Forum: F-22A Raptor

Last edited by jetnerd on Feb 13, 2010 - 07:11 AM; edited 1 time in total

Quote:

F-35's can be built as rapidly as 200-300 per year with ease.

I don't think we can yet project accurately when this capability will be reached, in light of cost overruns, current delays in development and testing, and any ensuing political fallout [that I have faith we'll ultimately get past]. I'll take such projections seriously only when the bigger issues are put to bed and the LRIP jets start rolling off the line - projections about when F-35's can be contributing significantly to the force structure - which I'm guessing would be when we have at least a few squadrons go FOC.

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jetnerd wrote:

Quote:

F-35's can be built as rapidly as 200-300 per year with ease.

That remains to be realized. According to Bill Sweetman's Feb 5 article in AvLeak, LM's production line seems to be maturing fine ["less and less traveled work"], but issues need to be resolved before testing can proceed full-bore - as everyone is tired of hearing about these last couple of months. Only when the bigger issues are put to bed and the LRIP jets start rolling off the line will I take seriously any projections about when F-35's can be contributing significantly to the force structure. I.e. about when could we expect the first few squadrons to go IOC.

If you are at all familiar with production lines then you would know that the ability to manufacture these jets in the numbers mentioned is trivial.

-DA

DA, I wasn't questioning LM's production capability - I'm fully convinced they're champing [chomping?] at the bit to get started. But it seems that redesign work on a few systems and a few other issues are holding things back for now.
I can't wait til we get past these what seem to be minor [but expensive] problems. I know they will.

PS - sorry for the edit to my previous post - you were quick to reply before I could post the edit.

jetnerd,

That was an appropriate 'edit' anyway... to change the context from 'IOC' to 'FOC'. Absolutely, the adequacy of USAF's force structure - when upon deploying the first few FOC block III combat squadrons - has significant 'strategic' relevance to the entire debate of staying-the-course or modifying it (taking into account underestimated variables). By then the the capabilities of force structure will likely be more thinly stretched than at anytime... with the exception of National strategy requirements being reduced to meet the force structure, of course.

DA -

Correct, and you made my point.. JPO/DoD's 'stay the course' JSF recapitalization plan will guarantee AF's neglect and inability to direct equally strategic attention to primary procurement needs such as adequate Tanker capitalization, F-22 upgrades (and frankly, timely F-35 spiral upgrades!), UAV/ISR/Space assets, adequate modern weapon acquisitions, incl Prompt Global Strike and NGB among others. The F-35A budgetary demands (under the proclaimed expectations still today) will simply outstrip the required parallel USAF Procurement allocations!

A couple things you appear to be overshooting however, if I may:

Yes, the current plan DOES call for 'fixed', 'known', USAF MYB acquisitions. Why? For one thing, to prepare world wide synergistic network of industrial capacity equipped, supplied, manned, trained and prepared for an efficient, cost-effective roll-out operation. That cannot be done year to year and the global synergy will simply not support it.

No, USAF therefore cannot just bust out orders for 200-300 F-35As out of nowhere, one year - taking delivery 2 yrs later if necessary. Same goes for the argument of simply restarting F-22 line out of nowhere and have F-22s pumping out the door 24 months later, if need be. (If I read your post correctly and I take this back, if your point was not fully understood).

As for more plausible USAF acquisition realities of F-35A go... given the inevitably higher than projected/advertised LRIP/FRP UPC costs (even at fixed big buys of 80/yr), USAF will be cutting back by default. Furthermore, given inevitable federal (domestic) budgetary crisis/pressures, for argument sake starting in FY16 (perhaps by FY13), anything short of WWIII will force reversal in pledges and cuts to defense budgets. Hence, calculate closer to: 40/yr USAF buys at most, maybe 45 max in FRP @ substantially higher UPC costs than officially expected.

And lastly, re: 'adequacy' of USAF's 2020 force structure... no, the stay-the-course F-35 recapitalization plan (as decided from early 2000s - something which cannot simply/fully be reversed going forward), will NOT be adequate to maintain a similar level of projection-deterrence and overall 'balance of power' capability, as to today or recent past. Maintaining balance of power and capability (via any Service branch) being definition of 'adequate' in Peace-time.

Bottom line: As QDR projects now even higher threats to balance of power (national security) than at anytime since end of Cold War; this, when combined with imminent further expansion of USAF's capability gap (given the current JSF recap plan), is a high-risk, double negative impact to US's adequate defense planning. Very serious implications, sir, unfortunately something with which you clearly blow off as little worth in considering... yet is something absolutely with which a calculating and competent US Congress (and USAF) need to take issue, today.

GeoGen,

I can't recall how many times or generations of this platform or that that "if we don't do/buy x" then all hell breaks loose! It's laughable. The threat predictions that contribute to procurement choices Are factored in. Your alarmist unfounded superstition about a lack of fighters, more specifically F-22's(which is what's really driving you), is simply without any rational logical basis. It's based on old Abd distorted cold war paradigms that no longer exist, can't exist in the timeframe we are discussing and in all likelihood will NEVER exist again. I'm quite sure it took a while for enthusiast to get over the whole switch to 5.56mm when that happened too! Bottom line is that things and priorities change. The F-22 is probably one of last programs we need to be beefing up at this point. Especially when it's limitations are considered.

I've asked you several times to show or explain why the current and planned force would not be capable of meeting the requirements. You consistently fail to do that. I can show however that the DoD didn't just arbitrarily cap F-22 production and that as is the planned force was designed with things like PAK FA and J-xx ect in mind.

-DA

Last edited by geogen on Feb 14, 2010 - 03:40 AM; edited 1 time in total

What's driving me is not specifically more F-22. However, Yes, up to 100 more 21st century-applied block 35 variants (standarized, modern F-22 fleet) would allow early retirement of the 'lesson jet block 20s' as well as any adequate number of potentially less efficient 'problematic block 30'. So sure, 200 operational, 'modern/mature' F-22s (150 combat coded) is an acceptable balance to above 'should be future structure'.

Even without additional block 35 F-22 procurement, at least one current solution - probably by FY12 (ideally FY11) - is to procure maximal modern day F-16 variants (to replace retiring units on a less than 1:1 ratio), in parallel to continued F-35 R&D and its delayed/reduced procurement.

But what you (and camp) continue to fail at, in defending your case, is by arguing that DoD factors it's advertised requirement for 1,500+ USAF F-35A based on 'factored in' threat predictions going forward, while you bash any idea of 60 more block 35 F-22 being justified, let alone new F-16 production which you say would be 'overkill'! You can't have it both ways! I.e., If such alarmist predictions in fact require a 1,700 F-35A force structure, then absolutely we have a major national defense problem being predicted by your camp, one which is arguably even more threatening than suggested in the recent QDR (their alarmist words, not mine)!

Flat out, with well-intentioned, military industrial complex dreamed 1,700 F-35A NOT being procured for USAF at any point, it is paramount that JSF's Foreign partners need to be informed of this imminent, substantial annual cuts in procurement. To not do so is either purposefully being deceptive, or inept and disingenuous. Either way, Foreign partners/allies need to know the realistic, honest estimates. Moreover, Congress and USAF commanders need to be absolutely clear on this imminent adjustment, so that they can be armed with the most accurate information when making their own assessments. Otherwise, it is totally becoming an entire new issue for Congress to tackle soon (both fact finding and investigatory).

As for your highly speculative and implied assumption, that the stay-the-course recapitalization strat will confidently and sufficiently maintain 'balance of power' in 2020 ('maintaining balance of power' being actually something of point you seem to dodge repeatedly), both the newly articulated QDR threat assessments and prematurely reducing USAF Tacair capability, by 2020-2021, would tell otherwise.

So to be specific, once again... USAF is looking at around 40, maybe 45 max procurement in FRP (say around FY16 on), which could eventually equate in real numbers to perhaps 250, even 300 F-35A short of current expectations by 2021! Now factor less than expected F-16 (and even F-15) operational units.. Retire some (or all) block 20 F-22s (which would be perfectly normal for a new system acquisition).... and Now what do you have?!? Short of national strategy requirements, short of balance of power and mostly, short of foresight and accurate planning.

To all regards.
When Russians do bring their prototype 5 generations to the mind (they do promise deliveries into 2015) will be able this aircraft to be real enemy F -22? What you have impressions about first video PAK-FA?

Hello, ant (are you involved with Antonov?).

If you click on 'modern mil aircraft' forum link http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewforum-f-36.html you will find better discussions on this subject.

If T-50 is delivered to operators, regardless of in being 2015 or 2018, it will of course be a formidable future frontline aircraft. Regards and welcome to F-16.net.

Well, I actually don't think the PAK-FA will be an equal to the F-22. It's probably going to be better than our fourth gen fighters but not better than our fifth-gen fighters.

Let me clear up another thing. I do believe we need more F-22's, but I do realize that the financial (and sadly, political) situation is not ripe for more buys of a seemingly unneeded "relic of the Cold War". Mostly, the money just isn't there; what we have is better spent somewhere else. Tough choices must be made and even though I do not like it, I realize it is almost necessary.

Having said that, what I am at odds about is the assertion or belief that the F-22 is badly designed or somehow not fit to be in production in the first place. I AGREE that today, it makes no sense to spend north of $100 million to get one measly F-22 when for the same price or less you can get a whole boatload of armor and protective equipment to our troops in Afghanistan, where they face alot of IED's and RPG's. I AGREE that this is NEEDED today; what I DON'T agree with, and in fact I vehemently disagree with, is the assertion that we "can't upgrade the F-22" or "it has too many issues".

First of all, we CAN upgrade the F-22 and have done so already. The teen series of fighters we upgraded throughout their lifetimes and so will the F-22. Does it cost money? EVERYTHING costs money! All modern military aircraft are designed with future updates in mind. This is fact, not opinion.

Second, the F-22 DID have some structural issues. These were identified and a plan was put in place to fix them. The F-35 is in the final testing phases (I'm actually being a bit lenient as A LOT of testing was scrapped to save money), and we already identified a weight issue with the B version, and corrected it. Was it a serious issue? Yes it was. Did we fix it? Yes we did. Same thing happened with the F-22 structural issues: we identified and fixed them.

What I'm advocating in other words is, we need to solve today's problems in order to do what we need to do tomorrow. We need to fix Afghanistan, get out of there as much as we can, and refocus our efforts towards building a force that can handle broad confilcts AS WELL AS insurgencies. We were totally geared towards WWIII type conflicts at the beginning of the century - now we are leaning more towards being geared at insurgency type conflicts. I think we should prepare for both. There needs to be a look at what we want to accomplish and how best to allocate those funds to accomplish it, instead of the usual, case-by-case, program-by-program, service-by-service type of analisys. Somebody really needs to step back and think about our strategy as a whole, instead of just focusing on "Hey this program is great let's give XYZ contractor billions to make it".

Tinito,

I guess I have to confront this popular concept that F-22 is merely 'a Cold War relic'. The F-22 today is a long-derived product started from a natural contingency to eventually replace the F-15 (as Euro Fighter is a natural policy to replace Tornado, etc), nothing more, nothing less. The fact that the initial ATF project was in fact conceived during the Cold War should truly be irrelevant, IMHO, as this requirement was not political at all and simply derived from the approach to counter imminent, 'future oriented threats' which would presumably make F-15A-D obsolete. No?

The actual, 'ideologically blind' final product therefore, being the selected F-22, was in fact merely selected to 'hedge', or counter-balance assumed future air power capabilities such as what we see being developed today (and those rumored to be soon developed), of which are arguably being developed now with more accelerated fervor and with greater ambitions than contemplated in the post-cold war 90s?

Now w/ regarding the block 20 F-22... some would disagree with you only in that it was not meant to be a 'game-changer' still flying in 2030, etc Rather, it was more likely an early block 'lesson jet' and part of a spiral development program, designed and planned for long-term air-superiority deterrence and to be produced in substantially higher numbers than is the case today. Thus, it is only today that by default pressure is being mounted on the DoD/USAF to make very costly decisions on whether to upgrade the block 20s to some extent and the block 30s to block 35 standard. Such a debacle is merely the unintended consequence of prematurely ending the Program.

I totally agree with you, geogen.

It's clear that some people don't understand what's meant when a platform is called "cold war" relic which the F-22 clearly is. Basically that means three things. It's not a true multimission aircraft. It's avionics suite as designed are pre-NCW. It was also designed in an era where cost wasn't a primary designed limitation.

-DA

The notion that everything should be or needs to be "multimission" is rather problematic. The mission of our SSBN's is nuclear deterrent. An aircraft carrier is a mobile air base. Designs that added other missions detracted form the primary and were normally seen as an error and later removed (such as area air defense systems or surface to surface missiles). One's chemical defense kit is not multimission nor is a recon satellite. How multimission is an anti tank mine?

The mission of air superiority fighter is both challenging and unique. Air superiority is not a "cold war relic". It is a prime mission requirement. The US has fought many conflicts with contested air superiority from WWII to Korea and Vietnam. Just because the last couple conflicts the US was involved with featured nations either without an air force or without one to worry about does not mean the core mission requirement no longer exists.

If the F-35 can do the job of the F-22 wonderful. Then we can eventually replace expensive to operate F-22's with the F-35 in the future.

The B-52 is certainly a "cold war relic". The problem with this analysis is that heavy bombers are darn useful in any war even when the original design was nuclear strike. A stretched two seat F-22/F/A-22/EF-22/etc. could have been rather useful. However perfect the F-35 turns out to be there are specific missions where having a single crew, single engine, and single generator turns out to be a problem. There are various mulitimissions the F-22 can perform now and more it could perform if required. Indeed the F-22 may end up being utilized more than currently projected. In any case the nation still requires some number of air superiority fighters with whatever secondary capabilities being just that- secondary.

If there is no real worry about enemy air superiority aircraft then exactly why does every new USAF strike fighter require all aspect stealth? It's not like we need any stealth aircraft in our current conflicts. If the F-35 ends up a bomb truck in Afghanistan one day won't that be a tad silly vis a vis stealth?

The US constantly ends up planning for the next war based on the current war and ends poorly prepared in most cases. One certainly hopes the nation never requires the F-22 and that 1 1/2 wings are enough for the next 20 years. That said when the USAF gets around to seriously looking at F-X in 5 years they will be looking at another air superiority fighter. Having enough air superiority fighters is insurance- you might not need it all the time but one can not afford to be without at crunch time.

LB,

comparing SSBNs and recon SATs to fighters? Besides the obvious strawman argument, the DoD cannot afford to operate single mission fighters anymore. Cost is a huge part of this which is why the F-35 had that as a primary design criteria. An SSBN and Recon SAT are ALWAYS DOING their primary mission. An Air Superiority specific fighter is going to spend the vast majority of it's time flying in circles after the first few days/weeks of a conflict. This consumes resources and funds. Things like RAMP SPACE and tanking assets that are in short supply because of the disproportionate obsession with air superiority missions. Contrast that with a true multiple-role aircraft like. Viper, Super Horne or late model F-15 variants, all of which can seamlessly continue to contribute after enemy fighters are gone. The irony being that air to ground sorties actually kill more enemy fighters!

That is not to say we don't need the capabilities the F-22 has to offer, we do. But we don't need it out of proportion to the actual threats. Air Superiority specific aircraft like the F-22 can be rotated in and out of conflict as needed based on the level of threat. It's not cost effective or a good way to manage limited funds/resources to buy them for a mission that DOES NOT EXIST ANYMORE on the scale that it did during the Cold War. I've personally been in the same situation as the F-22 crowd where we emphasized platforms and methods of warfare that were inconsistent with the evolution of war. That killed people. Buying more F-22's at the expense of other needs will do that too. Moreover, it tells industry that it's okay to build hideously expensive platforms with serious design flaws that are delivered late and we will just take it. Nuts.

Finally, this new PAK FA aircraft and others like it that will follow in the next decade were planned for and considered by the DoD when they decided to end production. We are fine...

-DA

Forum: F-22A Raptor

Russian Stealth Fighter and premature shutdown of F-22