuck has indeed been around a long time. So long, in fact, that he is regarded much like the neighborhood dog which barks at everything within sight or hearing. Problem is, some wonder if he has lost track of what he really believes. Seems he has an opinion on everything -- which, of course he is entitled to. But, he's not entitled to his own facts.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm Harriers were the most forward-based fixed wing assets in-theater and were amongst the first forces to arrive in SA (along with the FF Eagles and, obtw, the 82d Airborne). USMC Hornets arrived at nearly the same time but remained based in Bahrain. This was when no one was sure whether the Iraqis were going to come further south and the 82d was considered a speed bump as the force build-up continued. 66 jets operated out of the abandoned King Abdul Aziz naval base airfield, along with USMC OV-10s (not other TACAIR assets as Chuck implies). They lived in a soccer stadium. Could other jets have operated there? Of course, but not at the time they were needed because the airfield condition was so lousy. 3000+ Harrier sorties were flown out of KAA for the 6 weeks of the war. Another 20 Harriers flew off of Nassau in the northern end of the Persian Gulf.

maus92 wrote:

...In the opening days of Iraqi Freedom, only one Harrier squadron was operating ashore, and that shore base was a conventional field with long runways. The remaining five Harrier squadrons operated from amphibious ships in the northern Arabian Gulf. Fuel tanker availability constricted the use of FARPs because it was difficult to keep fuel moving forward with the rapidly advancing coalition forces. On the one occasion that Marine Corps Harriers were able to operate on the side of a highway outside Baghdad, the FARP was rocketed minutes after the aircraft departed. After that incident, STOVL forward operations were limited to captured enemy airfields."

No kidding. Fuel tanker availability was a limfac for every TACAIR asset in-theater. It is and has been in nearly every operation since DS/DS. Problem was, the other jets (except the Warthogs) had no realistic alternatives -- the Harriers did, and made use of them. 'Limited' to captured enemy airfields? More like an option the others didn't have.

maus92 wrote:

A statement from from Harrier pilot Ben D. Hancock, Maj, USMC:

“[T]he only two-lane road that the vast majority of USMC Harrier pilots have ever flown off of or landed on is Lyman Road in Camp Lejeune, N.C. In my own personal experience involving 1,300 hours of Harrier flight time which includes two deployments to the Mediterranean, a Western Pacific deployment, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I have never landed on a road or austere VSTOL pad except at Camp Lejeune.... Except to prove the concept, USMC AV-8Bs do not operate off of grass strips either. If STOVL jets will take-off with full internal fuel and any significant payload, then a lot more than just a pad is needed.” [Remember that F-35B is a significantly larger aircraft.]

"The STOVL Joint Strike Fighter in Support of the 21st Century Marine Corps," Thesis (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College)

Another statement from Hancock:

“When operating from unprepared surfaces, such as grass clearings or asphalt roads, the effect of vertical jet blast is swift and destructive. Since the exhaust is deflected downward in a hover or slow flight, a STOVL jet can dig a hole and tear up huge chunks of asphalt and flying debris that can either damage the airframe or be ingested into the engine.... The increase in thrust for the JSF (35,000 pound-thrust class engine versus 23,000 pound-thrust class for the Harrier) will increase the energy directed on the landing surface and may increase the possibilities for self-induced FOD.”

Interesting that one would cherry pick some observations from Ben's paper and ignore his thesis (from 1997, no less) turning it into a negative --

"The potential basing flexibility and firepower that the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter offers the Marine Corps in support of OMFTS will not be realized with the current doctrine and equipment that determines how we operate and support STOVL jets on amphibious ships and ashore in an expeditionary environment. Although the JSF will to be able to perform all of the missions currently flown by both the AV-8B and F/A-18 and do them better, the Marine Corps cannot just buy the aircraft without also having the ability to support it properly or to maximize its potential."

Read the whole paper. His plea to the service was to "make it better" -- to make the support system that enables expeditionary operations equal to the capability it was buying. The operational evidence of the subsequent 15 years suggests they have and they are.

Epilogue -- Col Ben Hancock is currently the Assistant Wing Commander, 2d MAW (Fwd), deployed to Afghanistan where the Marine Corps has been operating jets from an expeditionary forward base for nearly two years.

I guess there are three possible cases for STOVL, from what was presented here.

1) Land based expeditionary support. This has been discussed already, and it seems that STOVL is useful but hardly necessary. The costs in terms of bringing in supplies, security a landing pad, etc., probably make this a very much boutique capability.

2) Secondary fighters for airbases. This argument states that military's should develop airplanes capable of operating from runways when they've been cratered. The users in this case will be countries which face a clear and immediate threat on their runways. The obvious users are Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel. The less obvious user is the USAF for Guam and Okinawa.

3) Fighters for STOVL carriers. In previous threads, the value of STOVL carriers has been discussed to death.

Which of those reasons supports the Marine's need for STOVL? And in particular, their own stealthy STOVL airplane? Number 1 is a nice party piece, but as revealed with the Bold Alligator and the whole problem of logistics, is perhaps not necessary. Number 2 falls under the USAF, and note that the USAF has not put a lot of emphasis on base protection until very recently, when they started pouring concrete at Anderson AFB. Number 3, once again, nice to have but is it truly necessary and does it require stealth?

The problem with the F-35B is not that it has STOVL capability, it is that its STOVL requirement has tainted the rest of the program, most notably in the airframe. Had the F-35B been a separate program, one that ran parallel to the other two variants but with a different airframe, then the JSF program would probably have been better off. The STOVL plane could have been optimized to be STOVL, and the other two could have been better optimized for their roles. But that is the past, and the USAF/USN/USMC now get to live with the consequences of their decisions.

arkadyrenko, perhaps you are forgetting the use of 1) & 3) in combination? The F-35B will jump from one to the other and not necessarily go back to the same 1) or 3) and on and on...

quicksilver wrote:

maus92 wrote:

The comments of the KC-130 pilot - who has probably seen many Harrier tanking evolutions - should not be dismissed out of hand. Plenty of other naval aviators (usually not senior officers guarding their careers, legacies, or prospects) have questioned the value (capability / effectiveness / decisiveness vs. cost) of STOVL...

...The point is the KC-130 pilot is not some sort of heretic deserving no attention. Plenty of others share his viewpoint in what continues as long and ongoing debate.

Right. We should accept not only the 'word' of any critic, but also the insinuations and purposeful sophisms of those who would have us believe all Marine Corps senior leaders are toady careerists, devoid of intellect, experience, and perspective -- and above all -- lacking integrity.

Ever heard of the revolt of the Majors?

quicksilver wrote:

maus92 wrote:

A statement from from Harrier pilot Ben D. Hancock, Maj, USMC:

“[T]he only two-lane road that the vast majority of USMC Harrier pilots have ever flown off of or landed on is Lyman Road in Camp Lejeune, N.C. In my own personal experience involving 1,300 hours of Harrier flight time which includes two deployments to the Mediterranean, a Western Pacific deployment, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I have never landed on a road or austere VSTOL pad except at Camp Lejeune.... Except to prove the concept, USMC AV-8Bs do not operate off of grass strips either. If STOVL jets will take-off with full internal fuel and any significant payload, then a lot more than just a pad is needed.” [Remember that F-35B is a significantly larger aircraft.]

"The STOVL Joint Strike Fighter in Support of the 21st Century Marine Corps," Thesis (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College)

Another statement from Hancock:

“When operating from unprepared surfaces, such as grass clearings or asphalt roads, the effect of vertical jet blast is swift and destructive. Since the exhaust is deflected downward in a hover or slow flight, a STOVL jet can dig a hole and tear up huge chunks of asphalt and flying debris that can either damage the airframe or be ingested into the engine.... The increase in thrust for the JSF (35,000 pound-thrust class engine versus 23,000 pound-thrust class for the Harrier) will increase the energy directed on the landing surface and may increase the possibilities for self-induced FOD.”

Interesting that one would cherry pick some observations from Ben's paper and ignore his thesis (from 1997, no less) turning it into a negative --

"The potential basing flexibility and firepower that the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter offers the Marine Corps in support of OMFTS will not be realized with the current doctrine and equipment that determines how we operate and support STOVL jets on amphibious ships and ashore in an expeditionary environment. Although the JSF will to be able to perform all of the missions currently flown by both the AV-8B and F/A-18 and do them better, the Marine Corps cannot just buy the aircraft without also having the ability to support it properly or to maximize its potential."

Read the whole paper. His plea to the service was to "make it better" -- to make the support system that enables expeditionary operations equal to the capability it was buying. The operational evidence of the subsequent 15 years suggests they have and they are.

Epilogue -- Col Ben Hancock is currently the Assistant Wing Commander, 2d MAW (Fwd), deployed to Afghanistan where the Marine Corps has been operating jets from an expeditionary forward base for nearly two years.

It seems that we agree that Col. Hancock knows what he is talking about, and the implications of the added weight and thrust of JSF - in 1997. He points out the practical limitations of STOVL operations, and the amount of effort and expenditure required to make it work.

@arkadyrenko:
No one know more about handling logistics in support of troops ashore than the the Marines. It's a "corporate knowledge" earned thru decades of actual field experience and multiple wars and exercises. It's what allows the Marines to conduct and sustain operations from aboard ship to troops ashore and hundreds of miles inland if required. BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 is going to explore how new assets e.g. V-22, new-gen logistics ships, etc. can further enhance the Corp's expeditionary capabilities.
BA2012 is currently ongoing. Lessons will be gleaned after after weeks and months of review and analysis whichwill provide valuable input into the planning process. How you are able to pass judgment at this pointis hardly credible.

'maus92' referenced what I suggest is a paramount work on the transition from AV-8B to F-35B (from 1997 no less). 'maus92' extracts don't represent the work (seen on previous page (2) of this thread). With the discrepancy well highlighted by 'quicksilver'. [Pity the 'ski jump' idea did not gain traction - but I digress] Very Happy

I rather like Hancock's Summary+Conclusion as extracted here (from very long thread). Pretty good value really and highlights what the USMC have been planning for and the basis of Bold Alligator 2012 - so enjoy:

Possibility small STOVL carrier USN/USMC

http://www.f-16.net/index.php?name=PNph ... ock#158889

Title: The STOVL Joint Strike Fighter in Support of the 21st Century Marine Corps
Author: Major Ben D. Hancock, United States Marine Corps (1997)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ancock.htm

Thesis: The potential basing flexibility and firepower that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) offers the Marine Corps in support of Operational Manuever From the Sea (OMFTS) will not be realized with the doctrine, mindset, and equipment that currently determines how we operate and support STOVL jets on amphibious ships and ashore in an expeditionary environment.

Background: In the 21st Century the JSF will replace both the F/A-18 and the AV-8B as the USMC fulfills its goal of an all-STOVL aviation component. STOVL aircraft increase basing flexibility which is fundamental to the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and provides the foundation for improved responsiveness. OMFTS seeks to avoid establishing a traditional logistics base ashore and the majority of firepower, to include aviation, will remain afloat and only go ashore if necessary. This means that the JSF will operate primarily from naval ships versus land bases. The JSF will be a far more capable aircraft than the AV-8B, but if the shipboard environment that it operates in is one which remains marginalized and biased against effective fixed-wing operations, we will not fully realize the JSF's firepower and flexibility.

Forward basing tactical aircraft reduces the distance to the battlefield and improves response times and aircraft surge rates. Operating jet aircraft from dispersed sites is a big logistical challenge. The Marine Corps does not have enough equipment to supply significant amounts of fuel and ammo to maneuver units. Relying almost exclusively on aviation to supply forward bases will place an enormous burden on already limited vertical lift capability.

Recommendations: The Navy-Marine Corps team must develop and refine STOVL employment concepts that includes ramps (ski jumps) and smaller EAFs and it must fund the hardware and structural improvements that allow STOVL aircraft to operate in their intended environment. If we envision maintaining a primarily sea-based approach to conducting operations and we require responsive day/night air support in all-weather conditions, then we need to fundamentally change how we operate fixed-wing jets off amphibious ships. The most significant contribution that the Navy could make to STOVL air and helicopter-borne power projection is adding a ramp to all LHA/LHD class amphibious ships. A dedicated " JSF carrier", such as an LHA/LHD with a ramp and updated radars, would serve as the optimum mobile forward base.

Although the most effective means of employing the JSF would be to base it ashore as soon as possible, it should remain sea based for as long as possible where it can be more easily provided with fuel, ordnance, and maintenance without becoming a logistical burden. Seabasing may remain the best means of enhancing sustainability and reducing vulnerability."

Here is another 'blast from the past'.... Repeated earlier (with slightly different extract) here on the 'very long thread': http://www.f-16.net/index.php?name=PNph ... nke#206678

http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada520417.pdf

The STOVL Joint Strike Fighter—From a Harrier Skeptic 2002 Captain A.R. Behnke USMC

“...Harrier Argument: Skeptics of the AV-8 “Harrier” argue that STOVL is forever a flawed concept, and proof of this is readily available when you focus your attention on the Harrier....

...Carrier STOVL Operations/Ramps: For the Marine Corps and Navy to reap the full benefits of the STOVL JSF, it must be deployed on carriers. In addition, the Navy should modify both the Tarawa and Wasp class (LHA/LHD) ships to include a ramp (ski jump). These two issues are not received well by most naval officials. Their arguments are: STOVL aircraft on the carrier will hinder the deck cycle, & modifying the LHAs and LHDs with a ramp is too costly (in addition to losing one helicopter deck spot). However, it has been proven in many studies conducted by the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics (AIAA) that both would greatly assist the Navy in sortie rate & deck cycle impacts.

Carrier: On a carrier the operations of STOVL recovery and respot are greatly simplified. In addition, vertical landing pads on the port side of the carrier take up less area than the landing area required for normal carrier aircraft. This facilitates the simultaneous operations of launch, recovery, and respot. Therefore the flight deck is never fouled for any single operation, thus reducing the impact on sortie generation. For STOVL, the limiting factor of sortie generation then becomes aircraft servicing rate. Today’s CTOL carrier airwing has reached a near optimum level of mission perform-ance. That is, no increase in airwing size or availability will result in increased maximum sorties attainable....

…VSTOL, [STOVL more correctly these days] on the other hand, has been shown to be limited by the servicing cycle only. Here significant increases in sortie generation capability and decreases in numbers of aircraft required to support that capability are attainable simply by increasing the number of servicing crews. It is evident from this excerpt and other studies by AAIA that the STOVL JSF on the carrier will not hinder operations. In fact, it will contribute to a better deck cycle and more sorties.

LHA/LHD & Ramps: The next step the Navy should take in support of the Marine Corps & the STOVL JSF is to modify its LHAs & LHDs with a bow ramp. By doing so, the Navy will increase the combat payload a STOVL JSF can bring to the battlefield, while improving deck cycle. With a ramp on the bow of the ship, the STOVL JSF can take off in only 400 feet, freeing the aft end of the ship for concurrent helicopter & MV-22 operations. The Harrier’s takeoff performance was dramatically enhanced; the heaviest Harrier—31,000 pounds—ever from the deck of any ship was launched from the [Spanish carrier, Principe de Asturias] with a deck run of only 400 feet. An aircraft whose weight precluded its launch from any LHA or LHD, even using the entire deck, used the ski jump to take off in approximately one-half that distance.

Conclusion: The STOVL JSF is the correct aircraft...”

spazsinbad wrote:

'maus92' referenced what I suggest is a paramount work on the transition from AV-8B to F-35B (from 1997 no less). 'maus92' extracts don't represent the work (seen on previous page (2) of this thread). With the discrepancy well highlighted by 'quicksilver'.

Nor were the extracts meant to, and btw there was no discrepancy, only over-reaction by some. The Hancock quotes were imbedded in Jordan's paper, and the reference was pulled from the notes.

The purpose was to show that some modes of basing and operations that are touted / assumed by V/STOVL proponents are simply not practical, as observed by a Marine who flys the aircraft. "Austere" is not a roadside or grass field, it is a well prepared FOB with a runway long enough to support KC-130s for resupply. Fields with runways long enough for resupply can operate Hornets with arrestor gear (which was done with Corsairs in Korea.) When the KC-130s cannot handle the logistics, runways are extended to support C-17s. And there will not be enough MV-22s "in all Christendom" to support F-35Bs in the field.

The original post points out some important deficits in the F-35 forward basing concept in a deep inland campaign. If you read Navy and Marine planning papers and studies of their Frigate and Assault ship considerations, you will see a long pattern of excitement about the extended punch these vessels gain when you add a 5thGen aircraft to the aft platform (F-35B).
In parallel with this is the big crunch that will be arriving in the next decades concerning the ever increasing cost (and many say vulnerability) of Bush class fleet carriers.
If one suggests that the Marines convert their entire buy of F-35s from Bs to Cs, then you are also in effect forcing the basing decision of those Cs onto the fleet carriers as well. There will be fleet carriers in the future, just perhaps not sufficient quantities to host every Marine fixed wing aviation asset. So buy more Bush class fleet carriers??? If we have to add that fleet carrier cost into the Marine F-35C then the decision to buy F-35Bs is an easy one purely for financial reasons.

Forum: F-35 Lightning II

Value of STOVL jets, Harrier and F-35B questioned. Again.