The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will “redefine the concept of multirole strike” aircraft, Lockheed Martin officials say, but they offer few details to flesh out that claim.

Still, while the future concept of operations, electronic attack (EA) capability and derivative options remain undefined, at least publicly, some capabilities can be picked out of their purposely vague descriptions.

Starting from the notion that new hardware is the least likely addition to the aircraft and that it has an open architecture for avionics, look for the big multirole capability additions to involve electronic attack.

Because of the ability to penetrate while using low-probability-of-intercept radar and passive sensors, the JSF will not operate in proximity to current, so-called fourth-generation aircraft. It will instead roam well-defended enemy airspace while feeding precision targeting data to nonstealthy aircraft with standoff-range weapons.

Tailored for EA

The F-35 aircraft is being designed to deliver electronic attack (jamming, spoofing and pulses of energy) with the same ease that it can deliver explosive weapons. Moreover, Lockheed officials say the F-35 – first of all a combat aircraft – will have full 360-degree awareness of what is going on around it.

That presents an interesting dilemma for EA versus kinetic weaponry. The new AIM-9X air-to-air missile can perform high off-boresight shots without turning the aircraft’s nose toward the target. However, delivering electronic effects require specialized antennae pointed toward the target. As far as is known, JSF has only its advanced active, electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar antenna in the nose to pump out its electronic firepower. It would then have the weakness of any AESA array in that it is flat with a field of view of less than 180 degrees, perhaps an effective field of regard for effective attack of 60-90 degrees.

Some radar specialists and Air Force planners already say they anticipate flying the F-35s in line, with the first aircraft being passive and the second emitting and passing target information to the first so that it can remain undetected. Therefore, it appears that without an add-on antenna, the JSF’s EA capability will be limited to the forward quarter.

However, within that field the electronic effects generator can be routed through the AESA radar, which allows the F-35 to invade, blind or fool enemy sensors and radars at ranges of up to hundreds of miles.

Sensors

Lockheed officials do admit that the F-35’s sensor capabilities include advanced electronic surveillance allowing development of an instantaneous electronic order of battle – what’s emitting and from where.

Along with EA, the JSF will take on the mission of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. So instead of depending on a few specialized high-demand aircraft like Rivet Joint (for signals intelligence), Cobra Ball (measurement and signature intelligence) or Compass Call (EA) that can’t venture into enemy airspace, a fleet of F-35s will be able to conduct those missions deep into enemy territory to take advantage of physics (by being nearer the targets) while deepening the areas of surveillance.

They won’t say if information warfare is part of the package. Info warfare is generally the bailiwick of Commando Solo and Compass Call (including network penetration and attack), but with software upgrades radar specialists expect the capability to appear soon.

LMAggie, since I know you're an engineer with LM I recognize you can't be specific but, are you at liberty to say whether this article is more or less accurate or more or less BS? AMIguy, seems like LMAggie credited the article with "good insight" (which I suppose answers my question, unless LMAggie was referring to what I wrote). You, however, state that AvWeek has "missed the boat" and that the article is full of "incorrect statements and misconceptions." Are you involved with the F-35 program in any way, or is that just your informed/uninformed take on it from an observer's point of view? If you're "in the know" then I won't argue with you. However, if that's just your opinion, then maybe there is some room for discussion here. From my very ignorant perspective (that is, not being in a "need to know" basis with the program), there is nothing in this article that seems outrageously fantastical and/or inaccurate. Speculative, yes, but then again, that's what most of us do on these boards, speculate away...

It would have been healthy to have that debate earlier in the JSF program and it would have been good to debate the programs you mentioned. The SR, for all its excellence, had a catastrophic safety record - finally improved at the cost of very cumbersome operations - and while the F-111 finally matured into a useful airplane for the USAF and RAAF, the joint-service aspect of the project was a near-complete waste of money.

It was clear, early in the JSF process, that the Pentagon should look at "Airbus-type" commonality - that is, similar engine cores, LO systems, production techniques, cockpits and avionics in mission-tailored airframes. (Which is basically where we are ending up, but at a horrible cost.) But nobody would dare to look at that option, because (as we can see here) politically oriented people insisted on a common airframe.

...but at a horrible cost...

You are implying that somehow the program has already essentially failed. While I concede that it has yet to prove itself, the reverse is also true: its detractors have yet to prove that the program will fail at meeting its stated goals. And I'm not at all certain that this program will, in fact, fail...

That includes expecting 2,500 US (and 4,000 world wide) purchased units and being air-superior to 2040, etc.

Many variables will factor in the program's year to year reality, other than marketing and the F-35 faith.

It's not faith, it's hard data. The F-35 is replacing many different types of platforms in multiple airforces. Why It has no direct equivalent or even near competitor. Why would it not sell in those numbers?