Forum: Modern Military Aircraft

Yeah the SH probably is a more wise option than the SE as the SH is already here and all ready to go. No faffing about testing it and developing it. Only downside is that the SH a fairly slow jet, though saying that the standard cruise speed would be very similar so maybe that's a moot point. I've no doubt the SH is the cheaper option too and you also get the option of the Growler version. I guess a plus side for the Eagle is that the crews are already familiar with it and it has very good range.
I don't think there's any real difference in the 'stealthyness' of the two aircraft either as the SE and its so called stealth seems like a marketing gimmick, much as it does on the SH though thats not really touted as a stealth fighter.

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discofishing wrote:

Quote:

I don't think you read the post carefully anyways. I said "SH," not SE... as in using the F/A-18E/F (already in production) to still have a joint-service platform as opposed to Boeing's vaporware marketing gimmick. As for the "200 more F-22s" remark (roughly what they wanted), it's not outside the realm of possibility in my scenario, especially if one wants to make the USAF start using a Navy plane (carrot and stick is how these things have to work sometimes).

Hell, it worked with the Phantom didn't it? I know the various models had their differences, but I bet they still had a lot in common.

Hmmmm...I haven't gotten my hands on the NATOPS for the USN Rhino in any variant, but I *DO* have the 1F4C-1. The F-4C, which is pretty much an F-4B with a few tweaks, has very few major differences between the other models. The F-4J(UK) is pretty wacky, but everything else is just different black boxes and cosmetic things that change every block or so. The engines didn't change from the GE-J79-15 to the -17 until the F-4E. The radar and avionics is the biggest sticking point, but the airframes were all very similar. The only major weird things were folding wings and slats. Sorry if I bored everyone to death here, I'm an unrepentant Phanatic.

Very cute guys... But I'm glad Shep finally got a good chuckle here, despite having to clean up a little marmalade from the walls and floor.

And 1st503rd - your whole premise of USAF buying SH instead of F-15E+ (transitioning to a potential SE later on) was that USAF would also procure 200 F-22 which is yes, unfortunate as it is, the height of ridiculousness - no matter which rule book you want to use. (fwiw, the F-22 line arguably should not have been prematurely closed and should have instead been evolved into an exportable variant... imho).

But I'll concede too... SH is definitely a plausible piece of a necessary, interim USAF Plan B, I'll concur with you and Shep there as well. (I'm very glad to see Shep contemplating interim Plan B proposals). However, it should be considered that future next-gen SH alternatives need further development with regards to an internal IRST, MAWS and CFT... Then it could better supplement an off-the-shelf, hypothetical F-15E+ with existing superior Radar, MAWS and data federation already available.

So a Plan B counter proposal for you 1st503rd... sure, USAF could jointly-develop the International F-18 Super Hornet with Navy for a possible FY14 or FY15 low-interest financed acquisition. This could supplement USAF procurement of 6-10 F-15E+ and 10-12x F-16+ under similar financed-deals starting in FY13.

Thus, by FY15 USAF could be procuring a total of 30x F-15E+, F-16+ and SH-Int annually under supplemental financed procurement contracts, in addition to Leasing LRIP F-35A. To assist in funding such a Plan B, perhaps USAF could begin early retirement of 170 F-15C/D in lieu of upgrading to Golden Eagle?

For discussion sake, let's just say its arguably worth comparing such a Plan B concept with the stay the course plan, no? Warning, do not attempt to eat your morning marmalade and toast while contemplating the stay the course avenue... Shocked

Last edited by 1st503rdsgt on Oct 24, 2011 - 07:42 PM; edited 1 time in total

geogen wrote:

And 1st503rd - your whole premise of USAF buying SH instead of F-15E+ (transitioning to a potential SE later on) was that USAF would also procure 200 F-22

No. I do not see the SH as a mere way to help get the USAF its F-22 toys, I was just trying to find a way to soften the blow for them in that situation. Also, I didn't propose the SH as an interim solution (aka half-measure). I proposed it as THE solution; that is, no F-35s or F-15s of any kind. Simply use the SH to replace everything that the F-35 was supposed to replace (excepting the AV-8 of course, and maybe the A-10).

Whether or not the USAF would get the rest of its F-22s as part of such a deal doesn't really matter to me. For all I care, the USAF could do worse than replacing the F-22s and their orphaned technology/support structure (along with their F-15Cs) with SHs. In any case, what we'd end up with is a common 4.5 generation platform across all services and a chance to start over with some of the lessons learned from the F-22 and F-35 programs (like not hiring LM to build fighters ever again).

Ridiculous proposal? Damn skippy right, but it makes no less sense than what you've been proposing, which is to start buying mildly updated old technology just as the new technology is reaching maturity. Do you honestly believe that the F-15SE will be ready before the F-35 in 2018-2020 by any significant margin? Do you really think that purchasing a few extra F-15s to stave off a short gap in numbers in the 2020s is going to make things any easier for an AF that really needs to reduce the numbers and types it is flying? Because, if not, what's the point? We can argue all day about which plane is cheaper, or how best to achieve short term savings; but I'm more interested in the procurement plan that is SIMPLEST, which, in the long run, I believe will always end up being the cheaper option.

1st503rdsgt wrote:

. In any case, what we'd end up with is common 4.5 generation platform across all services and a chance to start over with some of the lessons learned from the F-22 and F-35 programs (like not hiring LM to build fighters ever again).

The BIG assumption here is that any other manufacturer could've achieved what LM has, without any issues, and that we'd be on/ahead of schedule. The F-22 and F-35 are using unprecedented technologies, so to expect there to be no challenges is incredibly unrealistic.

wrightwing wrote:

1st503rdsgt wrote:

. In any case, what we'd end up with is common 4.5 generation platform across all services and a chance to start over with some of the lessons learned from the F-22 and F-35 programs (like not hiring LM to build fighters ever again).

The BIG assumption here is that any other manufacturer could've achieved what LM has, without any issues, and that we'd be on/ahead of schedule. The F-22 and F-35 are using unprecedented technologies, so to expect there to be no challenges is incredibly unrealistic.

Sorry, I'm not an engineer, just a historian with a long memory of who does certain things well and who doesn't. It's not to say LM is useless, it's just that they haven't proven themselves very capable in the large-scale serial production of fighter aircraft (for the US) in a very long time. They seem to be more suited for building the silver bullet types (like SR-71 and F-117). Just sayin, maybe the services should look more closely at a company's prior record instead of being enamored by exquisite one-off prototypes next time. Though I must admit, I really didn't like the X-32.

There was a time when the military used to chose designs and contractors separately. In other words, a company might win a design competition, only to lose production to someone else when they proved incapable of actually making the thing. Might be something to keep in mind down the road.

Thanks for the reply 1st503,

hey, I realize we both agree more than we disagree with respect to criticism of certain acquisition policymaking decisions over the past 10-15 yrs. In particular, we concur that there has been overestimated certainty with expecting the JSF Program to unfold as conceived, 10+ yrs ago... and as such, there's been too much 'crushing' investment in one acquisition model - too many eggs in one basket. etc.

I guess where I was going off more than the debate was worthy of going or being useful, was in detecting a slight shift in your recent position and wanting clarity for discussion sake regarding how (or when) to proceed with alternatives... that is, I believe in the past you've been in the camp of thought willing to support 'upgrades' to existing legacy airframes per 'Plan B', but only after giving more time to F-35 to 'play itself out' and putting as much money into it as warranted to ensure success, etc. Obviously, some critics, cough, have been in the camp supporting a more accelerated and assertive Plan B 'hedge'.

Being a clearly intellectual and articulate student and researcher, probably some Ph.D in something or another... Wink

you clearly have a grasp of the broader situation, and can very well grapple with arriving at your own conclusions.

And yeah, I guess I knew you were more or less using the 200-more F-22 pitch as more of a lure and diversion to assuage AF into accepting your all-Navy Jet crisis procurement solution. I was just trying to verify that aspect and assure you that AF would likely see through that plan and call your bluff on it lol. Not a bad strat though, you never know...

I'll agree to disagree however in that I still assess some assertive and more robust 'hedge' is required on a 'high-end' strategic-value platform in the interim - to preempt (starting now in FY13 procurement) against possible capability gaps and deterrence implosions brought on by: future F-22 reliability questions, severe F-35 reductions and plausible F-15C/D early retirement. This 'high-end' component of the Plan B in my vision at least would NOT be in waiting around for the F-15SE as I fully understand it could be a few years, if at all. The supplemental 'high-end' component (i.e., hedge) therefore, would have to be a latest capability block F-15E+, an upgraded variant which could be procured by FY13. Eventually could such a supplemental acquisition transition into a mature F-15SE procurement, if say the F-35A procurement schedule took a major setback, or as noted, F-15C/D was to be early retired unexpectedly?? Sure, that could be assessed later on. But in the interim... the argument would be that some 'mix' of capability including latest upgrade block F-16s (arguably a very successfully managed and viable LM project), possibly Super Hornets (my guess @ up to 8-10 per yr, some wired for Growler and leave capacity for possible USMC procurement and FMS too) and yes, perhaps 8-10 F-15E+ per year to round off a 'high end' capability.

It is my view that at least the F-15 acquisition could be medium-term 'financed' with favorable low-interest rates, in order to better afford higher annual 'Plan B' procurement rates in the medium term (modernization time frame to offset delayed F-35 component of tacair recapitalization). Accordingly, LRIP F-35 could potentially be procured under a specially configured strategic Lease arrangement, in order to ensure maximal mid-term recapitalization efficiency to sustain deterrence - preempt against hollow force.

To propose retiring F-15C/D, ending F-35A, possibly retiring F-22 and replacing F-16 with an All-Super Hornet USAF recapitalization plan to me at least though, just doesn't sufficiently cover a 'Plan B' balance of requirements based on budget alone. imho

Yeah... I'm no PhD, still working on the MA. Anyways, it's tough to sell extensive upgrades/new-build F-15s as a mere stopgap solution with the F-35's IOC getting so close, no matter how apparent it is that numbers are gonna fall off even if F-35 production proceeds as planned. Thing is though, if the money just isn't there for the F-35, its not gonna be there for the the SE either (or the SH for that matter). My proposal was for a true Plan B, in which there is an "oh $hit" moment regarding the F-35's price/performance. I don't really think it will come to that, but if I was Boeing and looking to skim customers from the F-35's pool, I'd be pushing the SH more than the SE because the main selling point they have over LM is the fact that they can quickly deliver a top-notch, combat proven, cost-effective fighter that actually works. The SE, whatever you make of it, just doesn't exist yet.

Also, FWIW, LM did not get the F-16 until 1993, after it had already been in production for 17 years; so I'd hardly count the tweaks they've made over the years as a major achievement of theirs; credit for the plane's success still goes to its original designers and the company they worked for, GD. LM got a little more ambitious with the Mitsubishi F-2, but you can just ask the Japanese how efficient that project was.

Again though, I'd still want to differentiate between the two different aircraft being discussed here and which should be clarified: 1) a modern, current F-15E+ type which would be available in FY13, vs 2) an eventual 'evolutionary' F-15SE which could 'transition' from the current F-15E+ class being proposed in the interim...

Regarding the the hypothetical but plausible "oh sh%t" USAF appropriations moment as you suggest which would so drastically affect the F-35A's PUC price point to warrant a fundamental review alternatives, there would likely still be procurement budget sufficient for your SH Plan B, as well as a potential mix of alternative airframe types.

My example in this context would conceive of say, $4.0-4.2bn per year in 2011 dollars allocated for usaf combat aviation. This would be compared to around $7.5-8bn projected for future budgets and as required to afford FRP in 'affordable' economies of scale. Such hypotheticals would certainly still 'afford' procurement of new-build alternatives, yes even to include small batches of F-15E+ making up said mix (as opposed to the still unknown -15SE). Granted, the USAF will not be able to afford 60 F-15E+ either, and that is certainly not being suggested in this hypothetical. It could be as few as 8-10 existing F-15E+ units per year (note: not necessarily even the F-15SE) as very justified 'high-end' component of a sustainable, affordable 30-40 total jet per year recapitalization mix. (e.g., multi- model mix)

As far as 'why would the USAF require a high-end component' supplemental stopgap (e.g., an F-15E+, not the F-15SE), in case F-35A was further delayed or curtailed? Well, if there was such a requirement then there would likely be a significant 'high-end' capability gap created by drastically reduced F-35A orders and plausible F-15C/D early retirement.

So there's really at least two separate hypothetical 'Plan B' contingencies one could conceive here, not simply a 'F-35 is cancelled' moment, now what do we do type contingency.

One plan B being more of a modernization 'stopgap', or supplemental, could conceivably coincide with a continued, albeit reduced LRIP and FRP restructuring... whereby LRIP was Leased under some strategically configured term and FRP was possibly 'financed' under some multi-year term.

Or, the more radical Plan B being a full blown F-35A procurement suspension or major delay, etc, in which case the proposed tri-model (F-teens) could construct a 30-40 unit per yr procurement plan in the immediate-term under the hypothetical 'big-cut' 40-50% Procurement appropriation vs expected budgets.

Re: LM's management of the F-16 program since the mid-90s, one would have to give them credit for a fairly successful and well sustained program sales and program management to date - compared to the 5th gen programs. In that regard, the aircraft still has growth and opportunities for whomever a hypothetical customer might be in the future. imho.

discofishing wrote:

Quote:

I don't think you read the post carefully anyways. I said "SH," not SE... as in using the F/A-18E/F (already in production) to still have a joint-service platform as opposed to Boeing's vaporware marketing gimmick. As for the "200 more F-22s" remark (roughly what they wanted), it's not outside the realm of possibility in my scenario, especially if one wants to make the USAF start using a Navy plane (carrot and stick is how these things have to work sometimes).

Hell, it worked with the Phantom didn't it? I know the various models had their differences, but I bet they still had a lot in common.

Well the Phantom was a special case. Its performance combined with its versatility was so much more than anything USAF had in, or scheduled to enter, service. it was kind of hard to ignore. Even then, they only considered it under DoD pressure.

In 2011 or beyond I would opine that the likelyhood that USAF would consider a Navy plane, especially the SH, probably does not even rise to the level of fantasy. This is especially true now that there are things like the F-15SG out there.

I seriously don't see why the USAF would consider a Navy plane either. Despite what's going on with the F-35 the Air Force has their own requirements and the Super Hornet is no air superiority aircraft in terms of its kinematic performance and other capabilities. The DoD and the US federal government in general should not have supported canceling the F-22 after a measly 187 planes.

Quote:

The DoD and the US federal government in general should not have supported canceling the F-22 after a measly 187 planes.

That's the one thing most seem to agree on, even if they despise the JSF program.

I don't hate the F-35, it's just buying the Super hornet as a stop gap is completely out of the question and the F-22 and F-35 are the only aircraft that can fill the niches they are given in the air force.

Ok everyone, this far into the thread, I probably need to explain the whole crazy "SH for the USAF" thing (it started 1 or 2 pages back). On another thread, I was urged by Geogen to make a suggestion here about what course of action might be taken as a "plan B" alternative to the F-35. Our usual disagreement is over how to deal with the likelihood of a fighter shortfall due to the F-35's cost/scheduling problems. He favors interim solutions (usually involving the F-15SE), while I favor letting the program play itself out a little more before deciding whether or not to buy more legacy fighters. Still, it never hurts to have a backup plan despite the services' assertion that there is no "plan B" for the F-35. Remember, my idea was for a worst-case scenario and only applies if the F-35 gets canceled altogether.

My reasons for suggesting the SH were:

1. It's already developed/in production (unlike the F-15SE).

2. It can be used by all three services in the "strike" capacity (sorry, you'll just have to forget about an AV-8 replacement).

Now, I've never really been a fan of the SH due to its lackluster performance on paper specs, but it is economical (as fighters go) and could probably get the job done long enough for us to get something else ready.

Quick correction... For the record, I'm not suggesting the -SE as an interim solution. It would sound easy enough but it's still a concept aircraft, a well-intentioned one... but it will definitely still be a few years if BA ever brings the complete design to maturity to where it could be evaluated cost and capability wise.

What I would support though, would rather be an 'interim', ie immediate-term, supplemental stopgap (creatively financed) involving that latest available off the shelf derivative of the existing F-15E class, a la F-15E+, as a 'transition' to a potential F-15SE down the road. Thus a potential -SE could indeed be a viable 'high end' option for a Plan B alternative later in the decade, especially if faced w/ a worst case scenario as 1st503 contemplated. However this path would likely require a build process in getting from point A to point B in the meanwhile and would probably benefit if the line remained open and the skilled labor retained. imho Thumb

Forum: Modern Military Aircraft

F-15SE transition: Now or never?