Forum: F-22A Raptor

DarthAmerica, you're forgetting that the PLAAF is acquiring KJ-2000 AWACS, based on the Beriev / Ilyushin A-50 Mainstay.

The VVS and PLAAF are eschewing ineffective and restrictive Soviet-based GCI tactics and are embracing Western-based AWACS coordination tactics, enabling a great level of autonomy to individual pilots, enhancing overall effectiveness.

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skyhigh wrote:

DarthAmerica, you're forgetting that the PLAAF is acquiring KJ-2000 AWACS, based on the Beriev / Ilyushin A-50 Mainstay.

The VVS and PLAAF are eschewing ineffective and restrictive Soviet-based GCI tactics and are embracing Western-based AWACS coordination tactics, enabling a great level of autonomy to individual pilots, enhancing overall effectiveness.

No, I'm aware. I'm glad you brought it up though. This platform will take time to integrate into their system. 5 to 10 years before the develop doctrine and tactics and then institute it and have officers and NCOs to make it effective at the systems level. Thats the latter half of next decade. It will certainly increase the effectiveness of the PLAAF and their progress is to be admired. But it's not the kind of systems level event that is going to give then the edge over the USAF or USN. For instance, the F-22, a TLAM, SOF personnel, EA-18G, B-2, heck even ICBM is necessary can remove the A-50 from the equation. My point is that we have the means at the systems level to apply overlapping methods of dealing with the and have confidence that we can negate it if need be.

So it's something we should definitely monitor, prepare for, but we can deal with it.

-DA

DA, I hear your analysis regarding 120 frontline Raptors being sufficient, although some will clearly differ in the assessments and conclusions.

I just see too much 'theoretical' basis in your conclusions. You asked for specific examples.. well, the uncertainty of future potential adversarial capabilities, tactics, and intentions, not to mention the pure reality of SNAFUs and Fog of War in a worst case, major conventional Ao cannot arguably be just neatly assessed by lining up some possible force numbers opposing each side and then concluding: we win! Such a major, future conventional conflict could be unprecedented in the level of unconventional, unexpected tactics and under-estimated capabilities, intentions, etc. Asymmetrical methods and diversions and high-tech sabotage, etc, etc, could likely be more contributing to the outcome, than the actual hardware assumed in such a hypothetical. Would 'we' blue forces be defending against a surprise blitz strike? Would the scenario based around retaliation for a previous skirmish or blatant, unacceptable attack on blue forces? Would blue forces mobilize as a show of force in reaction to some hypothetical stand-off, with the will and preparation for a massive pre-emptive first strike of their/our own?

Things could obviously spiral rapidly out of control and stability lost in hours, not just days, weeks or even months in preparing, mobilizing, deploying forces, etc, etc, It just seems your 'assumptions' are based on assurances that so many of blue force F-22s would arrive on time, at the right place, along with accompanying USN aviation assets, and reserve F-15, etc. We're assuming that only one potential adversary would be opposing the blue forces and that they're tactics would involve throwing 200+ front-line tactical assets into the fray, head-on and as expected, etc. E.G., consider 600+ accurate (multi-adversarial) TBM's vs blue forces air bases (in Japan as you suggested), combined with asymmetrical attacks as a pre-emptive first strike against blue incapacitating half of said F-22s/F-15 deployed? Would the enemy(ies) wait for F-22s to attack? What if a third party (major conventional force) deployed maritime/aviation assets into Ao to prevent an escalation and force a cease-fire, after 30+ F-22s were damaged/lost asymmetrically and in early combat before enemy tactics were sufficiently analyzed? So now USAF has 80 front-line F-22s (including non-combat attrition) by 2013 and F-35s IOC is unexpectedly being pushed back further, as with block 4/5 delays and weapons clearance issues persist, etc.. With massively reduced US legacy fleets by 2014 (even greater than expected), a surprise number of advanced 4.5/4.5++ aircraft (along with under-estimated successful new classes of armaments/avionics) have been proliferated around the world, many in adversarial hands after the above hypothetical scenario.. Now what is USAF's plan, (assuming a catastrophic, simultaneous US/western financial crisis and global-wide deteriorating stability plus energy emergency, during unfolding events)?

I guess what I'm getting at hypothetically, regardless of how 'policy/contingency planners' are making their decisions and calculations... is that it's better to have an OVERWHELMING modern, tactical DETERRENCE, instead of squeaking by with fingers crossed, than to actually have to be forced into a major unexpected confrontation unprepared and completely mis-calculated! The strategic air combat DETERRENCE today and at this cross-roads in history is the F-22! (while we cross fingers and await some form of an F-35 tactical complement et al).

So perhaps the essential, 'fleeting' question today is... "do we assess 120 frontline F-22s as an OVERWHELMING deterrence, to cover all disperesed contingencies and strategic stabilization deployments, world-wide, and hopefully NOT have to endure a forced, catastrophic engagement if USAF was perceived and calculated as in fact weak and the yet unknown, opportune time exploited by the enemy, as radical as it sounds... at least over the next 10 yr estimated strategic air combat gap" IMHO.

In summary, what you're saying, is that if all the world's worst possible scenarios happened at the same time, the United States Air Force would be screwed. What you're not saying, and what I have yet to read anyone else saying is a plausible scenario that emphatically demonstrates that 187 is not enough. Basically you trying to engineer a perfect system that completely mitigates any risk. That's not possible when you're working with limited resources. 60 or even 100 additional airframes does not change your scenario. What if they just skip conventional weapons altogether and go straight to nuclear weapons? Do you see where I'm going with this?

The Department of Defense has to prioritize limited resources based on assessments of the likelihood of a conflict and the capabilities of the parties involved. I would like nothing more than to wake up and read that the Air Force is going to procure 1000 F-22's. But given monetary concerns and the fact that we're fighting wars I know that that's not realistic or even smart. Our ability to project force and win wars does not rest on a single platform. If it did a wise opponent would simply ask his engineers to develop a countermeasure. Once that countermeasures developed, you're SOL. So it is an invalid premise that the United States Air Force ability to conduct a mission rests solely on the F-22.

The United States Air Force and allies possessed overlapping redundant capabilities that are designed to endure attrition. So long as that attrition is kept to reasonable levels, in good shape. If not, it's much more likely that you have a tactics and strategy issue rather than a platform issue.

All evidence suggests considerable dominance over the People's Republic of China and the Russians. Moreover, no evidence suggest imminent hostilities. That gives us a buffer to refocus our efforts on platforms and systems in much higher demand. Things like helicopters, airlift strategic and inter-theater, funding to revitalize the United States Army and Marines who have been stretched thin. As has been demonstrated recently, systems like the literal combat ship which actually applicable to conflicts that are going on today and likely tomorrow. I could go on and on but I think you get the point. This is just like the Army's future combat systems, its high tech, it's great but the requirements have changed. It's good that the secretary of defense recognizes that. We're going to be in good shape.

-DA

Once the production line is closed it is very hard to re-start. I would like to see a compromise to keep the line warm. Produce maybe 10 a year so you keep your options available while waiting for world situation to change.

arl8733 wrote:

Once the production line is closed it is very hard to re-start. I would like to see a compromise to keep the line warm. Produce maybe 10 a year so you keep your options available while waiting for world situation to change.

That makes every airframe very expensive. Maybe it´d be possible to mothball the productionline for the and then start it up again in say 10 years IF the need arise?

The world situation has changed. Also, I don't buy the line that production can't later be restarted. Sure, it would be expensive as hell. But it's not like we would have to go through r&d again. 1-2 years notice and production could resume. Maybe quicker. But that's very unlikely given the situation today IMHO.

-DA

Actually it depends on how the line is closed. When the C-5A was stopped, the production tools were abbandonded in place making it relatively easy to re-start. At the end of the C-141A, the Air Force ordered the tools destroyed except for those for spares making it too expensisve to re-start although many would have liked to restart that program. Given Mr Gates attitude toward the F-22, I think he will do all that he can to prevent a restart and therefore will probably order the production tooling destroyed,

arl8733 wrote:

Actually it depends on how the line is closed. When the C-5A was stopped, the production tools were abbandonded in place making it relatively easy to re-start. At the end of the C-141A, the Air Force ordered the tools destroyed except for those for spares making it too expensisve to re-start although many would have liked to restart that program. Given Mr Gates attitude toward the F-22, I think he will do all that he can to prevent a restart and therefore will probably order the production tooling destroyed,

I really don't think thats a fair statement about the SecDef unless you know him. His motive isn't emotional against the F-22. Its just calculation based on what his Office thinks the USAF needs.

-DA

I certainly don't think it is personal. It is political. He knows that the political backers of the F-22 will continue to push for restarts in the future. If he is convinced that is the wrong path, the way he prevents is is by scrapping the production tools. That is a smart political move for him to achieve his goal.

And the Raptor pilots wouldn't want that to happen. Their brothers and sisters in the Air Force also want to fly the Raptor one day in their lives.

May be a pair of "disillusioned" Raptor pilots would want to buzz Capitol Hill while in session.

And they'll go "What was that noise!?"

"It's the curse of the Raptor!"

"I think it's a consequence of the attempt to kill off the F-22 program!"

Thanks for well stated reply as usual, DA. (and I have to respect the very closeness in position and mindset you articulate to the arguments being made today at the top - that makes it a grounded, relevant, on-topic debate here).

The frustrating part however is that such logical an intelligent 'leadership' is arguably employing just so unconvincing, inconsistent and contradictory rationale used to make the case for much of the 'Office's' positions, including the F-22. I mean, are you personally cognizant of even the appearance of some of the main contradictions as argued (and simply just making a logical debate to support a fixed, rigid political decision)? Or are you truly believing every aspect of the debate and reason supporting the absolute thinking behind the decisions made by 'Office'? And please, I truly mean neither disrespect to you nor to current SecDef by phrasing the above 'survey' questions out of pure curiosity, and would be fascinated if you had the time to reply to the more philosophical aspects of this debate.. Anyway, and I've stated this before, I would fully support SecDef's positions only if there was some secretive multi-lateral strategic disarmament agreement underway, which would explain the trend. So yes I would actually support that and have promoted such a hypothetical Yalta II (Super powers, End of Cold-War) demobilization/disarmament/cooperation agreement and would understand if at least initially it was to remain secretive (e.g., in order to dodge various domestic political difficulties).

Otherwise, point blank, I'm sorry there's such broad disagreement on so many fundamental national defense issues/opinions by various camps..

A few examples in particular:

"60 or even 100 additional [F-22] airframes does not change your [total riskless] scenario. What if they just skip conventional weapons altogether and go straight to nuclear weapons?"

I'm not intending to speak for everyone in the 'more-Raptor' camp, but the point is that ANY number, even 20 additional Raptors, would enable more strategic air combat deterrence, at least over the 10 year critical 'gap', than none at all (of course... no plan will ever produce a 'riskless' level of deterrence - sorry to have implied that). It's all relevant though, sure and so yes, 60 would enable even more deterrence/air-dominance than 20, etc.. And of course, if it ever went 'Nuc Option', all the LCS, F-35 and UAVs one could wish for would not mitigate risk either..

"But given monetary concerns and the fact that we're fighting wars... Our ability to project force and win wars does not rest on a single platform... solely on the F-22..."

I'm sorry but that argument is a direct example of a commonly made distraction to the heart of the matter: i.e. could at least 20 more F-22 provide more cost-effective strategic deterrence and modern tactical capability especially over said 'gap', at the expense of a nominal chip off the still sustained official plan 'B' (expecting 2,440+ cheap F-35s over the next 25+ yrs)?

"...So long as that attrition is kept to reasonable levels, in good shape. If not, it's much more likely that you have a tactics and strategy issue rather than a platform issue."

And arguably, a strategy to limit near-future Air dominance at '120' MC F-22 to counter current and near-future capabilities could absolutely lead to historically normal set of scenarios affecting attrition reality and thus become an 'issue' too?

"All evidence suggests considerable dominance over the People's Republic of China and the Russians."

While I am inclined to not evoke actual govts (and unnecessarily provoke the issue), that above argument being articulated by the Office today just comes back to the circular rationale that "there's no indication of a future intent for confrontation, so therefor there's no reason to account for possible or real future technological capabilities which could challenge US's changing interests". Am I totally off base on that interpretation?

"Moreover, no evidence suggest imminent hostilities. That gives us a buffer to refocus..."

Viola - I'm sorry, but when a complex modern Air dominance fighter takes 30 months from order to delivery, not to mention the hypothetical 'line restart time and experienced engineering disruptively bribed back away from JSF and other programs', it's just incredibly inconsistent and irrational to simply wait for positively imminent hostility before a refocus on the present 'buffer' refocus can start!

"As has been demonstrated recently, systems like the literal combat ship which actually applicable to conflicts that are going on today and likely tomorrow."

DA, the inconsistency and contradiction is killing me!! (lol, not trying to be disrespectful, just clearly in disagreement) But how can one with a straight face simply go on about budget contraints and need to remain diversified and flexible for the forseeable future known threats - as confidently claimed by Office - then in the next breath maintain rigid, Long-Term, massive-cost commitments (especially referring to golden duo of LCS/JSF)? I don't follow that line!

Look, I have been publicly assertive on imperative, strategic UAV shift of battlefield doctrine since 2001 when it should have been clear as a first priority by Congress/DoD/USAF/Army - agreed. But, how exactly is it that guesstimated $150 million block 5 F-35s and more immediate $140m block 3 F-35s are the known essential future counter-insurgency platform for the next 30 years as being marketed up the gazoo.. and how exactly would 55 Littoral Combat Ships be able to counter insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan today (as being a primary marketing point for the doctrine-changing, must have, cost-is-no-issue platform)?!? And I do hope to heck USN/DoD is not going to soon justify the transformed, notional LCS refocus against pirates in row boats! (This being said, I actually support SedDef's JHSV plan, just to agree on something).

No offense in any of the above emphasis, DA, sincerely and I thank you for your service.

I think I’ll sit this one out but a couple things:

Last week Gen. Schwartz confirmed that the military requirement still stands at 243 jets (essentially two full wings of F-22s).

More F-22s gives provides for a more robust and sustainable force, attrition reserve and in the China scenario, it is the catalyst for offensive operations which is the only way you’re going to successfully defend Taiwan (probably true for many of the other scenarios as well). 243 jets ups the combat coded inventory by almost two squadrons which may not have a decisive impact for DCA mission sets in some PACAF scenarios but will have a rather significant impact in allowing offensive operations such as envisioned as part of the USAF’s Global Strike CONOPS. The USAF clearly wants the F-22 for offensive air to ground operations as is demonstrated in the currently planned upgrade paths.

Gates has not been able to articulate a reasonable military rationale for capping F-22 production. All internal DoD and USAF studies concluded that the minimum requirement was ~250 jets and even England’s own “Mother of all studies” concluded 260 was the requirement. Schwartz’s comments as mentioned above confirm that this is not a military driven decision. Much more frustratingly Gates has been woefully inconsistent with the current acquisition roadmap as we’re planning on buying systems that are designed for a high intensity war with a near peer threat as is the F-22. It should be noted that these are for the other services and basically all of the USAF’s key acquisition priorities were essentially killed (NGB being the worst IMO). I do like sending FCS back to the drawing board and restarting KC-X ASAP however.

I disagree that the US will retain decisive overmatch in TacAir in the PacRim AO in the next 10 years. China has the advantage in not only raw numbers but also basing options (~30 within 500nm from the Taiwan Strait) which translates to a conservative 3:1 sortie generation rate to as high as almost 10:1 if access to basing in Japan and Korea are denied or the airbases suppressed. The addition of CBGs can improve the situation but even if we were lucky to get 4 into the AO they can only reduce the margin to perhaps 2:1 at best.

Right now and for the near future that isn’t bad as most of the PLAAF fighter force is junk but they have about ~370 4th Gen fighters right now with two active production lines (one in high rate) and a upgrade program for their older Su-27UKs. Given their known requirements for the J-11B and J-10 programs the total 4th gen inventory alone could increase to ~ 600+ in 5 years. Their air defense systems are even more robust; they have right now ~ 50 batteries (200 launchers) of SA-10/20 and HQ-9 with an active domestic production line for the latter. They also have active domestic R&D programs for their air defense systems with new systems on the horizon so any required offensive operations will tax the currently projected force structure in terms of material and personnel.

BDF

BDF wrote:

I think I’ll sit this one out but a couple things:

Last week Gen. Schwartz confirmed that the military requirement still stands at 243 jets (essentially two full wings of F-22s).
BDF

Sorry in advance, this will be brief. The Grand Prix starts soon and this is the first free Sunday I've had in a loooooong time... Wink

BDF,

He did say that. But in the context of that number representing "Moderate Risk". Thats opposed to the 300+ number representing "Low Risk". He also said that 187 is the final number in light of other needs which are more important.

HEre is the quote...

Speaking at a National Aeronautic Association luncheon in Washington, D.C., Schwartz acknowledged that 243 Raptors would have been a “moderate-risk” inventory, while 381 F-22s, the long-standing requirement prior to this year, was a low-risk number. (Schwartz and Air Force Secretary Michael Donley articulated these points in an April 13 op-ed in the Washington Post.) During his talk, Schwartz elaborated on the decision to cap production at 187, saying that “nothing is free,” and that more F-22s would mean less of something else. “Our conclusion was and remains—Mike Donley and I—that more F-22s are unaffordable in the context of other things we must do,” said Schwartz (his emphasis). He declined to say whether the number 187 represents a “high-risk” fleet of F-22s, though, and when pressed, said “I gave you my answer.”

...So clearly, 187 represents the minimum number that we are able to live with and still do the things asked on the USAF. Choices. MOre later...

-DA

DarthAmerica wrote:

In summary, what you're saying, is that if all the world's worst possible scenarios happened at the same time, the United States Air Force would be screwed. What you're not saying, and what I have yet to read anyone else saying is a plausible scenario that emphatically demonstrates that 187 is not enough. Basically you trying to engineer a perfect system that completely mitigates any risk. That's not possible when you're working with limited resources. 60 or even 100 additional airframes does not change your scenario. What if they just skip conventional weapons altogether and go straight to nuclear weapons? Do you see where I'm going with this?

The Department of Defense has to prioritize limited resources based on assessments of the likelihood of a conflict and the capabilities of the parties involved. I would like nothing more than to wake up and read that the Air Force is going to procure 1000 F-22's. But given monetary concerns and the fact that we're fighting wars I know that that's not realistic or even smart. Our ability to project force and win wars does not rest on a single platform. If it did a wise opponent would simply ask his engineers to develop a countermeasure. Once that countermeasures developed, you're SOL. So it is an invalid premise that the United States Air Force ability to conduct a mission rests solely on the F-22.

The United States Air Force and allies possessed overlapping redundant capabilities that are designed to endure attrition. So long as that attrition is kept to reasonable levels, in good shape. If not, it's much more likely that you have a tactics and strategy issue rather than a platform issue.

All evidence suggests considerable dominance over the People's Republic of China and the Russians. Moreover, no evidence suggest imminent hostilities. That gives us a buffer to refocus our efforts on platforms and systems in much higher demand. Things like helicopters, airlift strategic and inter-theater, funding to revitalize the United States Army and Marines who have been stretched thin. As has been demonstrated recently, systems like the literal combat ship which actually applicable to conflicts that are going on today and likely tomorrow. I could go on and on but I think you get the point. This is just like the Army's future combat systems, its high tech, it's great but the requirements have changed. It's good that the secretary of defense recognizes that. We're going to be in good shape.

-DA

Aside from the force structure question, how many airframe hours are these 187 Raptors going to accumulate? Even if you don't need the airframe #s to deal with contingencies, it'd sure be nice to keep the average number of hours per airframe low(as well as to keep a higher availability rate).

Forum: F-22A Raptor

F-22 vs. Congress