Forum: F-16 Procedures

After the discussion of deep stall and back/forth with Gums on the issue I thought I might start a new thread that might generate some interest.

As an academic instructor in the RTU at Luke I enjoyed relating stories I knew, either from personal experience, friend's experience, or stories related by others. These stories were most important when they related to an experience in those early years of Viper flying that resulted in new knowledge about the F-16. We used to say these events led to new Notes, Warnings, and Cautions in the Dash-1. I always felt like they put a personal touch to the problem that studs could relate to and would remember, like Bob Gallon's PTO shaft failure as he related it to me. Seems he was most concerned about his cowboy boots in the travel pod than he was jumping out of the jet. I'll relate a few here...but not all as it would be a massively long post. Would like to hear others stories...Gums sharpen your pencil...and I'll come back later to ad more as I remember them. Haven't read a Dash-1 in years so I will summarize the Note/Warning/Caution as best I can. I won't use names to protect the guilty but ,may throw in initials for the old drivers to remember.

Don't land soft on wet runway, apply breaks prior to landing, or apply breaks in aero brake if not sure WOW and wheel spin up have occurred. Make firm touchdown when hydroplaning is expected. TJ deployed to Incirlik ~1984. A bud lands in rain storm, greases it on and aero breaks right away applying breaks in aero break as worried about stopping distance. Jet finally settles and nose comes down when POP/POP both mains fail. Do a 45 right and exit the runway, nose gear collapses and intake sucks up tons of Turkish mud (literally there was several inches of mud in the burner can that went through the motor). We learned about the requirement to have both WOW and wheel spin up for anti-skid to work. Was OK though as it was 81-0759, a non HAVE GLASS jet that was going to get dumped on Hahn anyway. Fixed it and flew it up there. Bet those guys never saw the CARFAX on that one.

Careful unstrapping to use piddle pack and then adjust seat with lap belt between seat and stick (CF) as the jet will roll like a MF when the buckle moves the stick to the right.

I've already mentioned the CL tank at high altitude but how about the pre-MPO deep stall recovery CAPs (Blk 1/5) and PM who discovered them by trying everything in the book in a departure (speedbrakes, AB, etc.). Turns out the only really effective part of the attempt was lighting the AB which burned gas faster and moved the CG forward. Who really wanted to find and properly move fuel boost pumps to AFT while in a deep stall? Thank goodness for the MPO.

How about the whole AOA probe heat fiasco and the departures that resulted. I know one happened at Hill and TB had one letting down into Aviano that he had to punch out of. Crewchiefs loved checking the probes for heat after that. For those who do not know, when AOA probes are not heated and icing occurs the ice builds up on front of probe, it rotates down, jet thinks >29 AOA, and from our discussion you know that HAL (FLCS) takes over and goes full trailing edge down to reduce the AOA. If you are 300+ knots that is a lot of negative Gs. TB's pitched under into an inverted deep stall and he punched out. Jet hit in an inverted flat spin so they salvaged his hang-up bag from the travel pod as I recall him relating!

Enough for now...Gums, et al., the challenge is over to you. I'll think of more later.

JB

F-16.net Sponsor

81-0759

Board ROE sez if ya mention a specific tail, ya gotta give a link to it in the aircraft database (if it exists there). (not really...it's just fun to see if'n we have a record of it. Wink

)

Link I would be happy to but am from the analog generation and don't know how. I only remember this tailnumber because it was the WG/CC's jet and we never saw it again since it was delivered to Hahn right after it was repaired (may have even been a Hahn pilot that transferred it from the Lik to Hahn). If in the recesses of my shrinking brain I ever recall another specific tailnumber I will try to link it but may need some assistance. You know all us fighter pilots suffer from Maltzheimers (SP intended).

Salute!

Good idea for the thread, 'gator.

As I pointed out on the other thread, we were all test pilots in 1979 thru '82 or '83. No matter how many profiles they flew at Edwards, we kept finding new and weird things for the Dash-One. Our Dash-One at the time I showed up was a xerox copy of the FSD jet, heh heh.

- We had no "boldface" procedures, as the test folks decided we could use common sense and exploit basic airmanship.

- As with the A-7D, we went thru motor problems as we flew more and more motor cycles ( no pun intended). The most common problem was 'burner stall-stag and subsequent overheat or shutting down motor and going for a re-start.

TEG- breath can chime in here, and maybe John-boy.

So that's when we noticed the reluctance to use BUC. After Tom and I showed the Pratt engine rep how easy it was to start the motor with BUC, it became part of the syllabus. We also had to log one every month or so on our training event sheet. Guess all that went sway with the new motors.

- DON'T LAND USING "WING LOW"!!!!

So naturally, a few of us tried it even after the test folks told us not to try it.

We got the big tails and the brass decided they wanted all the IP's and line folks to fly around in a family model to see what we thot. Was neat. No more manual fuel balancing and the sucker had better pitch authority in a slow knife fight. They also wanted us to comment on that increased pitch authority at touchdown due to increased odds of a tail scrape.

So Roger and I come back, do a few T&G's, and then decide to try a wing-low landing versus the "crab". We had talked about this, as student studlies always asked us "why not"? We answered, "just because", heh heh. So here you have two pilots with about 7,000 hours of total fighter time between us about to do something serious, stoopid - "just because".

We did it ONCE!!!!

We had not thot about the aileron-rudder-interconnect.

Sure enough, cross-controlled upon touchdown and WOW switch kicks in, FLCS decides we're on the ground, then waaaahooo! Nose moves 5 or 10 degrees according to our rudder input! Sure glad it wasn't a wet or icy runway as we would then be skidding down the thing sideways.

A year later I land the jet at Nellis with a 25 knot crosswind in a crab. Right at limit, and HUD symbology was trapped on one side, so flight path marker is useless. Piece of cake. those doggone certified test pilots at Edwards were right.

later,

Gums sends...

Salute!

Before the big tail, we DID HAVE THE MPO switch. Musta been incorporated with first few jets. We watched movies of deep stalls and were told how to use the MPO.

Meanwhile, we had to manually transfer gas forward. Maybe 1000 or 1200 pounds. Naturally, we wanted to see how the jet performed with that forward C.G.

Sure enuf, two guys did a max pull when flying in route formation and the "balanced" jet had a slower pitch rate. ho hum.

The problem came up on the way home, when we had to manually move that gas back to the normal c.g. Because we would forget, we often landed with an aft c.g. so bad that any normal jet would have departed in the break.

We knew we had forgotten that switch when we didn't have nose-wheel steering. Strut was not compressed enuf. No biggie, differential braking and move gas forward while in de-arm area.

If we had barely enuf weight to keep NWS, we still saw an unusual tendency. Just my wimpy 140 pounds, plus gear had kept the switch compressed and I had a severe aft c.g. Upon stepping off the ladder the nose starts going up as the jet tries to stand on its tail!!! Crew chief and I pull it back down before damage, but we heard that at least one guy ( who prolly weighed a lot more than me) had the thing settle back on the ventrals.

Gums sends...

Salute!

So the wrenchbenders learned along with us.

Doggone orifii in the hydraulics were tiny, and new materials for actuator seals were tighter. So no "red rag wrench" needed during preflight. If you saw a leak it was for real.

Seems that water could be absorbed in the hydraulics. We used new procedures soon and cured the "problem".

So Gums-breath raises gear handle and wingie notes, "Gums, left main is still down". Gums lowers handle. "Gums, nose gear down, left main down". So I have the nose and left main down. Not good.

Burn gas and orbit for a few, then decide not to use the blow down bottle as the mains dropped by gravity, and I would lose NWS if I used the bottle. Then it hit me, GRAVITY!!!

Being a Viper, I could pull 4 or 5 gees without exceeding the speed limit ( which was mainly for the doors). So last ditch maneuver is in order.

Get to 250 or 300, light burner and snatch! Whammo! Gear goes down and locks. Calmly advise SOF and tower I won't try a barrier engagement or bail.

Land and taxi off to de-arm.

Ammo dude plugs in and advises to shut down, as hydraulic fluid was leaking at a great rate from all the busted actuator seals.

Culprit was ice crystals, but I got the thing back with no other damage and crew chief was happy.

We started a neat filter process after that and maybe another incident or two, and problem went away.

Gums sends...

P.S. and then there was why I loved P & W industrial strength compressor blades...

jbgator wrote:

If in the recesses of my shrinking brain I ever recall another specific tailnumber I will try to link it but may need some assistance. You know all us fighter pilots suffer from Maltzheimers (SP intended).

Quite simple. Check the screen grab attached. Simply find the tail no. in the database and go to it's profile page then copy-and-paste the circled text into your thread entry. QED. If you use Firefox, it puts a space before and after each bracket. Dunno why. Just take 'em out before posting. If ya do it right, the tail number will show up underlined as in my last reply.

You go Gums! I figured that would get you started. Before I add a new one, more on MPO. The 72nd at MacDill where I did my B-course had Blk 10 B models and Blk 5 A models. Lots of avionics differences and the Blk 5s did not have MPO till they went through Falcon Rally which brought them up to Blk 10 commonality. I assumed Blk 10s were built with them and retrofitted on Blk 1/5. So we had to do two sets of CAPs for out of control because we flew Bs with MPO and As without them. All I remember of the non-MPO CAPs was lighting the AB and engine feed knob to AFT. Both desperation moves in our minds...not that we were too sure what "stick cycle in phase" meant at that time either.

It was interesting doing your dual rides in a Blk 10 and solo in Blk 5. Stab out radar was the toughest deal to get used to but as I recall you had to manually change radar ranges, no target locator line or TD box, and could not carry Aim-9L on Blk 5. Was way cool to get to TJ and brand new Have Glass Blk 15s.

Next Note,warning,caution (by the way these remind me of Dan Akroyd teaching Ned Beatty how NOT to fire a 40MM AA gun in the movie 1941...DO NOT place ammo clip in the feed guides here...DO NOT place arming lever to the forward position...DO NOT depress firing foot pedal here...)

DO NOT push nose down when landing fast due to heavy weight or SFO. The airplane will wheelbarrow causing the nose wheel or gear to fail. A certain TJ Lt Col who would later rise to multi star rank did an SFO at the Lik, as I recall due to a birdstrike on the wing (WTFO we thought at the time), landed long and fast, pushed the nose down to get on the brakes and the nose tire failed, cut a dual gouge in the runway with the rims, I think it cut the departure end cable (rotten piece of luck), and ran off into the overrun. Hot summer day in Turkey the asphalt in the overrun was especially soft and nose gear dug in, collapsed, and intake lip gouged into that soft black goo almost like 759 had into the mud. That was a Squid (613th TFS) jet so i think it would have been an 800 or 900 but don't remember so I don't have to struggle with trying to figure out Link's instructions above. Sat there for quite a while like a ruptured duck as I recall.

Enough till next time...JB

Hi Gums! Hope you and yours had a great holiday season. Very Happy

Another “trap post”

Blaze gas and orbit for a few, then decide not to use the blow down bottle as the mains dropped by gravity, and I would lose NWS if I used the bottle. Then it hit me, GRAVITY!!!

Bottles and NWS is an F-15 thing?
You got at least 3+ attempts to unlock the gear with full bottles!
still have some braking. Shrug

Gums you got it but I am tally, visual, supporting if required.

But wanted to comment on the wing low thing. Had to land in 25 knot cross wind on an early BFM ride in B-course. Had Jose Oberly (SP?) in my pit so I was intimidated, as he was a legend and I admit the BFM had not gone well. Went OK as you mentioned so had confidence from then on. Only problem with crab to touch down is that often crosswind decreases close to the ground and you wind up with too much crab and jet tends to tip into the crab at touchdown because your mains are at an angle to your flight path. Not usually a big deal but a lot of roll control opposite the tip could make the trailing edge of a big slab hit the ground. Never happened to me but did to others.

Kids do not try this at home but after I had several K hours in the jet I used to kick out some of the crab while I was in the flare, rudder in rudder out, so there was not enough time for drift to build up but aligned the fuselage more with the runway and i found that far preferable. But as I said that was after several thousand landings when I could tell the right time. It was not a wing low method and the rudder was neutral when I touched down. Never taught anyone or advocated to anyone to do it...just did it myself.

But the Jose story I wanted to relate because I used it later to teach IPs about additive stick input in a family model. As I said, Jose was a god. He was CC of the 72nd, had done the stuff at Nellis that nobody would talk about, and could walk on water as far as the other IPs, and by example us studs, at Macdill were concerned. This was my first DBFM ride and my first ride with him. Seems I was always clueless and out of sync with what he was thinking and obviously wasn't doing too well in his mind. When I was thinking break, he was saying "extend", and vice versa. Finally as the training aid IP was getting close at high angle off I was thinking he was still too far away and too few angles so I chose extend. Jose thought it was time to force an overshoot. He said "hook 'im" twice but JB was already unloading to extend. On the third "Hook 'im" he decided to help me by grabbing the stick in the back and "hooked him". My extension to that point had recovered enough airspeed that there was a fair amount of G available and, looking back over the seat and unprepared for the onset, my head went down between the ACES II pitot tube and the canopy and stuck there. The "AAAUUUGGGGHHHH" sound I made scared the crap out of him and he eased off the stick (I know what it sounded like because of the tape review). I slowly pried my head free of the tight place and regained my composure. He decided we needed to go home and we did through some really bad weather that I had a hard time staying on the wing. The only good thing in my grade book for that ride was the landing in a 25 knot Xwind. I don't think I ever flew with Jose again and guess I never redeemed myself with him. But I learned a lot from that and he was always good to me after that. Used that story to teach new IPs that you cannot "help" a student by getting on the stick as he had no idea you were helping and the results could be very counterproductive. Also made it clear never paddle off in the flare because you got neutral slabs for a second (go around is throttle up) and rudder out of a too-close formation situation vice trying to help on the stick. Make sure the stud knew you were doing it.

Workin hard on some motor stories to get TEG and crowd fired up but currently can only remember the first motor I saw going through academics. Looking into the burner can of this engine in the shop we could see thousands of little pieces of burnt white cloth hanging on the spray rings like burnt laundry. Turns out a crew chief, seeing some fluid on the nose strut of a running jet, wanted to wipe it off to make sure there was no persistent leak. Only thing that came to hand was the sleeve of her white bunny suit (which thankfully she was no longer wearing). As the large white garment rapidly disappeared from her hand into the intake I guess she figured out it was not a good idea. Better it than her. I hadn't even flown the jet yet and it gave me a healthy respect for the F100-PW200 intake. You can't script them like that and I credit our academic instructor for taking us to the engine shop to see it vice sitting around in a classroom looking at slides. Tried to use that same technique years later as an instructor myself. Engine shop guys were surprised at first by my requests to bring a class out but it became routine thereafter. I learned a lot from those trips. JB

Salute!

Hey, vark!!!

The only two mechanical connections we had in the whole jet were the throttle-to-motor, and the doo-hickey on the end of the gear handle that you rotated and then pulled to mechanically unlock the gear doors and "blow down" the nose gear.

So if you used that thing, then you lost nose wheel steering. Brakes worked fine if you still had hydraulics, which I did ( EPU would also have provided rudder and such). So I "minimized" my problems once getting the thing on the ground on all three wheels.

***********************

For JB.

Our Block 5's had the sloppy stick and the MPO switch. Most all of the Block I birds had been produced when I showed up in June '79. Some to OT&E, some still at Edwards, rest in the 16th TFTS.

So 34th got first Bk 5's in early fall and so did MacDill, tho I recall them having Bk I family models for awhile. As there were only a few IP's at the time, we flew Bk I's and Bk 5's, then Bk 10's on a day-to-day basis. The family model Bk I's were upgraded to Bk 10, then had the big tail put on and I honestly don't know where the black-nosed Bk I A's went.

I didn't see a lot of difference in the avionics until the Bk15. Sure, we had the neat video camera in some of the Bk5's and from then on. Otherwise, we were getting new sftwe to keep up until we had hdwe changes like the Bk 15.

Where's TEG-breath? He can tell all about stall-stag and EEC and BUC.

and then there was the day I had the chunk of ice hit the compressor blades.........

Gums sends...

P.S. The kick-the-rudder deal in the flare was in vogue from day one for strong crosswinds.

A story I heard from a co-worker back in 96...and it was old then, so no telling when this actually happened and I'm sure to goober it up but here goes

Guy was flying in AZ as a low time guy when suddenly the airplane wanted to pitch...hard. First time it caught him by surprise and before he knew what was happening he was over the top in an uncommanded loop. Since he was flying IFR home from the MOA he was promptly yelled at by the FAA controller as well as lead. As he was bottomed out of his loop he had the presence to roll the jet and turn it into a level turn. Think think think...for what ever reason he hit the MPO switch. It's designed to take a large chunk of the flight control system out of the loop but according to GD it shouldn't have worked but it did and he had pitch authority again. As he got home and tried to land he found he needed three hands. Stick/throttle/MPO. Think think think...he pulled his black USAF issue pen from his pocket, unscrewed the cap with his teeth and was able to jam it in such a way to hold the MPO switch in the engaged position. Landed uneventfully.

He got all kinds of awards for that one...to this day LM insists that the MPO switch shouldn't have worked, but then the uncommanded pitch was never explained as well so...

Quote:

... to this day LM insists that the MPO switch shouldn't have worked, but then the uncommanded pitch was never explained as well so...

I was involved in the Conference Hotel call for that one. And you're right, the engineers who designed the FLCS never could explain it. H. Zane Scott, a true FLCS engineering genius, was adamant that the MPO switch couldn't have done what the pilot claimed it did.

Actually there is a simple explanation that is quite plausible. Just as with the AOA icing which caused the AOA probes to rotate downward causing the FLCS to believe the AOA was >29 which resulted in the FLCS taking over and directing full trailing edge down on the slabs producing an negative G push under, an AOA signal fault could theoretically produce a pegged negative AOA situation leading the FLCS to command full trailing edge up on the slabs to get AOA back below -29 producing a pitch up. In such a case the FLCS would be working exactly as directed. Since it thought AOA >-29 it would allow the pilot to engage the MPO.

Not sure what kind of AOA probe failure could produce an erroneous negative AOA situation, but who would have predicted the response to the AOA probe icing situation? Air data in the F-16 is not as redundant as the 4 FLCS branches. Backup to the AOA probes is differential pressure in the data probe (we called donkey d...) which has a center hole for impact pressure and holes on the edges for static pressure. The AOA probes produced an electrical signal to the CADC the Donkey D had to go through the ADC where pitot and static pressures were turned into electric jet useable signals.

JB

Forum: F-16 Procedures

Notes, warnings, and cautions