Forum: F-16 Procedures

exfltsafety wrote:

Quote:

... to this day LM insists that the MPO switch shouldn't have worked, but then the uncommanded pitch was never explained as well so...

I was involved in the Conference Hotel call for that one. And you're right, the engineers who designed the FLCS never could explain it. H. Zane Scott, a true FLCS engineering genius, was adamant that the MPO switch couldn't have done what the pilot claimed it did.

Yup, I remember "Scotty". Back when engineers were allowed to have "personality"....

F-16.net Sponsor

Just for the record, I've got to quote page 3-95 (circa 1987):

"If any LG does not extend, the alternate extension system must be used."

From 3-96:

If LG indicates safe:

"Stop straight ahead on the runway."

"NWS is not available following alternate LG extension."

If LG (still) indicates unsafe:

"Apply g force to free LG."

This reinforces the old adage:

"Good judgement is no substitute for established procedures."

Very Happy

OL

Salute!

Good grief, OL.

So I forgot step 1. BFD.

The mechanical doofer supposedly unlocked the gear doors, but hell, I already knew something was stuck. Then, I gotta admit, I didn't want "to make a scene".

So I figured the gees would do the trick, And they did.

The dash one was right, best I remember, about no NWS if you pulled that gear knob doofer. Hence, I didn't yank on it until I was sure the gear wouldn't come down pulling some gees. Didn't like idea of landing on a nose and one main, so would have tried the emer doofer and done the same thing using gees. The gees worked, so turned out to be better than I could have hoped for.

Oh well, made it and calmly cancelled the emergency so fire truck dudes could get more coffee, polish trucks, etc.

BTW, did same thing after the LEF failure when the jet slowed so fast that I made a mid-field turnoff. Bad WX day and I was thinking about folks about to land and I would be sitting in the middle of the runway. Motor was fine, hydraulics fine, NWS fine. So whatthehell. Turn off and taxi back to where you started from. Who cared about that LEF up at 60 deg or so?

Gums sends...

Now, now, I was just trying to get into the spirit of the thread.

Quote:

We used to say these events led to new Notes, Warnings, and Cautions in the Dash-1.

In 1987, that referenced statement, using the term “must”, was in the book. Usually there’s a reason, especially when the imperative is used.

For all I know, maybe it previously read:

“Consider using the alternate LG extension” or “If desired proceed to Step 3” or “If any LG does not extend, you may utilize the alternate LG extension, or not”.

In any case, from my experience, it is generally accepted that anytime one lands successfully after a gear extension problem, it is prudent to stop straight ahead and get the gear inspected and pinned or the downlocks installed anyway…whether or not you have 3 green or whether or not you have NWS. Then one decides whether to taxi or have it towed.

I’ve landed & closed runways at international airports and never gave it a second thought. Fire truck guys are usually bored to death and love racing around the infield.

There’s no hurry, the aircraft obviously isn’t going to be turned around; it’s going to be put on jacks and run through some number of gear extension cycles.

I have seen a gear incident aircraft, with three green, turn to courteously taxi clear of a runway only to have the offending main gear collapse from side loads. Those micro-switches don’t necessarily recognize twisted or damaged structure.

Not trying to be argumentative (it’s hard to quibble with results), just presenting an old guy’s viewpoint in the spirit of Notes, Warnings & Cautions. Call me “granny”.

OL

Salute!

O.K., "granny".

The gear design was clever, so if you could open the main gear doors, then the mains would theoretically "drop" out and lock. Hydraulics raised the gear, then "relaxed", and the gear rested on the doors, which were hydraulic.

Nose gear was hydraulic all the way, hence the blow down bottle.

So let's review the bidding.

- raise handle, nose gear comes in, left main stays down.

- lower handle, get nose gear down.

- good hydraulic pressure on gauges, and no "unsafe lights" except right main.

- don't fool with gear handle no more!!! who knows what will come up or go down?

- look at procedures and decide to give gravity "one" chance.

- gravity worked, hydraulics are great, no unsafe indications and wingie confirms all gear down.

I also closed the runway at an international airport back in 1968. I had deadsticked my A-37 into Tan Son Nhut, Saigon and a Pan Am 707 wanted to land. BFD. Even helped the fire/crash crew push the damned thing off the runway, heh heh. Small, light jet, even with one tire flat from bullet holes.

With no "normal" hydraulics, and with bad indicators, I would have things differently. So no problem with roll out and stop st ahead. So I used my judgement and assessment of the situation to do what I did.

******************

The LEF failure was a horse of a different color. No "procedures" in any checklist, and the whole thing was personal judgement as to whether I could land without endangering the civilians around the base if I had to punch.

One reason we had no boldface in the first year or two was that USAF trusted our judgement and airmanship. We also had no "track record" for new pages in the dash-one.

As with the F-16, I got to the A-37 and A-7D, so early that many malfunctions and design problems had not been discovered. I would not trade my career with those three jets for anything. Was neat and very real. I'll talk about the A-37 design problems later, even on this thread, as we found some very serious problems with motors, control authority and other stuff.

Bottomline is that experience and airmanship will do us all better than some "stock" procedures that mindless clones follow to the letter.

That's my story, and I'm stickin' to it.

Gums...

Quote:

One reason we had no boldface in the first year or two was that USAF trusted our judgement and airmanship. We also had no "track record" for new pages in the dash-one.

Gums,

I attended nearly all the F-16 flight manual review conferences from 1980 through 2008. I always thought the F-16 had no boldface because the F-15 had no boldface. It became apparent after a number of years that there should have been boldface, IMHO, since each user created their own CAPS. There was discussion a few years ago about establishing boldface procedures in the -1; but, the EPAF and USAF all had their own versions of the CAPS and agreement was never reached on doing boldface in the -1.

EPAF? my english isnt so good, sorry.
did the F-15 have Caps?

ok, got the EPAF..
another Question, was it only disagreement between USAF and EPAF or also inside the US users?
Cheers.

Sorry about the acronym use - the European Participating Air Forces were originally Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Norway. Portugal later became the 5th EPAF.

For reference, USAF F-16 Critical Action Procedures are in Attachment 4 to an Air Force Instruction (see http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI11-2F-16V3.pdf). I didn't see CAPS in the USAF F-15 AFI (http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI11-2F-15V3.pdf)

The voting members at F-16 flight manual conferences are the pilot representatives from each EPAF country and each USAF command, including Guard and Reserve. Maybe the flight manual manager also has a vote Wink

. I don't recall if the bold face discussion ever got to a vote. I think what started the discussion was the latest change to add the FLCS reset step to the Block 40 and on out-of-control emergency procedure. (The need for that change is a whole separate discussion). Any change made to the flight manual emergency procedures that affects the CAPS also requires a change to the USAF AFI. And changing the USAF AFI requires a lot of coordination at HQ ACC. It was logical that having bold face procedures in the flight manual would eliminate the need for CAPS and thus eliminate changes to the AFI for that reason. The FLCS reset step will eventually be removed for certain users after incorporation of a DFLCS software update. Its removal will generate another USAF AFI change to the CAPS. Since the FLCS reset step wasn't needed for the pre-Block 40 jets, the EPAF representatives didn't have any CAPS change to be concerned about.

Great stuff Larry- thank you.
Ever had issues with the pilots/ Air forces thinking caps should be different then flight manual, or is it a must that the caps just be selected items from the dash-1 and in the same order?

Since I now write flight manuals for a living, I have a couple of things to add to this conversation (in defense of Gums). The following is in almost every major flight manual out there, civilian or military:

"....multiple emergencies, adverse weather, or other factors may require modification of the recommended procedures."

"When dealing with emergency/abnormal conditions, it is essential to determine the most correct course of action by using sound judgment and a full understanding of the applicable system(s)."

That means "here's the procedure, but you can modify it as required based on your situation."

More importantly, when people decide to discuss the meat and potatoes of the flight manual, keep these in mind:

"Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DOD Contractors only..."

"This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act..."

"Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties."

That means folks can get in a wee bit o' trouble if they decide to talk too much about what is in the book...

yes, the f-16 dash 1 is confidential, thats why you can download it online...

Fez,

The flight manual is not "confidential" as it is not classified; however, it is a limited use document and everything VPRGUY said is true.

Quote:

Ever had issues with the pilots/ Air forces thinking caps should be different then flight manual, or is it a must that the caps just be selected items from the dash-1 and in the same order?

Since the flight manual doesn't have bold face procedures, the CAPS don't have to be precisely the same. During my working years, I was involved solely with what went into the flight manual. While I knew there were CAPS, I rarely looked at the CAPS from the USAF or other countries.

OK thanks,
Feel free as im sure you do not to answer anything that can be seen as classified or limited. although i must say i have seen much more "interesting" threads here that just went on and on...

Salute!

Great thread, IMHO.

We gotta remember the penultimate "boldface" for most every plane since the Wright Flyer:

- Maintain aircraft control
- Analyze the situation
- Take action

As Richard Bach put it, all crashes are due to loss of control.

Either the pilot loses control, and that includes CFIT, or the airplane is so FUBAR he doesn't have a chance.

So if step one doesn't work, then the decision, which should be automatic, is punch. I realize some folks are made out to be heroes for guiding the jet to an unpopulated area, but that's B.S. put out by the news media.

I only know of one bail in the Viper where the pilot had minimal control and punched in a really good area. Was a LEF failure and he botched the initial attempt to land and his arm wore out in his opinion. The SOF had called me to the tower, as my landing was known to a few, but not highly publicized ( Chuck Horner was the accident Board Pres and heard about my landing. Called me in and ordered me to have the AV lab make a video from my HUD tape, with narration). I got to the tower too late to talk with the pilot.

Bill Lake had the uncommanded EPU failure and fried the FLCS computers ( this was after we hot-wired the suckers so they would never shut down due to over voltage). The 'puters degraded rather gracefully, but he finally admitted he wouldn't be able to land - a few barrel rolls and pitch excursions that got worse and worse. So he bailed while still having a semblance of control.

Step two: If the plane is still flying, even with minimal control authority, then take a deep breath and figure out what is wrong. Some things are easy, like engine failure or in my case seeing the right LEF up at about 60 degrees. Others are more insidious.

Third: If there's a procedure, try it, but still reserve your right to modify the procedure considering the whole scenario. If you choose that route, be prepared to face the music if your actions don't help.

The Professional Pilots' Rumor Network has lengthy discussions about "crew" actions during emergencies and other scenarios involving crashes.

http://www.pprune.org/index.php

I discovered the site when looking up the Air France crash over the Atlantic a year or two ago.

In the end, it's a combination of going thru a procedure you have trained for or thought about, and good old judgement.

Gums...

Forum: F-16 Procedures

Notes, warnings, and cautions