Forum: General F-22A Raptor forum

Raptor_DCTR wrote:

pilotbrah wrote:

I find it terribly difficult to believe a Raptor driver making a 30+ second-long mistake without some sort of impairment or significant hindrance.

... He still has RAM air for ECS functionality. I will have to look at the checklist for the C BLEED AIR ICAW as I'm not sure it calls for retarding the throttles to idle, can't remember at the moment. It does not take that long to reach over and switch the air source to RAM air.....

Neither here nor there, but a couple points.
According to the report, when the BLEED AIR ICAW asserted he was at 1.2M at just over 50k. Don't have it in front of me, but I'm pretty sure that's out of the bleed air envelope (not by a whole lot, but out). In any case, it's a long way away from the optimal bleed air flight condition. Pretty sure the checklist calls for "minimum thrust setting practical" (or something like that). In this case he would have gone to IDLE anyway, as he would have been trying to get low and slow as soon as possible. I didn't see any mention of the RAM position in the report, which seems a bit curious. I assume it tries to work anyway, even if you are out of the envelope (probably not too effectively), but I don't know.
The timing and application of the control inputs also seem pretty telling. If it was only stick inputs you could make the argument that he was disoriented and trying to get back to wings level (unfortunately it would mean he was ignoring his instruments). But there's no reason in the world for him to be deliberately putting in rudder pedal inputs there - really makes it look like the inputs were the inadvertant result of him twisting or turning in the cockpit.

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So they were able to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the crash from the Raptor's flight data recorder? Radar track?
add edit: do military planes have black boxes?

popcorn wrote:

So they were able to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the crash from the Raptor's flight data recorder? Radar track?
add edit: do military planes have black boxes?

Don't know if radar track was used; it could have been. Yes to the other two questions. That's why there is such detailed information about when certain ICAWs occurred, what attitude and airspeed were, what stick and rudder inputs were made, etc. USAF fighter aircraft didn't have a crash recorder until 1987 (IIRC) when the F-16 started getting one in production.

Problem I have with the AIB is the statements of the aircraft having a bleed air system malfunction that lead to the unfortunate sequence of events beginning...also mentioning that the pilot would have felt symtoms similar to suffacation...put yourself in the pilots seat...before blame is placed on the him.

Night, dressed up like a michelin man for "dress to egress", on NVG's in a small cockpit, trying to reach for the EOS which is behind you and can really only be found by touch (oh wait you have gloves on so your tactile sense is reduced)...you have a cockpit pressurization problem so you must make a quick descnet while trying to just BREATHE because the aircraft is suffocating you...AND you are in mountanous terrain...all these things add up to the loss of a great man, father, husband, fighter pilot, friend.

69 sec from initial problems to the accident location...not a whole bunch of time to solve anything...

The AF brass taking the easy way out and in my opinion protecting a contractor in the process is shameful. They sure picked the best board YES MAN president...a total tool douche....so the AF could ensure they got the answer they wanted.

This may be oversimplifying it.. but I understand the findings to be that the situation called for the pilot to perform certain remedial actions which, if done, would have allowed him to retain control of the aircraft. He had presumably been trained on the procedure to follow to deal with such a situation during training but he failed to do so. Based on expert opinion of physiologists, he should not have been impaired to a point that would prevent him from performing said remedial measures. The poor location of certain switches and controls has been cited as contributory factors but this too can be presumed to have been accounted for in training. My layman's view..

Not quite. It's like golden_eagle described with respect to what the pilot has to deal with using night vision equipment and wearing bulky flight gear while trying to respond to the caution indications that occurred and trying to restore his air supply. I doubt that any prior training he had was as difficult as what he faced that night. If the jet had been equipped with auto ground collision avoidance, this pilot would very likely still be with us. And he could have explained the difficulties he encountered without boards of investigators trying to discern them from the ones and zeroes and the fragments of the aircraft and equipment.

exfltsafety wrote:

Not quite. It's like golden_eagle described with respect to what the pilot has to deal with using night vision equipment and wearing bulky flight gear while trying to respond to the caution indications that occurred and trying to restore his air supply. I doubt that any prior training he had was as difficult as what he faced that night. If the jet had been equipped with auto ground collision avoidance, this pilot would very likely still be with us. And he could have explained the difficulties he encountered without boards of investigators trying to discern them from the ones and zeroes and the fragments of the aircraft and equipment.

I was just assuming as a general rule the AF woukd train its pilots to deal with emergency situations in less than ideal conditions, such as those faced by Capt. Haney. Training should be as realistic as possible and cater to "worst case" scenarios, at least that's how I see it. It woild be helpful if someone with direct knowledge could chime in.

Do you know how many times people 'die' in training? Sometimes unfortunate things happen, and things only get more unfortunate from there.

I'm also quite astounded that automatic collision avoidance systems are not available to the fleet. I don't work with the hardware, I only learn theory and give opinions, but that is just shocking. If a helicopter can have it, why not an aircraft? One would think that several months of downtime from such terrible accidents would have been a good time to implement those changes. But who knows, according to one of our members, USAF aircraft didn't have black boxes until 1987!

PhillyGuy wrote:

Do you know how many times people 'die' in training?

The USAF Safety Center lists a total of 82 fatalities for the USAF F-16 fleet through FY 2010 (see http://www.afsc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080114-063.pdf). Almost all of those were during training. They list one fatality for the F-22 (see http://www.afsc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080114-064.pdf).

Last I knew there was a USAF program to install auto ground collision avoidance capability in the F-16, F-22, and F-35. I don't know the current status/schedule. Getting to the auto system has been a long process. The cost involved is not insignificant, especially for those F-16's without the digital flight control system. In addition, there were those who argued against the jet taking control away from the pilot, those who believed better training would be adequate, those who believed improved ground collision warning would suffice, and those who argued in favor of spending scarce $ for better combat capability.

And just to clarify, the 1987 introduction of "black boxes" was for USAF fighter aircraft.

I was trying to make a point that even in training people die. You can't train for everything, because as clearly shown, certain circumstances exceed all measures of preparation.
As for the automatic ground avoidance system, I think that should be something included in the factory cost, and not treated like an after market upgrade.

Like I told you, it was software that wiped Haney out.

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-f ... 6553.story
Almost instantly, the F-22's onboard computers detected an air leak in the engine bay and began automatic shutdown of various systems — including the main oxygen supply.

hcobb wrote:

Like I told you, it was software that wiped Haney out.

Or the lack of it.

The software sucks so the OBOGS doesn't.

Salute!

I must not understand the sequence of failures. So maybe "raptor" can help.

Seems to me that with some indication of the oxygen system/ECS failing that cabin pressure would still be enough for a decent time to get squared away and descend while trying to get that backup oxygen doofer going. Am thinking autopilot.

I can fully understand inadvertant control inputs on the sidestick when trying to do something in the heavy gear and an awkward location of the emer oxygen ring - had a really bad inadvertant stick input incident in the Viper when entering a cloud layer looking over shoulder and had to do an IFR "unusual attitude recovery".

I am firmly against the implementation of an "auto pullout" doofer to prevent ground collision. A warning is fine, but sometimes there's a reason to exceed the criteria an automated system might have implemented by computer geeks.

Gums sends...

Gums wrote:

I must not understand the sequence of failures. So maybe "raptor" can help.

Seems to me that with some indication of the oxygen system/ECS failing that cabin pressure would still be enough for a decent time to get squared away and descend while trying to get that backup oxygen doofer going. Am thinking autopilot.

I'm not all that familiar with the system, but from the report it looks like after the inital (Bleed) ICAW ( at 42:18 ) he had about 5 seconds of more-or-less normal breathing air, based on the OBOGGS ICAW at 42:23. Then, it looks like he had partial pressure for another 24 seconds. It was shortly after the partial pressure stopped that the (apparently) inadvertant control inputs started. The Cabin Pressure ICAW didn't assert until about 26 seconds after the partial pressure stopped - indicating that the cabin pressure system was holding its normal schedule until that time. So yeah, it looks like there should have been usable air in the cabin. My conjecture (that's all it is) is that he was relying on being able to use the emergency bottle, rather than the cabin air, which is why he (apparently) didn't remove his mask. (Not sure how "software" interfered with him being able to get the ring on that bottle pulled - I'm sure one of the resident experts can enlighten me. )

Quote:

I am firmly against the implementation of an "auto pullout" doofer to prevent ground collision. A warning is fine, but sometimes there's a reason to exceed the criteria an automated system might have implemented by computer geeks.

We'll just have to disagree on this one.

Forum: General F-22A Raptor forum

F-22 oxygen system malfunctioned moments before crash