Forum: F-35 Lightning II

I'm curious as to what the USMC CONOPS (Concept Of Operations) is going to be as regards maritime operations.

The vast majority of USMC fighters have essentially been identical to USN fighters. The USMC A-4, A-6, A-7, F-4, and F-18 have differed from their USN counterparts only in their exterior markings. As such, they were fully compatible with standard USN attack carrier operations involving catapult launch and arrested recovery. Carrier cycle times, deck spotting, spare parts supply, etc, was not affected by having USMC aircraft onboard. USMC fighter and attack squadrons are often seen aboard the Navy's CVNs.

The exception has been the STOVL AV-8B. The AV-8 is not capable of a vertical takeoff with a useful fuel and weapons load, thus requiring a "short", but still significant takeoff roll. Since STOL takeoffs require a total reconfiguration of the flight deck, disruption of cycle times, etc, the Navy is loathe to carry the AV-8 on it's attack carriers. The Harrier is rarely if ever seen deployed on the USN CVNs. Almost all USMC "carrier" operations take place on the Navy's much smaller assault (LHA) carriers. There they can mix with the USMC rotary wing assets such as the CH-46 and CH-53.

What does the USMC plan to do with the F-35B? From what I see the F-35B is not capable of conventional carrier ops involving catapult launch and arrested landing. That means the F-35B does not mix well with the USN F-18s, E-2Cs, and future F-35Cs.

I can forsee the following scenario: "Admiral, we want you to park all your E-2Cs, F-18s and F-35Cs below decks so that we can use the length of your deck for rolling takeoffs. Oh, and for recoveries, you need to modify your decks to deal with the heat and acoustic environment generated by our vertical landings. And yes, our F-35Bs have less range, less payload, and less stealth than your F-35Cs, but who cares, because we are the Marines after all."

Operating the F-35B off an LHA may be equally problematic. The F-35B weighs roughly twice what the AV-8B weighs, and it's VTOL profile is far more demanding on the landing surface than the AV-8B. It's sophisticated systems and stealth technology will probably require a greater maintenance party onboard than the AV-8B. It also requires a much greater fuel load than the AV-8B, placing greater demands on the LHA's limited supplies. The USMC contingent aboard an LHA is going to have to make tradeoffs between V-22s, CH-53Ks, AH-1s, and the F-35B.

Some may argue that the F-35B will only deploy to the combat area onboard an LHA or CVN, then operate from land. I see two problems with that: One, if you load up your carrier with F-35Bs, which will leave once they arrive in theater, you now have empty space on the carrier that is not being used in the combat theater. (Admiral, once you drop off our jets, you can sail back to San Diego with your empty ship....) Two, if the combat area is so benign that the USMC can build 2000' concrete STOL runways, hardened 90 x 90 VTOL landing pads, transport many tons of jet fuel, PGMs, spare parts, mission planning facilities, ground support vehicles, etc, then it probably wasn't a very high threat are to start with, and you probably don't need an amphibious assault acrioss the beach.

So my questions is this: How will the F-35B be used that is different from what the F-35A or F-35C can do?

That being said, the Harrier can do a lot that the F-35B can't...

Does anyone else think that the Marines insisting on a STOVL variant has wrecked this program? Who the hell really needs STOVL anyway. The f-35B has caused so many delays it makes me want to pull my hair out when i think of where we could be in the testing phase with out it. What is the true tactical application of STOVL? I would say it is obsolete if you have carriers close by. Im not a marine, so i guess my question is this. What is the bottom line tactical kinetic effects that an f-35b can bring, that a f-35c cannot?

popcorn, perhaps the 'Battle for Wake Island' is another cause for USMC concern:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wake_Island

"USN relief attempt
VMA-211 Insignia.The projected U.S. relief attempt by Admiral Frank Fletcher's Task Force 11 (TF-11) and supported Admiral Wilson Brown’s Task Force 14 (TF-14) consisted of the fleet carrier Saratoga, the fleet oiler USNS Neches, the seaplane tender Tangier, the cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, and ten destroyers. The convoy carried the 4th Marine Defense Battalion, the VMF-221 fighter squadron equipped with F2A Brewster Buffalo fighters, along with 9,000 five-inch (127 mm) rounds, 12,000 three-inch (76.2 mm) rounds, and 3,000,000 .50 cal. (12.7 mm) rounds as well as a large amount of ammunition for mortars and other battalion small arms. Task Force 14 (TF-14) with the fleet carrier Lexington, three heavy cruisers, eight destroyers and one oiler was to undertake a raid on the Marshall Islands to divert Japanese attention.

On December 22 at 21:00, after receiving information indicating the presence of two IJN carriers and two fast battleships near Wake Island Vice Admiral William S. Pye, the Acting Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, ordered TF-14 to return to Pearl Harbor for fear of losses."