Forum: F-35 Lightning II

duplex wrote:

handyman wrote:

Why are we manufacturing aircraft that we know have seriously structural problems and won't be able to fly 8000hrs without major structural repairs?

Structural cracks are among the most serious problems a new fighter program could experience , if not the most. .F-35 is the greatest desaster in the history of US fighter programs. Its just a question of time when all the other partners, including the UK leave the project and buy something else.. Japan buying the F-35? forget it..

You obviously know very little about fighter development. If you don't find any cracks during development, it means that you over-engineered the design(i.e. it's heavier than it needs to be). If cracks were occurring with a high degree of regularity after IOC, then that would be a bad thing.

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SpudmanWP wrote:

A CVN cannot provide support if it's tasked to a location deemed "more important". That's the whole point of a LHA, it can be sent to areas where the air threat is low and CAS is needed (ala Libya).

Perhaps the French CV and ground based air provided the support necessary for the LHA/D to operate off the coast of Libya. If those NATO forces had not been in theater, you would have seen a CBG in the Med. Another flaw in the Libyan example is for political reasons here in the US, we decided on a measured response. The CBG was kept the near the Red Sea, and NATO, several members of which have historic ties to the region, stepped up and lead the show.

SpudmanWP wrote:

Look at what they did in Grenada. They send a handful of CVs at a tremendous cost when just one or two LHAs with F-35Bs would have done the job just fine.

Grenada was a demonstration project that had geopolitical implications well beyond the borders of Caribbean. But as you say, you would need several gators to seize the island and provide air support in practical numbers. Go big or go home.

maus92 wrote:

popcorn wrote:

maus92 wrote:

popcorn wrote:

maus92 wrote:

popcorn wrote:

I think being left stranded on Guadalcanal without air support has left a lasting imprint on the Marine psyche.

Noted naval author James D. Hornfischer recently published the book "Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal" that essentially dispels this myth. One tidbit that I found interesting is that the Navy lost (significantly) more men at sea during the Guadalcanal campaign than the Marines did on land. It gives a bit more perspective to the situation...

I wonder if the Marines think its a 'myth'? No one is belittling the losses suffered by the USN and allied fleets in the Guadalcanal campaign and no doubt the Navy felt justified in its actions.. OTOH, you can understand why the Corps see things differently and that experience has influenced their thinking to this day.

The Marines indoctrinate their boots from Day 1 with Marine Corps mythology, and there is nothing wrong with that. Justifying huge expenditures of money based on a incomplete interpretation of history is another matter altogether.

With respect to Dr. Hornfischer whose book I don't have on hand, is he claiming that the Navy did not pull out and leave the Marines stranded w/o air support, short of needed supplies and reinforcements.?

Nope - He does not take sides in the debate whether the Navy left the Marines "stranded w/o air support short of needed supplies and reinforcements," [your words] but he does explain the strategic and operational considerations why leadership did what they did. Note that the entire operation started underprovisioned, with fuel ending up a becoming a huge problem. Read the book.

I surfed for info about the book and will be on the lookout for it an his other works.. of special interest to me is the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He's definitely a great writer who tells the story from the eyes of the people who were there.. albeit in this story Navy eyes. Needless to say, the Corps see things differently and that legacy has shaped their thinking and doctrine over the ensuing decades.

I did come across a book review though authored by Jeffrey G. Barlow, a historian at the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command who has written extensively about World War II, is the author of two books on the U.S. Navy during the early Cold War. In his words..

"Portions of the book are less successful than they could be. Hornfischer does not appear to have a clear understanding of some of the troubling command issues at Guadalcanal, particularly the supposed culpability of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who removed his aircraft carriers from their supporting positions, reducing the island's initial defenses. Similarly, the discussion of the Battle of Tassafaronga at the end of November 1942 is surprisingly sketchy."

Everybody's a critic..

arkadyrenko wrote:

The podcast guest clearly stated that LHA's are incapable of providing sustained air support in a hostile environment.

How long is "sustained" and why have the Marines supposedly not noticed the uselessness of the aircraft they have now?

delvo wrote:

arkadyrenko wrote:

The podcast guest clearly stated that LHA's are incapable of providing sustained air support in a hostile environment.

How long is "sustained" and why have the Marines supposedly not noticed the uselessness of the aircraft they have now?

Even a CVN needs help hence a CSG has several AEGIS ships as escort. Provide similar defensive assets to and ARG and use the relatively smaller number of F-35s as pickets to cue SMs on to incoming threats at the missiles' max range. Any threat would have to run a gauntlet of SMs for several hundred Kms; I wonder how many would get through?.. any that do would then face ESSMs then finally RAM/SeaRAM/Phalanx.

delvo - sustained probably 5+ days to weeks. And the Marines haven't noticed the uselessness of the AV-8B on an LHA because they haven't conducted a military operation against a reasonably capable opponent.

Popcorn - so you turn the F-35B into a missile warning airplane. Never mind that its radar probably can't provide terminal / mid-course guidance to SM-2s/SM-6s, never mind that it probably isn't capable of doing a CEC network, and never mind that using the F-35B as a picket means that you're broadcasting the position of your "stealth fighter" to all and sundry. Also, I doubt that the F-35B's radar is as capable as the E-2Ds, I doubt that it can pick up stealthy anti-ship missiles at the same range and with the same ease. And, I may be wrong about this, but I don't think that the F-35B's radar can view 360 degrees.

As for the missiles having to run the gauntlet of SAMs, how to put this: a supersonic ASM (which everyone but the US has) gives the ESSM < 60 seconds and a CIWS < 10s (I've heard only 3 seconds) to respond. Add in the fact that everyone gunning for a carrier group will be shooting dozens of those things and it'll be quite hairy.

The defense of the F-35B and the LHA is, in my opinion, getting laughable.

The number of airplanes on a ship? No Problem! Because the LHA won't be used in high threat environments or something.

The lack of organic AEW? No Problem, the fighter's small AESA radar and networking capabilities make it super powerful! Which flies in the face of the fact that the Navy, which is still buying F-35Cs, has decided to upgrade its E-2s. Why would the Navy do that if all its planes have AESA? Maybe because the Navy knows that fighters cannot effectively serve as their own AWACs. Or the Navy knows that upgrading the F-35B/C to have the same communication ability as the E-2 will tax an already over-budget and behind schedule program.

Finally, we've seen in the Falklands conflict that jump-jet fighters on a jump-jet carrier work, but barely. Very much barely. And that was against an opponent whose airbases were a significant distance from the combat zone. Imagine what would have happened if the Argentinians could base fighters at half the distance to the Falklands... Let me remind you all of San Carlos Water, where the Harriers could not provide air cover because they couldn't move the carriers into range, because the carriers couldn't fly AEW to warn of an Exocet attack. And the Harriers were not capable enough to run sustained air patrols at range.

And we still haven't addressed the problems of operating 22 F-35Bs on a LHA, is there enough space for it to be effective? The podcast mentioned the salient fact that the smaller LHA cannot launch and service the fighters as fast as the CVN, due to lack of elevators and hanger space. The problems with the LHA: slower than a CVN; less resilient to battle damage than a CVN; and requires more visits from the fast replenishment ship than the CVN.

I don't understand this diehard defense of what seems abundantly clear, the F-35B and the LHA are only effective, operating by themselves, in a low threat environment. I happen to think the F-35B has very many uses as a land based airplane, particularly as an emergency fighter to be deployed at airbases where ballistic missile strikes are expected. But the F-35B as a ship based strike plane in an independent battle group? It might work from time to time, but not enough to put much emphasis on it. Essentially, spending tens of billions to build a combat complex capable of fighting against an already prostrate Libya or invading Grenada is rather silly. Wouldn't it be better to spend those billions boosting Marine helicopters or fighting vehicles? But, I'm not a Marine, I don't get their pathological need to have their own private air force with their own private fighter.

arkadyrenko wrote:

... And the Marines haven't noticed the uselessness of the AV-8B on an LHA because they haven't conducted a military operation against a reasonably capable opponent.

You mean a capable opponent like Afghanistan or Somalia? Because those would be the kind of opponents that anyone with half a brain would consider sending an LHA strike group to. I haven't seen anyone suggest sending one LHA up against a genuinely capable opponent, like Russia or China, or even Iran or Libya (without other NATO land-based assets already in the area), even with F-35B on board. Except you. Nice straw man.

Quote:

... Never mind that its radar probably can't provide terminal / mid-course guidance to SM-2s/SM-6s, never mind that it probably isn't capable of doing a CEC network, and never mind that using the F-35B as a picket means that you're broadcasting the position of your "stealth fighter" to all and sundry. Also, I doubt that the F-35B's radar is as capable as the E-2Ds, I doubt that it can pick up stealthy anti-ship missiles at the same range and with the same ease. And, I may be wrong about this, but I don't think that the F-35B's radar can view 360 degrees. ... The number of airplanes on a ship? No Problem! Because the LHA won't be used in high threat environments or something.

Yeah, never mind that the integrated F-35's sensor suite did track a missile hundreds of miles away. Ignore the radar and EO-DAS and EOTS behind the curtain! Your "probably" this and "probably" that sure carries more weight than demonstrated capabilities. But aside from that, again, who's suggesting sending an LHA to singlehandedly fight an enemy with dozens of supersonic anti-ship missiles? You. An LHA certainly can be used in high-threat environments, just as it is now, where in those cases it's part of a larger fleet including CVN and AEGIS picket. It's your own straw man and you can't even pretend to knock it down without ignoring demonstrated reality.

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Why would the Navy do that if all its planes have AESA? Maybe because the Navy knows that fighters cannot effectively serve as their own AWACs. Or the Navy knows that upgrading the F-35B/C to have the same communication ability as the E-2 will tax an already over-budget and behind schedule program.

Or the Navy knows they'll still be flying legacy Hornets, sometimes in large numbers and in high-threat environments beyond the limited AWACS capability of the F-35 to coordinate. The mini-AWACS capabilities of the F-22 are already demonstrated; you can't really be arguing that it hasn't been enhanced further by the F-35's improved communications capabilities and simultaneous 360 degree IR/optical tracking, can you?

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Finally, we've seen in the Falklands conflict that jump-jet fighters on a jump-jet carrier work, but barely. Very much barely. And that was against an opponent whose airbases were a significant distance from the combat zone. Imagine what would have happened if the Argentinians could base fighters at half the distance to the Falklands... Let me remind you all of San Carlos Water, where the Harriers could not provide air cover because they couldn't move the carriers into range, because the carriers couldn't fly AEW to warn of an Exocet attack. And the Harriers were not capable enough to run sustained air patrols at range.

Now that is one of the best arguments I've ever seen for upgrading the Harrier fleets to the longer-ranged, more capable Lightning II. That's the way to argue a point!

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And we still haven't addressed the problems of operating 22 F-35Bs on a LHA ....

That is legitimate. But I don't think anyone's seriously proposed retasking the LHAs as front-line ski-jump carriers a la the British ships of the Falklands War, and scrapping their ability to serve as LHAs. The proposal is add a few F-35B (in place of the Harriers and maybe some very aged attack helicopters they already have), thus decreasing maintenance needs (F-35B is supposed to have greatly reduced maintenance compared to legacy; in fairness that still has to be demonstrated. That it has longer range, greater loiter time, and greater combat capabilities than legacy is already proven.), and use them to provide CAS for the Marines landing, when the landing is low-intensity enough to not require an actual carrier air wing to provide AWACS, fighter cap, and missile picket. If you need all of that, you don't send a lone LHA. But when you don't need all of that, is it really more cost-effective to send a CVN battle group, just so you can use the same LHA to do the same mission?

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But the F-35B as a ship based strike plane in an independent battle group? It might work from time to time, but not enough to put much emphasis on it.

It would've been adequate for nearly everything we've done since WWII except the two conflicts in Iraq. And even with that, there were probably specific locations where a self-supporting LHA may have been useful, if we had only had that.

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Essentially, spending tens of billions to build a combat complex capable of fighting against an already prostrate Libya or invading Grenada is rather silly.

Not "spending." To a degree not far shy of complete, it's "already spent." Now that we have the F-35B nearly done, doesn't it make sense to spend the last few pennies to make it operational? And then once it's in service, actually use it to do the things it can and act as the force multiplier it can be?

river_otter:

My first point was this: the LHA + F-35B combo has very little use in a high intensity scenario, when operating independently. Now, I probably was incorrect that no one advocated for the LHA + F-35B as an independent combat entity in medium to high intensity scenarios. For that, I am sorry. But, let this be a good point to reiterate: it seems that everyone is acknowledging that the F-35B + LHA combo has its greatest usefulness in low intensity conflict. I'll return to that in a second.

Second, about the AWACs capability of the F-35B and the F-35B within a battle group, this was a response to popcorn's comment that the F-35B's mini AWACs ability mitigates the loss of a proper AWACs.

1) The F-35B spotted a missile launch from several hundred kilometers, not a cruise missile. The Sizzler missile, for example, runs sub-sonic until it gets within horizon distance of the target, then it shifts to supersonic burst. The sub-sonic form implies a lower IR signature, reducing the DAS effective rage. Though the current version of the Sizzler doesn't have stealth shaping, to the best of my knowledge, that upgrade is inevitable. Those two facts mean that the sensor range of the F-35A/B/C against stealthy cruise missiles will certainly face some challenges.

The key question becomes, how much airspace can F-35Bs reliably cover against anti-ship missiles? That is classified up the wazoo, so I have no idea what it is, and anyone who does can't say anything. We can probably confidently assert that its less than the maximum range of the radar and DAS system, but we don't know how much. The mini-awacs ability exists, but if its useful in fleet defense role is another question.

2) I never, in any of my comments, assumed that the LHA would be operating alone. The problem here is will the F-35B enable over the horizon engagements? Because, as I have stated elsewhere, the newest version of anti-ship missiles give the defenders precious little time to react.

As to the comment about the Falklands proving the need to upgrade to F-35Bs, how about the Falklands proving the need to use CVNs as opposed to using independent F-35Bs / LHA combos combat ops against a capable opponent? Remember, a re-run of the Falklands includes a more capable Argentine air force (unless you want it to be a walkover, as any modern fighter group against un-upgraded 70s tech will win), which changes the whole threat problem significantly.

I doubt that the USN could have conducted airstrikes in Vietnam without the CVN. And I doubt that the USN could have posed a legitimate threat against the soviet union without the CVN. The US choose to engage in the low threat conflicts, it wasn't forced to by geo-political necessity. That, again, adds to the argument that the F-35B / LHA combo is a luxury, not a necessity.

To the kicker: if we all agree that the F-35B is only useful, by itself, against weak opponents. And we all agree that the F-35B will be operating in conjunction with CVN for the heavy hitting missions, then why does the F-35B need to be a stealthy strike fighter? Why continue to spend so much money on the aircraft? If the DoD wanted to cut a single variant and reduce the costs by the greatest amount, it would be the F-35B. The F-35B is probably more complex than the other two versions (the lift fan), it has unique elements (the lift fan), and it will be purchased in the smallest amount. The costs of maintaining the stealthy STOVL ability will be concentrated solely in one branch of the military. And, an analysis of alternatives to the F-35B for a low intensity environment could reveal some cheaper airplanes to achieve that low intensity ability. Perhaps a gunship version of the V-22.

Everyone, myself included, agrees that building more things is better. The problem is the military cannot just build more, it faces real budget constraints. And in those circumstances, one has to cut the least important systems. And, we've all implicitly agreed that the F-35B is pretty low down there in terms of importance. It is best used in conflicts where the overall risk is low, which is synonymous with conflicts where the interests of the United States face a lower degree of immediate risk.

But, in a sense this argument is moot, because there is still the problem of sunk costs, etc. What I can say is this: in retrospect, adding the F-35B to the JSF program was a mistake.

Finally, here's my gauntlet for the F-35B fans, what capabilities does the F-35B and the LHA offer in a conflict against China? That's the direction the USN is heading towards, notice the relatively fast pace of UCAV testing (the UCAV could hit the flight decks in numbers before the F-35C...). And its the direction the USAF is heading to with its bomber program, plus the probable host of classified projects. I have some ideas about how to use the F-35B / LHA, but I want to hear other peoples thoughts on this. And, please don't say: we'll, we can use the F-35B and bomb Somalia while we're going after China. That's a stupid argument, the US would want to commit every military capability against the Chinese if a war broke out.

We have to be prepared to fight full spectrum warfare. This means that budget priorities have to be balanced between the highest level threats/worst case scenarios, and most likely threats/scenarios. The USMC is never going to invade China or Russia, so you can go ahead and refrain from using them as reasons against the F-35B/LHA combo. What this capability brings, is uncertainty for lower tier foes though(think back to Desert Storm, when the USMC forces offshore tied up significant amounts of Iraqi forces). It also gives combatant commanders more options. The USMC has the unique role, of being the only self-contained expeditionary force, in the US military. It has it's own infantry, armor, artillery, transport(ground and air), CAS/rotary and fixed wing aviation, etc... and is designed to operate without external support for 30-60 days, depending on the size of the MAGTF. All of these element train together, and all Marine aviators have served with ground units they support, fostering a close working relationship. Having all of these organic capabilities, is what makes the USMC unique(and vital).

wrightwing - that argument makes sense when the USN and the DoD has enough money to go around. Right now, it doesn't. If the choice is a better CVN force or the F-35B capability on the LHA, right now the USN should choose the CVN force. Marines can tie down the enemy, but that isn't entirely dependent on the F-35B capability, especially against a lower tier enemy. The MAGTF is a great capability, but one has to question at what cost for that ability? The Marines are already causing damage to themselves through their expensive programs, the F-35B and the now cancelled AAAV.

Oh, and I never expected the Marines to invade China. I envisioned them being used, in smaller task forces, to mop up the Chinese "String of Pearls" allowing for the CVNs to concentrate against the Chinese mainland and primary combat forces. Which is a useful ability, to be sure, but I don't know if the DoD can afford it.

Arkadyrenko, if only it were so simple and the DoD could focus exclusively on China in the coming decades. In reality, US National Interests and obligations span the globe and as do potential conflict areas.. if hostilities do break out, they won't involve a peer-level threat.. the vast majority of such conflict will in all probablility not require a CVN.. the ARG can be configured with the necessary assets/resources to cope with these in a more timely and more cost-effective manner.

Just curious but what territories do you consider China's string of Pearls and why do they need to be cleaned up?

Re 5Gen Fighters performing AWACS functions, you may not think highly of SLD but hopefully you can appreciate what Lt. Gen, Dave Deptula's (Ret.) observation.. as the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR he's more than qualified and credible to speak on the subject, don't you think?

http://www.sldinfo.com/leveraging-5th-g ... -aircraft/

Today, JSTARS is valued principally as a source of ISR. With respect to AWACS, with modern AESA radars air combat systems like F-22 and F-35 can provide the degree of situation awareness on-board that for previous generations of aircraft required AWACS. Tactics today include using F-22s operating in roles that used to be the sole purview of AWACS.

popcorn - the problem is simple. The DoD doesn't have enough money to fully fund an anti-China force and a global power force. So the military has to prioritize against the greater threat. Or, one can use CVN inefficiently against terrorists in Somalia, one cannot use the LHA efficiently against China. So the military should pick the military units that offer the greatest amount of flexibility in military environments.

You haven't heard of the "String of Pearls" strategy? Essentially, China is trying to develop a string of Naval bases in the Indian Ocean, which will allow them to protect their tankers coming from the Persian Gulf to the Chinese mainland. They need to be cleaned up as part of the overall strategy of enforcing a long range blockade against the Chinese. See the wiki page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_of_ ... 28China%29

What I got from that interview is that the 5th gen fighters can form their own data networks in hostile airspace. That is a very good ability and will probably be advanced upon in upcoming years, though the breakthrough will come when a moderately cheap and stealthy UAV can serve as the sensor platform. The problem I have with that argument is that it is missing the second half of AWACs acronym. A network of fighters will always have less command and control capacity than an AWACs assisted fighter group, as the AWACs group will have dedicated operators to watch the entire battle space and give an overview and clear commands to the fighters. That will be much harder in a single pilot environment. Finally, the USAF is working on new tech to boost the effectiveness of the AWACs in the new stealth era: http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-d ... a-j-2.html

arkadyrenko wrote:

popcorn - the problem is simple. The DoD doesn't have enough money to fully fund an anti-China force and a global power force. So the military has to prioritize against the greater threat. Or, one can use CVN inefficiently against terrorists in Somalia, one cannot use the LHA efficiently against China. So the military should pick the military units that offer the greatest amount of flexibility in military environments.

The military has to prioritize against the more likely threats, while still being able to deal with less likely threats. The likelihood of a conventional war with China or Russia, is statistically somewhere around 0%. That's why we have the nuclear deterrent, as it would be cost prohibitive to develop a force structure to fight on Chinese soil.

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What I got from that interview is that the 5th gen fighters can form their own data networks in hostile airspace. That is a very good ability and will probably be advanced upon in upcoming years, though the breakthrough will come when a moderately cheap and stealthy UAV can serve as the sensor platform. The problem I have with that argument is that it is missing the second half of AWACs acronym. A network of fighters will always have less command and control capacity than an AWACs assisted fighter group, as the AWACs group will have dedicated operators to watch the entire battle space and give an overview and clear commands to the fighters. That will be much harder in a single pilot environment. Finally, the USAF is working on new tech to boost the effectiveness of the AWACs in the new stealth era: http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-d ... a-j-2.html

AWACS will still serve a role, but with the advent of a Network Centric force, the datalinked fighters will be able to get much closer to the threat, providing greater situational awareness. To use a Star Trek analogy, a networked force will be something akin to the Borg. Even if you lose some nodes, there's a lot of redundancy built in, keeping the big picture well understood. As far as command an control, due to the sensor fusion, pilots will know where the threats are, and if they've been targeted(the threats), and by whom. They'll also know where all ID'd ground threats/targets are, and if they have been targeted, by one of their wingmen. The foe on the other hand, will have their hands full, with all of the confusion.

arkadyrenko wrote:

popcorn - the problem is simple. The DoD doesn't have enough money to fully fund an anti-China force and a global power force. So the military has to prioritize against the greater threat. Or, one can use CVN inefficiently against terrorists in Somalia, one cannot use the LHA efficiently against China. So the military should pick the military units that offer the greatest amount of flexibility in military environments.

That's like saying the household budget is limited so we have to spend it all on food at the expense of having no electricity, or education for the kids, etc..same principle. The problems isn't simple and neither is the solution.

The money is finite so you have to maximize use of resources to address all essential needs .. Wrightwing had it spot on about full spectrum warfare.

You haven't heard of the "String of Pearls" strategy? Essentially, China is trying to develop a string of Naval bases in the Indian Ocean, which will allow them to protect their tankers coming from the Persian Gulf to the Chinese mainland. They need to be cleaned up as part of the overall strategy of enforcing a long range blockade against the Chinese. See the wiki page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_of_ ... 28China%29

Oh, I know about the supposed Chinese bases in Burma that caused a lot of concern in the media only to be discovered later they didn't exist. Or the Pakistani offer to China to build a military base near the Gwadar commercial port that China financed.. only for China to quickly shoot down the idea. Right now ther is no string of pearls, a flimsy thread, at best..

I just thought you were proposing some sort of island hopping campaign against heavily fortified Chinese facilities, with Marines possibly storming ashore from the ARG.. anythings possible, I suppose. It might just be simpler and cheaper, if ever such bases get built and are deemed a threat, to send a SSGN to take care of the matter in a few minutes. Still a long way down the road if ever the pearls get strung into a necklace. Lots of ways to skin that cat.

What I got from that interview is that the 5th gen fighters can form their own data networks in hostile airspace. That is a very good ability and will probably be advanced upon in upcoming years, though the breakthrough will come when a moderately cheap and stealthy UAV can serve as the sensor platform. The problem I have with that argument is that it is missing the second half of AWACs acronym. A network of fighters will always have less command and control capacity than an AWACs assisted fighter group, as the AWACs group will have dedicated operators to watch the entire battle space and give an overview and clear commands to the fighters. That will be much harder in a single pilot environment. Finally, the USAF is working on new tech to boost the effectiveness of the AWACs in the new stealth era: http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-d ... a-j-2.html

Gen. Deptula was very clear. The tech is leading in that direction as initial tests with the F-22 operating with AEGIS have shown the potential of the new technology. Northern Edge gave more indications of what the F-35 Missions Systems can achieve. BOLD ALLIGATOR 12 should provide and additional venue to validate its capabilities. Still baby steps but already very impressive. Look for the UCLASS to complement the F-35s in the C4ISR role.

The E-2D / AWACS will no doubt be used as a consolidator for information if there is one around. Gen. Deptula addressed that in the article I linked. But it won't be the only one doing battlefield management functions. The need to have a battle management staff cramped in a tube in the air was a necessity due to the limitations of technology when the concept was developed decades ago. Technology changes what is possible. Why have your battle staff in the air, exposed and with a limited endurance? Why have the E-2D visible to enemy radar making the enemy's job of locating your fleet easier?

Instead, isn't it better to put a stealthy UCLASS up there to direct multiple incoming data streams to a battle staff on a Command Ship in the battle group. Unlimited coffee and hot showers lead to improved performance after all. All the pieces may not be here yet but that's the direction thing are going.

Lastly, there's another acronym that can be mentioned in passing.. C4ISRD, with the "D" referring to battlefield management functions performed in the cockpit. F-35 pilots roles are going to expand, facilitated by sensor-fusion, so they can share in the battle management responsibilities with others on the network. There are advantages to being up close to the action and shortening the OODA loop.

Popcorn - your analogy about the household budget doesn't fit my point: preparing for the full spectrum warfare is a luxury when you only have enough money to adequately fund the top spectrum of warfare, which is the most critical spectrum. The US can afford to loose in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the US cannot afford to loose a full scale war to China. In either case, the point is moot for the time being because people aren't really discussing trading more LHAs for fewer CVNs, right now the discussion is fewer CVNs and LHAs. And, I agree, there should be several LHAs, I just don't know how many.

Next, about the String of Pearls, I really really don't get your statement. I offered a concrete and constructive use for the LHA in a full scale war against a widely known Chinese basing strategy. That they haven't built one yet is a success of American diplomacy (ever wonder why the US is so happy that Burma is coming out of its isolation? Hint, its not about human rights...)

As for your suggestion about using a SSGN, any SSGN the US has will be desperately needed to conduct strikes against the Chinese mainland; those assets cannot be diverted to points of secondary importance. In the opening weeks of such a war, the Marines won't have many tasks, especially in the Pacific theater; maybe defending Vietnam or Singapore, so I thought it would be constructive to use them as means of mopping up overseas Chinese bases while the main battle fleets conduct the blockade and strikes against China. As a historical example, think about how the Royal Navy fought the High Seas Fleet during WW1. Primary battle units concentrated against the enemy fleet and homeland, secondary battle units eliminated overseas German bases.

Finally, about the AWACs strategy. I agree, the forward air units will need to create their own ad-hoc networks, but I don't think that the battle management role will go away so easily. Here are my reasons:

1) Battle management can focus on the wider picture. Advanced sensor fusion makes it easier for the fighter pilot to monitor his surroundings, but the pilot will always be far more distracted than the command staff. This becomes important as the units are more and more geographically dispersed. its one thing for a pilot to keep track of his immediate surroundings, is another thing for him to keep track of a wide area.

2) UAV control, especially if the UAVs are tasked with shooting and are operating across a very geographically dispersed area, may require far more attention from the commander, attention which the F-35 pilot cannot supply. Battle command staff will be necessary here to deal with the fact that the F-35 flight may be nowhere near the UAVs, which implies the F-35 won't be paying attention to the UAVs until they radio the request to shoot, and thus won't be able to react quickly and intelligently.

As for the E-2D, how else are you going to put the radar in the air? Either a UAV flying radar or the E-2D will be needed to carry the large AESA array necessary for fleet airborne early warning. Any other option, dispersed radars, etc., has the same drawbacks, giving the general area of the fleet, and may just be too complicated, numerous small airplanes takes up flight deck space that would otherwise be dedicated to strike aircraft. The F-35 may have a great radar, but that radar will never be as good as an E-2 sized radar, from the same radar generation. Simple physics demand that.

Finally, I think that short range battle management will never go away. The threats that cyber warfare, long range hunter killer UAVs, and unrestrained anti-satellite attacks pose to communication networks mean that any network that covers a significant geographical area cannot be relied upon. I half expect that a variant of the new bomber may be converted into a command and control node for unmanned airborne ops for that very reason.

Forum: F-35 Lightning II

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