Forum: F-35 Lightning II

Repairing the F-35 Program by David A. Fulghum at Feb/10/2011

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/de ... d=blogDest

“I think we have succumbed on the F-35 program to adding too many things too quickly,” says a veteran Pentagon program manager.

Moreover, the Joint Strike Fighter’s problems have been compounded because the development effort was launched without a complete test plan.

Paul Kaminski, speaking as a private citizen, picked out three aircraft programs – the F-16, the F-117 and the F-35, all products of Lockheed Martin – to show how some programs function smoothly, others become delayed and some are repaired along the way. He is CEO of Technovation, Inc., a former under sec. of defense for acquisition and technology, a former director for low observables technology and the current chairman of the Defense Science Board. A DSB research effort is looking into how acquisition can be speeded up, made cheaper and better aligned with military missions.

Another problem involves a lack of coordination between the interrelated demands of acquisition and test and evaluation. A particular issue for F-35 was the undefined nature of the test program that has cost the 10-year-old program five years of delays.

“It’s amazing to me how many programs we start and sign contracts for that don’t have a test plan,” he says. “That’s the rule, not the exception.”

However, he does see ways to repair the F-35 program even this far into its development.

“Some of the things that the Secretary [Robert Gates] has done of late are helpful, for example putting on probation the pace and nature of the [vertical landing F-35B] airplane, setting standards for performance and breaking it up into some pieces,” Kaminski says. “But it’s hard to walk this dog back after all the requirements are in place and signed-up to.”

Another handicap is that such a program comes along so infrequently and in such long cycles that it is almost impossible to avoid the operational push to put everything in the first version. What Kaminski recommends instead are programs with block upgrades like the F-16.

“Where you don’t see that is in a block upgrade program where you have a pattern of testing, you know what the upgrades will be and you don’t have to test the whole system,” he says. Without a signed [test & evaluation contract], the whole process hasn’t been thought through. I think we have challenges with what we’ve committed ourselves to with the F-35.”

Nonetheless, there is still room and time for improvements in the F-35 test program, he says.

“It requires discipline because the first tendency is to put everything in the first block,” Kaminski says. “You have to reserve what goes into the first block for what has earned its way onto the system and what is sufficiently mature to be integrated.”

Turning to next generation designs such as a new bomber for the Air Force, Kaminski is adamant that it be a graduated design with interchangeable and upgradeable packages of sensors and weapons. That kind of plan would skirt today’s problem issues of 20-year development times for new programs.

“If you are trying to align our enterprise to the mission, it’s just too long,” he says. “We have to look at block buys with planned upgrades for those blocks. The cycle times will depend on the mission. It will be different for strategic bombers [compared to] work in the cyberenvironment.”

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Wise words.

F-16 wasn't a Lockheed Martin program.
fisk

They are not trying to put everything in the first IOC block (Blk3). Just look at the planned Blk4-7 schedule and that becomes apparent. They have included what is required to get the basic job done.

Lets look at the systems and decide which one could wait till later blocks.

EOTS: To effectively execute an A2G mission (it's primary mission), they would need to attach a Sniper pod. This would increase the RCS at least 10 fold. It would also need it's own integration so you would have to integrate twice (time wasted). No EOTS also means no IRST which helps in BVR/WVR tracking and ID.

HMD: Cannot fly effectively without it.

Radar: Too critical to the mission, must stay.

RwR: Too critical to the mission, must stay.

EODAS: Too critical to the mission (night flying, MLD/MAW functions, A2G tracking, WVR tracking, etc), must stay.

Datalinks: Too critical to the mission, must stay.

What systems (or weapons) do you think can be separated into later blocks?

The Key To Acquisition Reform Is A Better Customer Author:Daniel Goure, Ph.D. Date:Thursday, February 10, 2011

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/the-k ... amp;c=1171

"There has been a tendency among defense officials, news outlets and defense analysts to blame industry for most of the acquisition problems and program failures that have occurred over the last several decades. Defense companies have been accused of being too expensive, restraining competition, having conflicts of interest between technical support and production activities, not delivering on their contractual commitments and even not being concerned about the welfare of service personnel. The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Dr. Ashton Carter, has chastised the defense industry for failing to provide the kinds of increasing functionality at reduced costs experienced by the commercial computer industry. A recent example of such a mind set was a speech by Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz to a defense industry audience. Responding to a question about how industry could support the Air Force in a period of declining defense budgets, Schwartz said “Don’t blow smoke up my a$$.” He went on to chastise his audience for failing to deliver what they had promised, saying “there will be less tolerance … for not delivering.”

General Schwartz did go on to acknowledge that part of the blame rested with the military services and their tendency to hunger after the most advanced technologies and gee whiz capabilities. He promised to restrain his service’s appetite in line with its shrinking budget. He said that the Air Force would do its part to be a better customer but that industry had to do better.

Yet, the reality is that the defense acquisition system is so dysfunctional it is hard to have confidence in General Schwartz’s promise to be a better customer. The acquisition system is not structured to support sensible acquisition. Defense acquisition officials continually change the terms of the bargain, moving money between programs, adding requirements, discovering new technologies and so-called black programs to compete with existing procurements. Government officials resist multi-year procurement contracts or performance-based logistics agreements because of the restrictions they impose on managers’ freedom of action even as they save money. Different parts of the acquisition system do not talk to each other or, like Operational Test and Evaluation, only enter the process when architectures are set in concrete. Government program managers rarely stay around long enough to see their programs through to completion or take responsibility for their decisions.

Just look at the F-35 program. The ability of Lockheed Martin to deliver the Air Force’s version of the Joint Strike Fighter at a price similar to that of the latest model F-16 is predicated on rapidly ramping up to an economically efficient production rate. But the defense department has imposed new, unnecessary and onerous testing and development requirements on the program even though it is doing fine. As a result, the production schedule slips to the right and the buy rate over the next decade declines. So the price goes up and industry gets blamed.

When the Army has had only one successful major acquisition program in the past decade, the UH-72 Lakota helicopter which will never be deployed outside the United States, the question has to be asked: was this a problem created by industry or by the customer? Or when acquisition officials take the program for a new presidential helicopter, one based on a platform, the EH-101, that is already in production and turn it into a multibillion dollar debacle by demanding hundreds of changes to the vehicle’s specifications, who is to blame? Or when the Marine Corps changes its concept for amphibious warfare is it any wonder that the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, an amazing piece of machinery, suddenly looks like a white elephant?

The Defense Science Board has proposed a series of reforms based in large part on commercial industry best practices that would go a long way towards bridging the requirements-performance gap identified by General Schwartz. In its recently released study on improving the adaptability of U.S. military forces, the DSB called for a block upgrade strategy for most major weapons programs. This strategy would focus on "rapidly fielding 60- to 80-percent solutions and then subsequently enhancing capability." The report goes on to assert that "this strategy allows new capabilities to be inserted in a time-phased manner and enables lower risk, lower cost, and faster deployment. Programs, contracts, and budgets can be aligned to support this approach." The DSB points out a number of successful examples of a block upgrade strategy including the F-16, F/A-18E/F, and ARCI sonar program. The report also makes some very far reaching recommendations related to improving adaptability in such areas as risk-management, increasing global awareness, learning to operate in degraded environments and enhancing the workforce.

The services may be starting to get their own house in order. The best example is the Army’s new request for proposal (RFP) for the Ground Combat Vehicle. The Army identified only four key requirements, the most important of which is growth potential. It also made schedule and cost critical variables. Industry has warned that the Army will have to be willing to live with a platform that at least initially is not the whiz bang system they envisioned in the first, canceled RFP. We will see whether the Army likes what it gets when time, cost and capability are all constrained."

You can't compare 70's legacy aircraft such as the F-16 & F-117 with the F-35. That is like comparing a rotary phone to an I-phone 4. As for the F-16 the only risky technology on the F-16 was its flyby wire system and that almost killed the program on the first high speed taxi test. As for the F-117 it is used off the shelf technology on the inside so the only risky part on that airplane was the stealthy airframe. So these are two very poor examples from some former pentagon bureaucrat.

As Edgar Schmued the North American designer of the P-51 Mustang was famous for saying, “Any damned fool can criticize, but it takes a genius to design it in the first place.”

Schmued was employed by North American Aviation, later a division of the Rockwell International Corporation, for 22 years. During his tenure, Schmued also designed the F-82 and, the other iconic NAA designs, the F-86 Sabre and F-100 Super Sabre. After leaving North American, he spent five years as an aircraft designer for the Northrop Corporation, where he helped design the F-5 and the T-38.

And any damn fool can try to plaster over the logical and evidentiary paucity of their argument by applying a thick coat of the logical fallacy known as Appeal to Authority.

Also note that the P-51 only became a success after someone other than Schmued redesigned the P-51 to accept the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. And that the Mustang was never touted as being the solution to all things combat aviation. Nor took twenty years from original conception to IOC*...

JL

*'96 to '16 (At least until the next schedule 'slip')

The 2016 IOC for the USAF will likely be brought back to the 2014/15 timeframe as LM continues to beat the scheduled test rate, certifies the test labs, adds a 3rd software integration line, and temporarily converts the Eglin AFB Software upgrade facility.

A lot of the extra flight and delayed timeline are due to the software integration facility backlog, not problems with the software itself. That and the need to certify the simulation labs. Once that is complete, the extra flights will no longer be needed.

Btw, here are some numbers that might surprise you for recent fighter programs. Just like your '96 to '16 timeline, these represent initial contract to IOC (including demonstrator aircraft).

F-22 was '86 to '05 (19yrs)
EF was '83 to '06 (23yrs)
Rafale was '83 to 04/'07 (21yrs-Navy/24yrs-Air Force)

SpudmanWP wrote:

They are not trying to put everything in the first IOC block (Blk3). Just look at the planned Blk4-7 schedule and that becomes apparent. They have included what is required to get the basic job done.

Lets look at the systems and decide which one could wait till later blocks.

EOTS: To effectively execute an A2G mission (it's primary mission), they would need to attach a Sniper pod. This would increase the RCS at least 10 fold. It would also need it's own integration so you would have to integrate twice (time wasted). No EOTS also means no IRST which helps in BVR/WVR tracking and ID.

HMD: Cannot fly effectively without it.

Radar: Too critical to the mission, must stay.

RwR: Too critical to the mission, must stay.

EODAS: Too critical to the mission (night flying, MLD/MAW functions, A2G tracking, WVR tracking, etc), must stay.

Datalinks: Too critical to the mission, must stay.

What systems (or weapons) do you think can be separated into later blocks?

Where to begin?

EOTS: But do you need IRST function on the early block birds? This can be added with a software update.

HMD: No HUD makes sense...

Radar: Do you have to have every single function and mode on day 1 of flight school?

RwR: Yes but missions are years away, need to train the pilots first. The initial blocks can have this software completed later.

EODAS: Too critical?? My god how did the USAF survive the first 50 years without it!

Datalinks: Really? Ask the F-22 guys about this, the A-10a's, or the other aircraft we have with no link 16. I guess they cannot do anything.

Remember you WANT the latest iPhone, you do not need it. You need food and water. If you need a better example read up on the Army's RAH-66. The never set a starting block, they kept adding new function and features. They wanted to have everything day 1, and got nothing. If you read the story of the M1 you will find out the same thing almost happened. But we had a Sec of Defense who put his foot down. And the M1A1 was in the works before the first front line units had the M1.

Salute!

I gotta go with Kaminski and Schwartz. [ btw, the Viper was a GD product and the company became LM. Same plant and folks plus a few new ones from Lockheed mostly).

I also have to agree with some folks posting here that we are trying to cram too much into the jet too quickly, much as what Kaminski points out.

Fer chrissakes, what was wrong with a HUD? Install the cosmic helmet doofer when all was refined and developed and simply needed to be integrated into a robust avionics architecture.

As both of the "experts" pointed out, the services are guilty of asking too much too soon. The contractors are guilty of promising the moon, and below cost and sooner than you can believe. The politicians are guilty of trying to get jobs in their districts. I personally saw/worked on several DoD programs that crashed and burned when the services had reasonable requirements in the beginning but then started to add "capabilities" and nifty features and .....

I am also starting to think we need to separate the "B" model and make it a separate program to live or die on its own in order to preserve the Navy and USAF variants. I shall post my thots and evidence about this idea on another thread.

Gums sends...

P.S. Honesty in posting ---- I am a classmate of Paul Kaminsky, class of '64 from the Zoo. I trust the guy's judgement and opinion.

My 2 cents... The SDD-mature IOC block III should have been the F-35A, possibly with software capped at around 3 million lines of code or so, if feasible. The entry level fighter could have come with F-16 Block 60's systems such as AESA radar, EW suite, (possibly F-16's computer?), comms and MWS/MLD. That's correct, I would have supported a 2010 IOC F-35A for USAF as planned (and required) which could have been introduced without stealthy communications and other entry level, albeit still advanced, modern systems. Something along those lines could have been the most affordable and sustainable approach imho.

Block IV - V, already set to include the popularly envisioned 5th gen NCW capabilities; via expanded Wideband COM, ICP upgrades for comms and all-aspect integrated passive SA/threat detection/management, could have then the integrated higher-end hardware then - as did say, F-16 integrate spiral-upgraded Radar and other hardware, accordingly? Shrug

Granted, the new F135 engine would be an issue in such an equation and meeting schedule.. the debate kinda goes back to square one then, i.e., should it have been a Joint USAF/USN service twin-engine fighter. The project's history is certainly an interesting read, that's for sure.

My beef with Paul Kaminski is that he has never gone through the airplane design processes. He hasn't had to make the tough engineering decisions of selecting a jet engine and trying to wrap an airplane around it with all its myriad of integrated systems. So while it would be really nice to be able to evolve an aircraft over time as Mr. Kaminski suggests you first need a fully functional airplane in order to modify it.

Also when ever you design an airplane you are also taking a leap of faith that all the contractors will deliver what they promised. If any one of the thousand of contractors can't deliver what they promised then you have to redesign the airplane which not surprisingly happened once already on the F-35. People often forget that one of the reasons the F-16 was so successful is that it was built on the technological back of the F-14, F-15 and F-111. So General Dynamics was able to pull a lot of the hardware off the shelf such as the jet engine. That isn't the case with the F-35 as it is a brand new next generation airplane with capabilities even beyond what the F-22 can do.

So it really seems here that Paul Kaminski is playing the role of the mother in law in the back seat of car giving all the design engineers on the F-35 project who are driving the car steering directions after they a missed a turn or two.

geogen wrote:

My 2 cents... The SDD-mature IOC block III should have been the F-35A, possibly with software capped at around 3 million lines of code or so, if feasible. The entry level fighter could have come with F-16 Block 60's systems such as AESA radar, EW suite, (possibly F-16's computer?), comms and MWS/MLD. That's correct, I would have supported a 2010 IOC F-35A for USAF as planned (and required) which could have been introduced without stealthy communications and other entry level, albeit still advanced, modern systems. Something along those lines could have been the most affordable and sustainable approach imho.

Block IV - V, already set to include the popularly envisioned 5th gen NCW capabilities; via expanded Wideband COM, ICP upgrades for comms and all-aspect integrated passive SA/threat detection/management, could have then the integrated higher-end hardware then - as did say, F-16 integrate spiral-upgraded Radar and other hardware, accordingly? Shrug

But then you end up with different logistics and training tracks, plus additional integration and testing, which costs money too. Plus using the Block 60's systems would require royalties to UAE, who funded their development...

Quote:

But then you end up with different logistics and training tracks, plus additional integration and testing, which costs money too. Plus using the Block 60's systems would require royalties to UAE, who funded their development...

An acceptable trade-off, as I see it. The initial block III logistic base scenario could have been sustainable and doable, imo, via a fleet of more modern (and more common) systems, when compared to the NOW forced plan B alternative to keep older F-16s with far more mixed and matched of systems in extended operation?

In 10 yrs, the radars could have been swapped out too, if need be e.g.

But keep in mind there will be extensive retroactive upgrading going on as it is, to upgrade currently expected block IV to block V standard, or even more so block III to block IV. (which will likely have to be the case as USAF will not be able to afford the number of block IV and V as expected and planned).

The argument then comes downt to up-front costs/trad-offs absorbed from an entry level block, in order to get the actual F-35 airframe more sustainable and in orderly, functional production in the first place.

Royalties to UAE on the radar and EW suite would have furthermore been minor too, given say 300-400 jets taken into account in the whole JSF scheme of things and damage/pain being absorbed going forward (in establishing a functional production). my views.

h-Bomb, I think you misunderstand which blocks we are speaking of. Most of those things that you say are not needed for "training" are not part of the Blk1 suite (which is the default training Blk starting this year). Most of the other "iPhone" features will be part of Blk 2&3 which will come later in the program prior to IOC.

Some here need to do some more research prior to spouting off about what is and is not causing delays. Most of the core component software is done and the backup is not in these systems, but in the integration of the blocks as they come out of the labs. That is being addressed (with a new 3rd integration line and a temp integration lab).

Forum: F-35 Lightning II

F-35 - 'BLOCK' my Upgrade/Development